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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGAM-P (M) (21 Aug 68) FOR OT UT 682332

5 Sep 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH B. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-CG

7 May 1968

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(RCS-CSFOR-65) (RI) (U).

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Section I
Significant Organization and Unit Activities

A. Command.

1. (U)

COMMAND

Brigadier General Charles W. Ryder, Jr., Assistant Division Commander, was reassigned to US Army, Pacific. General Ryder departed on 9 March 1968. Colonel (P) James V. Galloway assumed the duties of Assistant Division Commander and joined the Americal Division on 15 March 1968.

CHIEF OF STAFF

Colonel Robert H. Musser was reassigned to Department of the Army and departed on 6 February 1968.

Colonel Nels A. Parson, Jr. assumed the duties of Chief of Staff on 5 February 1968.

2. The following distinguished persons visited the Americal Division during the reporting period.

a. Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, 19 April 1968.

b. Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, General Dwight E. Beach, 28 February 1968.

c. General William C. Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, visited the Division several times for operational guidance and orders.

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B. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline.

1. Personnel (U)

a. (U) Enlisted Records.

1. A complete screening was made of DA Form 41 (Record of Emergency Data). As a result of this screening, it was determined that approximately 4000 forms required review by individuals and/or updating. Immediate action was taken accordingly and review and updating of DA Form 41 is being accomplished.

2. The Enlisted Records Branch experienced a heavy workload during this period due to a large turnover of personnel. 3,621 individuals were in processed; 1,382 individuals were out processed; records of 938 medical evacuees were out processed; records of 332 KHA were out processed; and 4,211 individuals were serviced.

b. (U) New Officer Efficiency Report. On 1 April 1968, a new Officer Efficiency Report (DA Form 67-6) became effective. To provide for the smooth transition to the new report, during March 1968, classes were given to officers assigned to this headquarters and to all S1's and Personnel Staff NCO's assigned to subordinate commands. Additionally, the Chief of the Officers Records Branch visited several subordinate units and gave classes to assigned officers. A revised officers efficiency reporting regulation was also published to implement the new DA regulation.

c. (U) Awards and Decorations. The Awards and Decoration Branch, Adjutant General Section, continued to experience a heavy workload. During the period 1 February through 30 April 1968, a total of 3,783 individual awards were processed and 1,916 General Orders were published. Procedures were implemented to provide for a more expeditious processing of awards to include posthumous awards.

d. (U) Administrative Machine Branch. During this period, the ADP equipment was still not received by this headquarters. Consequently, the preparation and processing of all data was accomplished manually. The lack of ADP equipment hampered the Personnel Services Division, Adjutant General Section, in providing timely and accurate statistics and reports. However, pending the receipt of the equipment, personnel assigned to the Administrative Machine Branch were given training by attending various USARV sponsored courses. Additionally, plans were formulated for reception and use of the equipment.

e. (U) Senior Enlisted Promotions. During this period, policies and procedures were formulated and a comprehensive regulation published on promotions. During the latter period of March and early April, a Division E8 and E9 Promotion Board was convened to establish and integrate E8 and E9 Standing Promotion Lists. It was necessary to establish an initial standing

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list because of the Division being recently activated and a previous standing list not having been published. Additionally, E7 Promotion Boards of subordinate commands were convened to establish E7 Promotion Standing Lists. The establishment of promotion standing lists together with the receipt of promotion allocations for senior enlisted promotions, contributed greatly to the maintenance of morale.

f. (U) Infusion. During this period, the 4th Bn, 21st Inf and 5th Bn, 46th Inf arrived in country and were assigned to this Division. The arrival of these units resulted in an increase in the number of units and personnel required to be infused to reduce rotational humps. Although approximately 50 officers and 650 EM were infused during the period, this was insufficient to adequately reduce rotational humps and to bring all units within the established ceilings of 15 and 25 percent. Infusion was hampered by tactical operations, transportation difficulties for external infusion, and a lack of understanding on the part of units being infused. The importance and necessity for infusion requires increased emphasis of all concerned to make the program a success. Necessary action has been initiated to accomplish this goal and to enforce infusion with vigor and dispatch. The maximum extent possible infusion will be accomplished within the Division. Where this is not possible, external infusion will be utilized.

g. (U) Casualty Reporting. On a whole, this headquarters and subordinate commands did a commendable job in reporting casualties under the difficult conditions which often prevailed during the preparation of these reports. However a few late reports were encountered and a few reports were submitted with inaccurate data. As a result of these reports, command emphasis was placed on casualty reporting at all levels of command to provide for the timely and accurate submission of casualty reports. Additionally, emphasis was placed on giving detailed information to next of kin concerning the circumstance involving deaths of personnel. Letters of sympathy were revised accordingly. The detailed information provided in these letters probably contributed greatly towards answering questions of next of kin and eliminating the requirement for them to request additional information concerning circumstances surrounding the death.

2. (U) Replacement Operations.

a. The quarterly period, 1 Feb 68 to 30 Apr 68, has seen the Replacement Detachment progress into a fully functional, yet ever-expanding organization.

This transition was made possible by implementing procedures which allowed more efficient and standardized processing of replacements. The result was that more time and manpower could be devoted to improving the physical appearance of the Replacement Detachment.

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b. The month of February was spent repairing the damage caused by the mortar attack of 30 Jan 68. From these repairs came ideas for further improvements. A new mess hall was opened on 10 Mar 68. It includes separate lining areas for officers, cadre and replacements, and is decorated with flags of each of the fifty states. The Division Central Issue Facility was opened, allowing faster outfitting of replacements. Troop billets were improved with new screen, rafters and doors, and protective bunkers were installed between these billets. A much needed new water point was opened, making an adequate supply of water available at all times. The existing road into the Replacement Detachment area was graded and hardened, and a new road was constructed leading out of the back of the area to the airport. Six bleacher sites were built to alleviate the problem of hot, over-crowded classrooms. These bleachers are equipped with metal roofs to provide shade. The motor pool and R & U sections were relocated to a more suitable area. A Division Museum, a new theatre, a mobile PX and barbershop, and a swimming area were added to benefit the replacements. Signs, with Americal Division crests, were installed around the area to indicate each individual section and/or function. To beautify the area, vegetation was planted in appropriate spots.

c. during the period 1 Feb 68 to Apr 68, the Replacement Detachment received some 3,700 regular replacements. Added to this are some 6,500 packet personnel to include the 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry; 5th Battalion 46th Infantry; "G" Btry, 55th Artillery; 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division; and a new company for each of the battalions in the 196th and 198th Brigades. All of these personnel have been processed, trained and shipped to their duty stations. This total of over 10,000 men represents more than a 100% increase over the previous quarter. At the same time, the training program was increased to include special schools for unit armorers, leadership (E-4 & E-5), reconnaissance, Officers and Senior NCO's seminar, and reconno missions. Finally the replacement supply section has taken over the responsibility of requisitions, personnel clothing records and accountability for all permanent party of the Americal Combat Center.

3. (U) Administrative Services.

a. AG Newsletter. On 1 April the first Americal Division AG Newsletter was published to bring together in a concise form current administrative and personnel policies and procedures for dissemination to division personnel. All branches of the AG Section submitted newsletter items which they felt would assist the individual soldier and commanders keep abreast of the ever changing Adjutant General areas of operation. Subsequent newsletters will be published on a monthly basis, with distribution being made down to the company level in order to provide the widest possible dissemination.

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b. Reproduction [sic]. During the last reporting period, two Multilith "1250" presses, one Meteorite camera and one Bruning "2100" copier were requisitioned through normal supply channels. Throughout the current period, constant effort was placed on determining the status of this equipment since the estimated delivery date has passed without receipt of the equipment. One AB Dick, Model 350, Multilith Machine was reconstructed from salvage to try to obtain a small Multilith capability pending receipt of the overdue equipment.

c. Publications and Blank Forms. Normally, publications have been requisitioned and received within allowable intervals, with two major exceptions. One is DA Form 2139 (Military Pay Voucher) which had been repeatedly requisitioned from PPC, Japan and not received in sufficient quantities to sustain the division for more than one month at a time. The supply is USARV Form 173A (Join Messageform) which has been in short supply since December 1967. Also, on numerous occasions quantities requested of USARV, DA, and DD Forms have been arbitrarily reduced when filled, being termed excessive.

d. Distribution. Distribution of official correspondence and the Stars & Stripes newspaper for this reporting period had become more efficient with the establishment of a division wide courier system. The Division Signal Office has assumed all responsibilities for courier service to units outside of the division headquarters area, this expediting distribution to all units of the division on a fixed schedule basis.

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4. (U) Postal Operations:

a. Inactivation of APO 96256. On 28 February 1968 the APO 96256 was inactivated and it became a Mailing Address ONLY (MAC).

b. Electronic Inspection of Parcels. On 1 April 1968 two mine detectors were made available for use at the main APO in an effort to detect prohibited items in fourth class parcels.

5. (U) Reenlistment:

a. Reenlistment involves the activities required to retain the maximum number of qualified competent enlisted personnel in the Regular Army.

b. In order to achieve this objective, the enlisted personnel have to be counseled and advised by motivated, knowledgeable personnel who can assist in planning the enlisted men's career. The Reenlistment Division must provide qualified personnel to aid the commander in initiating and implementing his Reenlistment Program. All documents concerning separation, Reenlistment and extension of enlistments are prepared and processed by the Reenlistment Division.

6. (U) Special Services:

A study was made to determine what facilities were available for recreational use by personnel of the Americal Division. Additional facilities [sic] were approved which would provide for:

a. Post Library facility which would support bookmobile service and books-by-mail to the individual soldier.

b. Twenty-five field collection libraries. Six are presently in use and five more have already been requested.

c. Two complete multiple crafts shops and ten smaller crafts shops located throughout the division area.

d. Two Service Clubs. One Service Club will become operational as soon as modifications of buildings have been accomplished. Modification of the building to house the second Service Club is expected to begin in early FY 69. It would become operational upon arrival of staff members after the necessary modifications are accomplished.

e. Organization of an Inter-Service Softball League in the Chu Lai Base area.

f. Construction and/or erection of basketball courts (outdoors), badminton courts, volleyball courts, miniature golf course and driving ranges are planned for future use.

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g. Water sports and recreation which will consist of beaches , water skiing, boating, fishing and skin diving. Two beaches were opened in the Chu Lai area in late March. Boats with motors have been requisitioned and are expected to be available for use by late June or early July.

h. Development of soldier shows within the Division. Contests will be held to select the best group which would represent this Division in other areas of Vietnam. These groups would provide entertainment to units on isolated Fire Support Bases within the Division, and supplement USO and Special Services Shows.

i. Motion picture services for Southern [sic] Sector, I Corps Tactical Zone. This service will provide films to approximately 130 film account holders.

7. (U) Finance:

a. The period from 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968 continued the expansion of all phases of finance administration and operations. Though the internal workload factor increased considerably beyond the staffing capability of the Division Finance Office the employment of stringent time-frames, methods, and overtime hours off-set the impact of insufficient staffing.

b. The period was marked by the assumption of complete finance administration, individual record maintenance, and operations for the 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry; 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery; 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery; Battery G, 55th Artillery,; six additional infantry companies, and several small units.

c. The Division Finance Office, organized under MTOE 12-3??, continues in the authorized strength of 4 commissioned officers, 3 warrant officers and 90 enlisted men. This authorization represents a servicing capability to 16,000 troops. During the period of this report, the capability was exceeded by 7,000 troops; the Division Finance Office currently providing service to 23,000 troops.

d. Selected workload statistics for the period:

	<u>February 1968</u>	<u>March 1968</u>	<u>April 1968</u>
Payrolls Prepared	219	276	304
Regular Monthly Vouchers	20,669	21,815	23,024
PCS Travel Vouchers	2,003	1,661	1,879
TDY Travel Vouchers	179	240	163
Counter Payments	6,232	5,104	7,616
Allotments Processed	2,689	2,760	3,607

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8. (U) Provost Marshal Activities:

a. Raids and checkpoints. a. 39 raids and 13 checkpoints were conducted during this reporting period in villages and hamlets within the Chu Lai area of Americal Division TAOI.

Significant items confiscated on raids and checkpoints:

(1) MPC	\$647.95
(2) American cigarettes	39 cartons
(3) American beer	32 cases
(4) Marijuana	1235 sticks

b. PW Activities. Five PW collecting points were operated during the reporting period. On 1 Mar 68 a PW collecting point (Forward) was established at the base camp of the 1/1st AC. This forward collecting point has processed 178 detainees during the reporting period. Results of the five collecting points detainee processing is as follows:

a. Total detainees processed	2713
b. PW	(180)?
c. CD	(322)
d. IC	(2201)
e. CH	(15)

c. Military Police Convoy Escorts. The Division Military Police convoy activities for the reporting period were as follows (does not include the 11th MP escorts between Quang Ngai and Sa Huynh).

a. Number of vehicles escorted -	4,283?
b. Number of miles traveled -	33,669

d. Weapons Registration Program: The Division Provost Marshal Section has established a privately owned weapons registration program and [sid] has directed that brigade Provost Marshals establish registration files at brigade level. A command letter dated 24 Apr 68, was forwarded to commanders specifying actions to be taken to insure control of privately owned fire-arms. This office has registered 21 privately owned firearms during the period 14 Apr 68 to 30 Apr 68.

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19. (U) Chaplain: Due to combat commitments and shortages of helicopters it has been difficult and sometimes impossible for the Division Chaplain or his deputy to visit unit chaplains. Command Control and supply ships were sometimes available but their schedule is often irregular, especially on return trips from their designated units. So visits were often a hit and miss proposition. The Chief of Staff has made available the use of his ship for regular staff visits thus making available more regular trips by the staff to all units.

10. (U) Staff Judge Advocate:

a. The Staff Judge Advocate section continued to furnish legal services to the Commanding General, his staff, and subordinate units. Visits were continued to subordinate units. Advice and assistance were given to Article 32 investigating officers, counsel of special courts-martial, presidents of special courts, and summary courts.

b. During the period, the section experienced a change of SJA's in April, the loss of one captain in February and the gain of a warrant officer in April. The warrant officer now occupies the position of legal administrative technician, which has been vacant since Task Force Oregon was organized. This office is now staffed with 1 LTC, 1 MAJ, 4 CPT, 1WO, and 7 EM.

c. Military justice/Military affairs matters still comprises the largest area of activity. During the quarter February 1968 - April 1968 this command tried 3 general courts-martial and received 25 special and 5 summary courts-martial cases for supervisory review. In addition 700 Article 15's were received for administrative corrections, logging and forwarding for file. Defense counsel also were furnished for several Article 32 investigations and counsel was furnished for one SPCM. The majority of Military Affairs problems received were reports of survey, line of duty investigations and congressional inquiries. The rates for general, special, and summary courts-martial during the period were 0.04, 1.05, and 0.32 respectively. The rates reflect the average number [sic] of cases per month per thousand troop strength.

d. Internal reorganization has resulted in the creation of a Soldier's Advocate Division, combining the former functions of the Legal Assistance Division and the defense portion of the Military Justice Division. During the quarter, 1,799 cases were processed, including but not limited to income tax, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills and powers of attorney, and counseling and advice on disciplinary actions and administrative proceedings.

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e. The section continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Convention, with emphasis on War Crimes and Treatment of Detainees, to each group of replacements as they process through the Americal Combat Center.

f. During the period 103 claims were approved for payment for loss or damage to property of servicemen, 89 of which arose out of rocket and mortar attacks on Chu Lai.

11. (C) Personnel Status 123rd Aviation Battalion:

a. Throughout the quarter, "A" Company enlisted and officer service and support personnel were gradually attached to various sections of the battalion. This change reduced "A" Company to three complete airlift platoons and necessary company headquarters personnel. The company strength averaged approximately 75 per cent of authorized officers and warrant officers.

b. The Aero Scout Company was activated 1 February. Unit strength on 31 January was one officer and eighteen (18) enlisted men. During the month of February the total strength grew to twenty-two (22) officers and 112 enlisted men. Strength at the end of the reporting period was twenty-five (25) officers and warrant officers, and 126 enlisted men.

c. The following is a listing of the consolidated battalion strength on 30 April.

<u>AUTHORIZED/MTOE</u>			<u>AUTHORIZED/AMCL GO</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>		
OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
39	59	350	41	59	390	32	43	303

12. (U) Post Exchange

The overall sales for both the retail sales and concession sales have shown a steady upward trend. The increased sales can be attributed to the opening of the concession arcade, the increase in the amount of merchandise coming to the Chu Lai area, and the opening of the two Imprest Fund Post Exchanges, one by the 11th Infantry Brigade and the other by the 2d Surgical Hospital.

13. (U) Education Center.

The Americal Education Center continues to provide expanding General Education Development services to the Americal Division as well as Air Force, Navy, and Marine personnel in the Chu Lai area. USAFI High School Tests, General Examination-College Level, Achievement Tests, and numerous USAFI Standard Achievement and End of Course Tests are now permanently stocked so that much of the delay in ordering tests has now been eliminated. There were 31 enrollments in the University of Maryland during Term 4. Anthropology I and English I will be offered during Term 5, 3 June to 27 July. Spoken Vietnamese evening classes are being conducted again with CPT Ty as the instructor.

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14. (U) Officer, NCO Clubs, and EM Clubs.

On 1 April 1968, the Americal Division Club system began a program to consolidate all sundry fund Officer, NCO, and EM Clubs currently operating under the provisions of AR 230-5 to open messes under the provisions of AR 230-60. The purpose of this conversion is to consolidate at division level financial and managerial responsibility of all clubs of the Americal Division and Army units stationed within the Chu Lai area, under the supervision of ACoFS, G1. The consolidation will require all officers' clubs to be consolidated under one account, NCO and EM clubs will be consolidated under another account. A custodian staff will be appointed from division resources to manage each account under the direction of an elected board of governors. It is intended that clubs which serve the same local geographical area will consolidate resources to provide more efficient service to the command. Conversion of clubs to provision contained in AR 230-60 will relieve unit commanders of the responsibility for financial management.

15. (U) Daily Hire Local Nationals

a. Americal units employed approximately 875 daily hire local nationals during the past quarter. Only one significant change occurred. As requested by Headquarters, USARV, units were given the option of paying the local nationals utilized to fill sandbags, according to the number of sandbags filled in lieu of daily wages. It was felt this method would serve as an incentive, thereby increasing the workers' output. Few Americal units adopted this method. Within the Chu Lai area, local nationals felt if adopted, their daily wages would decrease.

b. Presently, Americal Division is authorized 117 direct hire spaces; the division has 155 workers on board. Authorized spaces do not meet division needs. Americal Division forwarded requests to USARV for 301 spaces last quarter. Requests were appraised and subsequently the division was authorized 117 spaces.

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C. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

1. (C) Quang Tin and Quang Nam

a. Activity in Quang Tin - Quang Nam Provinces resulted from Operations Wheeler/Wallowa and Burlington Trail, enemy attempts to sustain his General Offensive with ground attacks and attacks by fire on friendly positions, and enemy interdiction of LOCs with mine, booby trap and sabotage tactics. There was a total of 87 such incidents along Highway #1 during the period 1 Feb 68 to 30 Apr 68 (43 in Feb 12 mines and 31 sabotage, 23 in Mar 18 mines and 5 sabotage, 21 in Apr 12 mines and 9 sabotage).

b. Following the initiation of the "Tet" Offensive by enemy forces on 31 Jan 68, during which enemy forces sustained a total of 797 EN KIA, 76 PWs, 14 C/S and 194 Ind weapons captured, Americal and ARVN Forces reacted swiftly and aggressively to counter the offensive and deny the enemy any gains militarily or politically.

c. On 5 Feb 68, probable elements of the 409th MF Sapper Bn fired 14 122mm rockets into the Americal Division Hqs area resulting in minor damage. During the first week in Feb 68, intelligence indicated a shift by the 2nd NVA Div northward into the DaNang/Hoi An TAOR. On 7 and 14 Feb 68, The Chu Lai Airbase received 6 and 12 rds respectively, of 122mm rockets resulting in negative damage.

d. On 8 Feb 68, the 1-6 Inf Bn (198th LIB) and the 2-1 Inf Bn (196th LIB) were formed into "Task Force Miracle" and deployed to assist the 1st Marine Division in the defense of DaNang. The task force was airlifted within 2-3 KMs of DaNang (BT0067 - BT 0270) and immediately came in heavy contact with the 1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Div and the 31st NVA Regt, 341st NVA Div. Moderate to heavy contact continued through 11 Feb 68 resulting in 308 EN KIA by Americal forces, 411 EN KIA by 1st Mar Div Forces, 31 C/S and 63 Ind weapons captured.

e. On 9 Feb 68, the 1-35 Inf and 1-14 Inf Bns (3/4th Inf Bde) moved into blocking positions south of Go Noi Island (AT 9954 - BT0454) and engaged the 21st NVA Regt and 2nd NVA Div Hqs and Supt units resulting in 236 NVA KIA, 14 C/S and 73 Ind weapons captured.

f. On 15 and 20 Feb 68, elements of the 196th LIB and PFs contacted the V-11 Co, 105th LF Bn vic BT 0631 resulting in 53 EN KIA and 12 weapons captured.

g. On 12 Feb 68, the 196th LIB initiated search and destroy operations in the Que Son, Base Area 116 and Antenna Valley areas to find, fix and destroy the traditional base areas of the 2nd NVA Div and to deny

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Div access to these areas. When the 196th LIB turned over operational control of this AO to the 198th LIB on 19 APR 68, these search and destroy operations had resulted in 262 NVA KIA, 417 VC KIA, 52 C/S and 413 Ind weapons captured, thousands of rounds of ammunition captured or destroyed, over 180,000 lbs of rice captured or destroyed and numerous battalion size or larger base camps destroyed. This aggressive action by the 196th LIB denied the 2nd NVA Div use of its traditional base areas for consolidation and resupply and forced him to move out of the lowlands and outside of the Americal Div AO into the mountainous regions of western Quang Nam Province by the end of March 1968.

h. Between 26 -28 FEB 68, elements of the 1/1st Cav and 2nd ARVN Div, reacting on intelligence indicating that enemy forces were consolidating to attack Tam Ky City, initiated an operation west of Tam Ky City near Pineapple Forest (BT2520) and contacted a number of LF/MF units conducting training and preparing for future actions. Results of the operation were 201 EN KIA, 16, C/S and 42 Ind weapons captured. Major units identified were the 72nd LF Bn, 70th MF Bn, V-13 LF Co and V-15 LF Co.

i. Reacting on intelligence indicating a possible attack on Thang Binh (D) Hqs, the 1/1st Cav and 196th LIB initiated an operation in central Quang Tin Province (BT 0930 - BT 1630) on 4 MAR 68 and contacted the 3rd NVA Regt, 2nd NVA Div. Moderate to heavy contact continued through 12 MAR 68 resulting in 436 NVA KIA and numerous weapons captured.

j. After a heavy mortar/rocket attack against almost every major friendly installation in the Americal area on 4 MAR 68, friendly elements found five (5) expended 70mm shell casings indicating the possible use of Howitzers by enemy forces in the area.

k. A PW captured on 9 MAR 68 reported that a new supply of rockets had been brought into the Dragon Valley area just northwest of the Chu Lai complex and would thus give the enemy the capability of continuing his attacks by fire against the complex.

l. Between 20 - 21 MAR 68, elements of the 1/1st Cav and 198th LIB reacting on intelligence gained from a Hoi Chanh, initiated an operation in the northeastern coastal region of Thang Binh (D) BT 1550 - BT 2250) contacting the 70th MF Bn and local force elements resulting in 263 EN KIA, 18 C/S and 22 Ind weapons captured. Reports had indicated enemy forces were in the area to prepare for an attack on Hoi An City.

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m. Between 29 - 30 MAR 68, elements of the 1/1st Cav conducted a recon by force operation in the Pineapple Forest area west of Tam Ky City (BT 2216) contacting several local force units resulting in 50 VC KIA and 7 weapons captured. Several detainees and PWs captured in this area during FEB and MAR 68 indicated that several new anti-armor units had been organized to operate in this area to destroy allied tanks and APCs. Main armaments of these units, which were to operate in squad/platoon size elements, are the RPG-2 (B-40) and RPG-7 (B-41) rocket launchers. Other reports indicated that the 70th MF Bn, 72nd LF Bn and 74th MF Bn (probable unit) were to combine to form a provincial regiment.

n. On 5 APR 68, enemy forces conducted attacks by fire on twelve major friendly installations and field positions within the Americal AO. A returnee who rallied to Ly Tin (D) Hqs on 8 APR 68 provided information indicating that the 409th MF Sapper Bn had been augmented with NVA personnel and six (6) 122mm rocket launchers and that the battalion had previously conducted attacks by fire on Chu Lai and Hill 54.

o. On 9 APR 68, Operation Burlington Trail was initiated by elements of the 1/1st Cav and 198th LIB to open Highway 533 from Tan Ky City to Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp. Since the operation started, enemy forces in the area have conducted almost nightly mortar attacks on friendly forward bases in the area.

p. On 9 APR 68, elements of the 1/1st Cav contacted the 72nd LF Bn vic BT 1918 resulting in 33 VC KIA, 1 C/S and 7 Ind weapons captured and 4 PWs captured. One of the PWs revealed that the RKG-3 and RKG-3M Soviet Anti-Tank HEAT hand grenade had been introduced into the area and that the 72nd LF Bn was undergoing training for future attacks. Special training was being conducted on movement through wet or swampy areas.

q. On 9 APR 68, elements of the 1-6 Inf (198th LIB) contacted an enemy force vic BT 2031 resulting in 12 VC KIA, 20 C/S and 6 Ind weapons captured and over 20,000 rds of ammunition captured or destroyed.

r. On 19 APR 68, friendly forces operating in Burlington Trail vic BT 2114 contacted elements of the Quang Tin Province Force resulting in 25 VC KIA and 5 weapons captured.

s. On 23 APR 68, the Chu Lai Airbase received 17 rds of 122mm rockets resulting in negative casualties and minor damage to equipment and buildings.

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t. During the reporting period visual reconnaissance revealed that the enemy was improving and constructing LOCs in western Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. Highway 165 in Laos had been extended through Base Area 608 to join with highway 14 in western Quang Tin Province and a new road had been constructed through Base Area 607 in Laos to join the A Shau Valley route with major LOCs in western Quang Nam Province.

u. Captured documents, prisoner interrogation and agent reports during the reporting period indicate that the enemy plans to continue his General Offensive until ultimate victory is obtained. The period 1 - 19 MAY 68 has been mentioned on numerous occasions as the time for his next major ground actions.

v. During the reporting period the Americal Division lost operation control of the 3rd Bde, 1st US Air Cav Div and the 3rd Inf Bde, 4th Inf Div. The 3rd Inf Bde, 4th Inf Div was one of the original units assigned to Task Force Oregon, which later became the Americal Division. From 19 APR 68 to 28 FEB 68 the brigade accounted for 545 NVA KIA, 3,103 VC KIA, 91 NVA PWs, 292 VC PWs, 65 C/S and 911 Ind weapons captured. The 3rd Bde, 1st US Air Cav Div joined the Americal Division and initiated Operation Wallowa on 4 OCT 67. This operation was later to be combined with Operation Wheeler being conducted by the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division. During the period of 4 OCT 67 to 26 JAN 68 the brigade accounted for 1,507 NVA KIA, 900 VC KIA, 28 NVA PWs, 61 VC PWs, 53 C/S and 259 weapons captured.

2. (C) Quang Ngai

a. Activity in Quang Ngai Province resulted from Operations Muscantine and Norfolk victory, enemy attempts to sustain his General Offensive through attacks on new life hamlets, refugee camps, district headquarters and harassment attacks by fire and enemy interdiction of LOCs with mine, boobytrap and sabotage tactics. There was a total of 47 such incidents along Highway 1 during the period 1 FEB 68 to 30 APR 68 (27 in FEB /4 mines and 10 sabotage/, 14 in MAR /4 mines and 10 sabotage/, 6 in APR /4 mines and 2 sabotage/).

b. Following the initiation [sic] of "Tet" Offensive by enemy forces on 31 JAN 68, during which enemy forces sustained a total of 642 EN KIA, 35 PWs, 42 C/S and 190 Ind weapons captured, Americal and ARVN Forces reacted swiftly and aggressively to counter the offensive and deny the enemy any gains militarily or politically.

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c. On 1 FEB 68, a PW from the C-219 LF Co of Duc Pho (D) led elements of the 3-1 Inf Bn (11th Inf Bde) to his unit's weapons cache vic BS7238 resulting in the capture of 4 C/S and 46 Ind weapons. A later captured document written by a cadre of the C-219 LF Co revealed that allied forces had raided one of his unit's base camps and captured the above-mentioned weapons. Also on this date, the 11th Inf Bde Base Camp, LZ Bronco (Bs 8138) received 25 rds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 12 helicopters damaged.

d. On 6 FEB 68, elements of the 2nd ARVN Div supported by Americal gunships contacted the 40th Co, 406th MF Sapper Bn southwest of Quang Ngai City resulting in 50 VC KIA, 3 PWs and 7 Ind weapons captured.

e. On 7 FEB 68, elements of the 2nd ARVN Div supported by Americal armor and gunships contacted the 83rd LF Bn vic BS 6370 resulting in 92 EN KIA (74 KBA), 1 C/S and 5 Ind weapons captured.

f. Reacting on intelligence indicating the 48th LF Bn had moved into one of its old base camps for rest and resupply, elements of the 11th Inf Bde initiated an operation of 12 FEB 68 vic BS 7280 resulting in 78 EN KIA.

g. On 19 FEB 68, the Ha Thanh Special Forces Camp vic BS 3970 received 4 rds of 140mm rockets marking the first use of rockets by enemy forces in Quang Ngai Province. Also on this date, elements of the 11th Inf Bde captured the XO of the 120 LF Sapper Co. The PW provided sufficient information to establish the unit in the confirmed Order of Battle Holdings.

h. On 23 FEB 68, elements of the 3-1 Inf Bde (11th Inf Bde) reacting on intelligence, initiated an operation south of the Batangan Cape (BS 7380) contacting the 48th LF Bn and 21st LF Sapper Co resulting in 71 EN KIA and 5 weapons captured.

i. A CICV readout of documents captured vic BS 6070 by elements of 2nd ARVN Div on 17 FEB revealed that the Quang Ngai Province Unit had established a new regimental size unit designated the 328th. The documents indicated the regiment consisted of the 81st and 83d LF Bns and several other force units.

j. On 28 FEB 68, elements of the C-19 LF Sapper Co conducted a mortar/ground attack on the Mo Duc (D) Hqs and jail resulting in moderate damage to the installation. There were 3 VC KIA and 3 Ind weapons captured during the attack.

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k. On 1 MAR 68, the enemy attempted to land a resupply trawler along the coast south of the 11th Inf Bde Base Camp (BS 8835). The trawler was brought under fire and exploded before it reached shore. A search of the area by elements of the 11th Bde produced 16 C/S and 751 Ind weapons (over 700 being new K-44s) and quantities of equipment and ammunition.

l. On 4 MAR 68, as enemy forces were conducting attacks by fire throughout the Americal AO, the Rural Development Hqs and Power Station near Quang Ngai City came under heavy mortar/rocket attack and a limited ground probe by the 506A LF Sapper Co. Counteraction by friendly forces resulted in 7 VC KIA.

m. An operation initiated by the 2nd ARVN Div on 12 MAR 68 in southwestern Nghia Hanh (D) vic BS 5663 contacted the 401st MF Regt resulting in 90 EN KIA. 3 C/S and 4 Ind weapons captured (including 2 Russian flamethrowers).

n. On 16 MAR 68, friendly forces in Operation Muscatine contacted local force elements south of the Batangan Cape (BS 7178 - BS 7197) resulting in 128 VC KIA and 3 weapons captured.

o. On 18 MAR 68, elements of the 3-1 Inf Bn (11th Inf Bde) contacted the C-19 LF Sapper Co vic BS 7657 resulting in 9 VC KIA and 11 Ind weapons captured. Later reports indicated the CO of the company had been killed during the engagement.

p. During MAR 68, the 2nd ARVN Div discovered a new enemy technique of launching satchel charges. With this technique the VC use a small kicker charge to launch the satchel charge. Test conducted by the 2nd ARVN Div revealed that the range of the satchel charge could be as great as 320 meters and would clear an obstacle 60 meters high. This new technique seems to be a field expediate [sic] method similar to that of launching of the "Explosive 320" by NVA forces in the DMZ area.

q. On 5 APR 68, the Tu Nghia (D) Hqs (BS 6768) received a heavy mortar/rocket launcher/small arms and a probing ground attack from elements of the 506A LF Sapper Co, 83rd LF Bn and the Tu Nghia (D) Force resulting in 16 VC KIA and 5 wpons captured.

r. On 9 APR 68, the 11 Inf Bde initiated Operation Norfolk Victory in western Tu Nghia and Nghia Hanh Districts and shifted forces operating in Operation Muscatine to assist in the operation. Purpose of the combined operations was to disrupt any enemy plans for consolidating for another major attack against Quang Ngai City and to destroy traditional

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base area of enemy units in the Area. On 10 APR 68, a VC Detainee led elements of the 11 Inf Bde to a weapons cache vic BS 5671 resulting in the capture of 11 Ind wpns and quantities of ammunition. Also on 10 APR 68, elements of the 4-3 Inf Bn (11 Inf Bde) discovered a provincial weapons/ammunition cache vic BS 5271 containing 2 C/S wpns, 121 Ind wpns (74 new K-44s), over 4,600 hand grenades, 2,250 lbs of explosives, over 400 rds of mortar and rocket launcher ammunition, 290 bangalore torpedoes, 7,000 lbs of rice and numerous quantities of equipment and small arms ammunition. On 12 APR 68, elements of the 11th Inf Bde found an enemy weapons cache vic BS 53266 containing 9 C/S and 48 Ind weapons. On 13 APR 68, elements of the 1-20 Inf Bn (11 Inf Bde) discovered an enemy weapons cache vic BS 5266 containing 3 C/S and 56 Ind weapons. On 15 APR elements of the 1-20 Inf Bn found an enemy signal cache vic BS 5266 containing 10 AN-PRC-10 radios and other signal equipment. On 19 APR 68, Operation Norfolk Victory ended having resulted in 45 VC KIA, 12 C/S and 120 Ind wpns captured, large quantities of ammunition and supplies captured or destroyed and numerous battalion size or larger base camps destroyed.

s. On 10 APR 68, local guerrilla units attacked the new life hamlet vic BS 5834 (Ba To District) destroying 57 houses in an attempt to disrupt the populace's faith in the GVN.

t. On 23 APR 68, friendly elements operation in Operation Muscatine located a large salt cache vic BS 7783. A search of the immediate area revealed another large salt cache resulting in the capture or destruction of over 140,000 lbs of salt. Other elements of the 11 Inf Bde operation in Duc Pho District found several large salt caches vic BS 9325 on 27 and 28 APR 68 resulting in the capture or destruction of over 181,000 lbs of salt.

u. On 23 APR 68, CAP 135 vic BS 7197 was attacked by the 95th LF Sapper Co supported by elements of the P-31 LF Co and 48th LF Bn. Reaction by the CAP unit and reinforcements from the Americal Division resulted in 11 VC KIA, 2 C/S and 6 Ind wpns captured. Examination of the KIA revealed that one was a VC Captain. Reports from the villagers in the area revealed that the VC had carried an additional 38 VC KIA away with them, one being a Bn CO.

v. On 26 APR 68, VC local forces entered the Refugee Camp vic BS 8040 and ordered the people to leave while they destroyed 16 homes belonging to GVN officials. The VC did not harm the people probably in an attempt to further discredit the effectiveness of the GVN in providing protection to the populace.

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w. Reports from prisoner interrogation, captured document translations and agent reports indicate the enemy plans to continue in his attempt to sustain an offensive posture in the area and to overthrow the GVN. Reports also indicate that added emphasis will be placed on new life hamlets, refugee camps and rural development centers to destroy the pacification efforts of the allies and to propagandize the local populace into a general uprising.

x. Significant items of intelligence revealed by the enemy's "TET" Offensive are as follows:

(1) NVA forces were used as replacements and reinforcements in LF units to improve their combat capabilities, and to make it appear that only LF/MF type units were involved in the attacks.

(2) LF units were equipped with the new family of weapons including the AK-47 and RPG-7 Rocket Launcher.

(3) LF units moved across district and provincial boundaries for the first time to participate in large scale attempts demonstrating a mild form of "Strategic" mobility.

(4) A large number of 14-19 year old youths had been inducted by VC forces and forced to fight.

(5) Introduction of the VZ-58 or M-58 Assault Rifle of Czech manufacture (Refinement over the AK-47). It has a less complicated construction without loss of accuracy or firepower.

3. (U) Military Intelligence Detachment: Significant events of the detachment for the period ending 30 April 1968.

a. In spite of many obstacles the provisional detachment has managed to provide outstanding intelligence and counterintelligence support to the Americal Division during the reporting period. Since 31 January 1968 the detachment has screened many Hoi Chanh and has successfully recruited 50 Kit Carson Scouts. These scouts have received initial processing and training from this unit prior to being assigned to the Combat elements of the Division.

b. Personnel strength of the unit has been adequate in comparison to that authorized by General Order 1746. However, it falls far short of that necessary to efficiently and adequately perform its assigned mission. This has been in part solved by the fact that General Order 1501 inactivated this Provisional Detachment on 5 April 1968. It is

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now planned to utilize the spaces and equipment of the Brigade MI Detachment and form one Provisional Detachment in the Americal Division. this will centralize the MI effort within the division.

c. The procurement of supplies and support given to the unit continues to be unsatisfactory. This is evidenced by the priority 5 assigned for replacement vehicles, the lack of maintenance support, the continuing lack of adequate hygiene facilities for the members of the unit in the IPW Cage Area, and the lack of support in providing water to the same area.

e. The number of promotions has been inadequate when considering the outstanding performance of personnel recommended. The Provisional Detachment obtains their promotions through Headquarters Company.

e. Order of Battle Section.

(1) During the reporting period, the OB Section continued to produce timely intelligence concerning the enemy situation in Southern I CTZ.

(2) Significant activities or projects completed by the Order of Battle Section during the period were as follows:

(a) Prepared weekly studies of mine, booby-trap and sabotage incidents throughout the Americal AO to aid in reducing the high percentage of casualties sustained by friendly forces due to such incidents.

(b) In conjunction with the II Section established a new Target Section consisting of 2 EM from the OB Section and 2 EM from the II Section. Mission of the section is to correlate all intelligence data collected from SLAR, IR, URI, APD, Agent Reports, Incidents, VR and Aerial Photography in order to provide accurate information for evaluation of CI agents and to pinpoint enemy units for friendly ground operations.

(c) Coordinated with the Americal Psychological Operations Section on several occasions to target specific enemy units for special psychological warfare operations.

(d) Reorganized the Order of Battle filing system as established by AR 345-210.

(e) Prepared four (4) area studies for the G-3 Plans section to be used in formulating contingency plans.

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(f) Prepared a study of new enemy LOC construction and presented a briefing on this study to the Division Commander, Major General Koster.

(g) Instituted a more detailed "Weekly Listing of Enemy Units" for the Americal INTSUM.

(h) Aided in preparation of G-2 briefings for General Westmoreland, General Abrams, General Johnson, General Palmer, LTG Dolman, MG Ryzin, General Beech and General Clarke (Retired). Also conducted informal briefings for newly arrived personnel, subordinate, adjacent and higher units who required knowledge of the enemy situation.

(i) Assisted in the preparation of all intelligence estimates prepared by the Division G-2 and prepared several intelligence bulletins to enhance the knowledge of friendly units on enemy units in the Americal area and their tactics.

(j) Conducted Liaison visits with USSF/CIDG camps, Advisory Groups, subordinate units and higher headquarters.

(k) Prepared a special estimate of post TET activities and movements of enemy units enabling friendly units to accurately predict withdrawal routes and locations of enemy units, thereby inflicting heavy personnel and equipment losses on these enemy units and reducing their capability to continue the "General Offensive" in the Americal AO.

(l) Provided the Radio Research Company of the Americal Division with Order of Battle information enabling them to isolate and identify several enemy units.

f. Imagery Interpretation Section.

During the reporting period the II Section continued to furnish the division II support through photo readouts and special II and related studies. Specific accomplishments were:

(1) 131 photo missions were received. Many of these were distributed to the brigades.

(2) 60 Supplementary Imagery Interpretation Reports were published.

(3) 20 Special studies were completed. These included studies of the Hoi An area, Chu Lai Rocket Belt, Tien Phuoc, Tam Ky Road and many mosaics.

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(4) Overlays of enemy defense and mosaics were made of all the Special Forces Camps in the Division Area.

(5) Liaison missions were made to all of the brigades and the 1/1 Cav. These were used to exchange intelligence information.

(6) Approximately 4 VR flights per week were made by II aerial observers. they reported approximately 200 significant sightings.

(7) The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Div was assisted when it passed through our area. Photography and maps were supplied through this section.

(8) During this period a new targeting section was established. This section utilizes personnel from the II and OB sections and is responsible for receiving, recording, plotting and analyzing all pertinent targeting information.

g. Interrogation Section.

(1) During the reporting period, the Interrogation Section interrogated and classified 676 detainees at the Chu Lai Collecting Point, 2d Surgical Hospital, 1st Marine Hospital, and 27th Surgical Hospital. A team has been assigned from Division Interrogation resources to operate the Division Cavalry Squadron's POW Cage, but the totals below do not reflect their results:

(a) NVA	45
(b) VC/PW	184
(c) Civil Defendants	70
(d) Returnee	21
(e) Regroupee	6
(f) Doubtful Case	0
(g) Innocent Civilian	350

(2) The large number of Innocent Civilians reflected above is a significant increase over previous reporting periods. This is due in part to the fact that the Division Interrogation Section is presently receiving, screening and interrogating all detainees from Operation Muscatine and 198th Brigade (rear). The remainder of the Innocent Civilians are mostly

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hospital cases from all units in the division. Previously, the 11th Brigade and the 198th Brigade were interrogating all hospital cases from their respective brigades, but this is now accomplished by the Division Interrogation Section.

(3) The Interrogation Section supported six US Navy Swift Boat Operations along the Southern I Corps coastal region. A total of over 150 persons were screened (not reflected in the above totals) for intelligence information, with twenty brought into the Division Collecting Point for detailed interrogation on VC activities in that area.

(4) The Interrogation Section assumed the responsibility of providing field interrogation support and processing of all detainees apprehended by the Division Cavalry Squadron. An Interrogator and interpreter team was permanently detailed to accomplish this mission. Additionally, two ARVN interrogators from the 8th ARVN MID are assigned for interrogation support. All interrogation support rendered has been extremely well received. Interrogators have provided invaluable assistance in the immediate exploitation of intelligence gathered through questioning of detainees, and document screening. Teams provided not only support for the POW Cage, but also went in with the squadron on several combat assaults. On several occasions, immediate exploitation of intelligence gained from field interrogations led to significant finds by ground troops.

(5) Eight interrogation teams were dispatched by Division Interrogation in support of Operations Wheeler/Wallowa and Muscatine during the reporting period. The teams were utilized in the interrogation of large numbers of detainees received and exploitation of information of an immediate tactical nature gained through interrogation at the Division POW Collecting Point.

(6) During the reporting period, the Division Interrogation Section screened, provided document summaries, and forwarded to the Combined Document Exploitation Center over 2,000 pounds of captured documents in support of division elements. A much-increased improvement was observed over the previous reporting period in the production of timely and accurate summaries of information derived from captured material. This improvement is due to increased interest and priority at all levels and quicker response by brigade elements in getting the documents to the Division Interrogation Section.

(7) Fifty weapons were registered as war trophies during the period, approximately 100 NVA uniforms, medical equipment, NVA web gear, insignia and related equipment, and assorted Russian chemical equipment was delivered, on several occasions, to II MAF Collection Branch in response

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to SICRs levied by higher headquarters.

(8) In response to G2 requirements for rapid information from captured prisoners and documents, the Division Interrogation Section initiated a program to contact all brigades and Division Cavalry Squadron at least twice daily for significant information relating to IPW. Additionally, greater liaison was initiated, not only with division elements, but also, with III MAF, and Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provincial Intelligence Centers and combined interrogation centers at the provincial headquarters. The program significantly increased the speed with which IPW information was being disseminated.

h. Counterintelligence Section.

(1) During the reporting period the CI section has been working in close cooperation with the Americal Provost Marshal and the Industrial Relations Office to decrease the security hazard presented by the approximately 3000 local national employees at Chu Lai Installation. To this end, Regulation 190-5, Identification and Control of personnel, has been revised and is presently being staffed prior to publication. It is felt that the revised 190-5 significantly increases the control of personnel on this base. An aggressive program of inspections and spot checks of activities employing local national workers has been initiated. These inspections are to insure compliance with Regulation 190-5. All local nationals apprehended on Chu Lai Installation without an installation pass, or outside the area authorized by their pass are held for interrogation and investigation by the CI Section. An increasing number of such personnel are being interrogated as a result of the inspection program.

(2) Eleven semi-annual CI Inspections, 16 pre-IG inspections, two courtesy inspections, 12 unannounced inspections and 41 defense against methods of entry assists have been conducted during the reporting period. In addition, security and investigative assistance has been provided the Marine Air Wing at Chu Lai Installation.

(3) The interviewing, screening, orientation, training, equipping and placement of Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) had expanded into a full time operation. it now requires a considerable portion of the time of three CI Section personnel. To date, 50 KCS are placed within the combat elements of Americal Division. The ultimate goal is to place one KCS in each combat platoon. Analysis of the KCS performance during the reporting period indicates that this program is very effective. The KCS has been directly responsible for an impressive number of VC killed in action and VC weapons and material captured. Several KCS have been wounded in action and at least four have been put in for awards by the using units.

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2 (4) The Volunteer Informant Program has expanded beyond expectations during the reporting period. The current rate of expenditure is approximately 70,000 \$VN (\$593.22) monthly. Full exploitation of this program could result in an estimated outlay of approximately 150,000 \$VN (\$1271.19) per month. Restrictions imposed in the downward receipting of these funds by AR 381-141 greatly effect the flexibility and use of this program. It is to be noted that the majority of funds expended in this program are for the purchase of US ammunition and weapons from local nationals. A surprising amount of this ordnance is weapons such as the M72 LAW, claymore mines and TNT charges. This program presently takes about 30% of the time of one man of the CI Section and is expected to become a full time job.

(5) Source recruitment and utilization has been accelerated during the reporting period. Emphasis is being placed on early warning and VC infrastructure information. Steps are being taken to identify and neutralize VC infrastructure in the vicinity of Chu Lai Installation.

(6) Two ArVN 8th MI Detachment personnel have been attached to the CI Section and are being utilized in the VC infrastructure identification program. As utilization of these personnel has just begun, results are as yet inconclusive.

i. G2 Air.

(1) The G2 Air section continued to support the Americal Division during the reporting period. A total of 174 Photographic missions were requested of which 100 were completed prior to the date no longer of value. The amount of Photographic Missions completed were practically doubled from the last reporting period.

(2) The G2 Air section has, with the use of the Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) Data Link, increased the amount of accurate and timely inflight reports, which has given the Brigades a fast, on the spot report of any activity detected within their AO.

(3) With the increased use of nightly inflight reports from both Infra-Red (IR) and Side Looking Airborne (SLAR) the Brigades have received more timely reports upon which they can respond. The G2 Air section will further attempt to increase the speed in the reporting of all its intelligence information.

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D. (C) Plans, Operations, Training and Organization

1. G3 Section.

a. General. (1) The Americal Division continued offensive operations in the Americal AO during the period 1 Feb 68 to 30 Apr 68. Contact varied from light to heavy. Two major named operations, Wheeler/Wallowa and Muscatine, continued throughout the period and two new operations, Burlington Trail and Norfolk [sic] Victory were initiated.

(2) On 13 April 1968, LTC William J. Baxley, Jr. assumed the duties of ACofS, G3 from LTC Jesomond D. Balmer, Jr.

(3) On 23 April 1968, a courtesy inspection was conducted by the division IG office in preparation for USARV AGI to be conducted in July 1968. Only minor administrative deficiencies were noted.

(4) The Division Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) were completed and approved. Publication is expected in the near future.

(5) The ORLL for the 4th Bn, 21st Inf, a newly arrived unit in Vietnam, is at inclosure 1.

b. Organization. The buildup of Americal Division units continued during the reporting period. Fourth rifle companies were added to the battalions of the 196th and 198th Inf Bdes (Lt) (SEP) and fourth Infantry battalions joined the 11th and 198th Inf Bdes (Lt) (SEP). Task Force Oregon with all attachments was discontinued. The Division troop list, as of 30 Apr 68, is attached as inclosure 2. The following organizational actions were completed.

(1) USARV General Order 5f29, 5 Feb 68, discontinued Task Force Oregon, effective 6 Feb 68.

(2) USARV General Order 638, 12 Feb 68, relieved the following units from attachment to Task Force Oregon, effective 6 Feb 68:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cav Regt

2d Bn, 11th Arty

3d Bn, 16th Arty

3d Bn, 18th Arty

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Troop B, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav

148th MP Platoon

3d Platoon ,10th Trans Company

358th Per Svc Company

US Army Mil Intelligence Det (Prov)

(3) USARV General Order 736, 18 Feb 68, assigned the 3d Bn, 16th Arty to the Americal Division, effective 6 Feb 68.

(4) USARV General Order 639, 12 Feb 68, attached the following units to the Division, effective 6 Feb 68.

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div (OPCON, only; passed to IFFV on 29 Feb 68)

258th Per Svc Company

US Army Mil Intelligence Det (Prov)

Battery B, 2d Bn, 11th Arty

(5) USARV General Order 806, 21 Feb 68, discontinued the US Army Combat Tracker team #10 (Prov), which was assigned to the 196th Inf Bde (Lt) (SEP), effective 15 Feb 68.

(6) USARV General Order 8212, 21 Feb 68, assigned the 63de Inf Plat (Combat Tracker) to the Division, effective 15 Feb 68. Assets of the Combat Tracker Team #10 were transferred to this unit.

(7) USARV General Order 766, 19 Feb 68, attached the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div to the Division, effective 16 Feb 68, less operational control. This unit was detached from the Division, effective 12 May 68, by USARV General Order 1006, 11 Mar 68.

(8) USARV General Order 640, 12 Feb 68, assigned the 3d Bn, 18th Arty to the Division, effective 6 Feb 68.

(9) USARV General Order 666, 13 Feb 68, assigned the 57th Inf Plat (Scout Dog) the Division, effective 19 Feb 68.

(10) USARPAC General Order 108, 8 Feb 68, reorganized Troop F, 17th Cav by MTOE 17-57G, PAC 1/68, effective 20 Feb 68.

(11) USARPAC General Order 110, 8 Feb 68, reorganized the following units as indicated, effective 20 Feb 68:

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HHC, 198th Inf Bde by MTOE 77-10-2T, CONARC 1/68

Troop H, 17th Cav by MTOE 17-57E, CONARC 1/68

HHD, 9th Spt Bn by MTOE 29-246T, CONARC 1/68

Co B, 9th Spt Bn by MTOE 29-247T, CONARC 1/68

Co C, 9th Spt Bn by MTOE 8-197T, CONARC 1/68

(12) USARV General Order 951, 1 Mar 68, as amended by General Order 1257, detached the 14th Avn Bn and companies, effective 1 Mar 68. Operational control remained with the Division.

(13) USARPAC General Order 142, 1 Mar 68, reorganized the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav, effective 12 Mar 68, by MTOE's 17-106G PAC 1/67, and 17-107G PAC 2/67.

(14) USARPAC General Order 166, 122 Mar 68, reorganized all Infantry battalions of the Division, effective 25 Mar 68, by MTOE's 7-176T PAC 2/68, 7-177T PAC 2/68, and 7-178T PAC 3/68.

(15) USARV General Order 1171, 17 Mar 68, assigned the 5th Bn, 46th Inf to the Division effective 31 Mar 68.

(16) USARPAC General Order 182, 21 Mar 68, activated F Troop, 8th Cav, the Division organic Air Cav Troop. Personnel and equipment of C Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav were transferred to F Troop and C Troop was assigned to Fort Knox, Kentucky.

(17) USARPAC General Order 189, 22 Mar 68, reorganized the direct support (DS) artillery battalions assigned to the Infantry brigades of the Division, effective 1 Apr 68, by MTOE's 6-116T PAC 1/68, and 6-11T PAC 1/68.

(18) USARV General Order 1501, 4 Apr 68, discontinued the US Army Military Intelligence Det (Prov), effective 5 Apr 68.

(19) USARV General Order 1711, 13 Apr 68, assigned the 4th Bn, 21st Inf to the Division, effective 17 Apr 68.

(20) The 6th Bn, 31st Inf, previously scheduled to be assigned as the fourth battalion for the 196th Lt Inf Bde was diverted, on arrival in-country, to the 9th Inf Div.

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d. Disposition and movement of units during the period.

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period units were conducting combat operations as follows:

(a) 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div with 1-14th Inf, 1-35th Inf, and 2-35th Inf: Northern portion of Wheeler/Wallowa AO.

(b) 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav: Eastern portion Wheeler/Wallowa AO.

(c) 196th Inf Bde (Lt) (SEP) with 2-1st Inf, 4-31st Inf, and 3-21st Inf: Southern portion of Wheeler/Wallowa AO.

(d) 198th Inf Bde (Lt) (SEP) with 1-6th, 1-46th Inf, and 1-52d Inf: Chu Lai TAOR and a small portion of NE Muscatine AO.

(e) 11th Inf Bde (Lt) (SEP) with 3-1st Inf, 4-3d Inf, and 1-20th Inf: Duc Pho AO and Muscatine AO.

(2) Major movement of units during the period was as follows:

(a) On 3 February 1968, 4-31st Inf was airmoved from 196th Inf Bde Ao to 3-4th Inf Bde, at LZ Baldy. OPCON of 4-31st Inf passed to 3-4th Inf Bde at 031100. 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div moved north into the 1st Mar Div and 2d ROK Bde area with the 1-14th Inf and 1-35th Inf to put pressure on elements of the 2d NVA Division.

(b) On 6 Feb 68, Americal Division was tasked by III MAF to provide a two battalion TF to become OPCON to 1st MAR Div to conduct operations in Da Nang area. 1-6th Inf from the 198th Inf Bde and 2-1st Inf from the 196th Inf Bde under control of TF Miracle (Provisional TF from 196th headquarters personnel) moved north vic of Da Nang. The force remained OPCON to the 1st Marine Div during the period 7-12 Feb 68. Two battalions returned on 12 Feb 68, with both units initially being placed OPCON to 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.

(c) During the period 12-14 Feb, there was a realignment of forces in the Wheeler/Wallowa AO. The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Division shifted emphasis of combat operations to the west conducting operations with the 4-31st Inf, 1-14th Inf, 1-35th Inf, and 1-6th Inf. The 196th Inf Bde also shifted forces and concentrated operations in the western portion of the AO conducting operations with the 2-35th Inf, 2-1st Inf, and 3-21st Inf.

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(d) On the 15th of February elements of the 3d Bde 82d ABN began to arrive in Chu Lai for a period of combat orientation training prior to a move north to the Hue, Phu Bai area. The brigade remained in the Americal AO until March and cleared the AO on 6 March 1968.

(e) On 17 Feb 68 the 1-35th Inf of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div prepared to move south from Americal AO. 1-35th Inf cleared Americal AO on 18 February 1968 p[assign OPCON to 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) in II CTZ.

(f) On 25 February 1968, the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div with the 1-14th Inf, prepared to move south to the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM). On 27 Feb 68, the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div's AO in Wheeler/Wallowa passed to the 196th Inf Bde and the 4-31st Inf and 1-6th Inf passed OPCON to 196th Inf Bde. On 29 Feb 68, the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div with the 1-14th Inf cleared the Americal AO to the II CTZ.

(g) On 1 March 68 the 196th Inf Bde moved from Hill 35 (BT227315) to LZ Baldy (BT133453).

(h) On 6 March 68, elements of the 11th Inf Bde began movement to a field location in support of operation west of Quang Ngai. The 4-3d Inf reinforced with supporting forces conducted the operation.

(i) On 10 Mar, 4-31st Inf moved from FSB Polar Bear (AT898471) to LZ Colt (BT114375).

(j) On 18 March 68, B Battery, 2d Bn, 11th Arty departed Americal AO.

(k) On 19-20 March 68, three battalions were reshuffled in order to position 2-35th Inf for movement from Americal AO. 1-20th Inf moved to 196th Inf area, 2-35th Inf replaced 1-20th Inf in Duc Pho AO, and 4-31st Inf moved west in 196th AO.

(l) On 25 March 68, 2-35th Inf was relieved of their combat mission in Duc Pho AO. 2-35th Inf departed Americal AO 261600H March 68. 3-1st Inf assumed responsibility of entire Duc Pho AO with A-3-1 moving from Muscatine AO to Duc Pho.

(m) On 31 March 68, the 5-46th Inf closed Vietnam, joining the 198th Inf Bde as the brigade's fourth battalion.

(n) On 6 April 68, the 1-20th Inf moved from the Wheeler/Wallowa area of operations to the 11th Lt Inf Bde's area of operation, in preparation for Operation Norfolk Victory.

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o. On 8 April 68, two major named operations were initiated, Operation Burlington Trail and Operation Norfolk Victory. 1-6th Inf was airmoved from LZ Baldy (BT133453) to vic Tam Ky coming under control of the 198th Inf Bde. The 1-52d Inf was airmoved from the Chu Lai TAOR to LZ Baldy coming under control of the 196th Inf Bde. The 1-20th Inf combat assaulted into area NW of Song Ve Valley, west of Quang Ngai City initiating Operation Norfolk Victory.

(p) On 9 April 68, TF Barker operating in the Muscatine area of operation was disbanded, with 4-3d Inf assuming responsibility for the Muscatine area of operation.

(q) On 14 April 1968, the 4th Bn, 21st Inf closed Chu Lai to join the Americal Division.

(r) Between 17-23 April 68, the 196th Inf Bde with 3 Inf Bns, 4-31st Inf, 3-21st Inf and 2-1st Inf moved from Americal AO to Camp Evans (YD535322) in the PCV area of operation. Americal Division had been tasked by III MAF to provide three battalions, brigade force to PCV.

(s) On 20 April 68, the 198th Inf Bde assumed control of Operation Wheeler/Wallowa from the 196th Inf Bde, conducting operations in the area with the 1-52d Inf (-), 1-20th Inf, and 1-6th Inf. TF Roach, a provisional headquarters consisting of assets from the 198th Inf Bde, assumed control of the Chu Lai TAOR. The 5-46th Inf and 1-46th Inf were placed under its control.

(t) On 26 April 68, the Mike Force operating in the Duc Pho AO was relieved by elements of the 4-21st Inf and departed the Americal AO.

d. Plans. The following plans, operational orders or fragmentary orders were in effect or initiated during the reporting period.

(1) Operation Wheeler/Wallowa has been continued from the 1st reporting period. The operation has been characterized by light to heavy contact in all portions of the AO, with primary emphasis placed on clearing the Que Son (BT0334) and Antenna (AT9137) Valleys and neutralizing Base Area 116. Primary tactical technique used was company sized search and sweep or search and clear operation to achieve contact, then a battalion size or larger combat assault to exploit the contact.

(2) Operation Muscatine has been continued from the last reporting period. The operation has been characterized by light to moderate contact

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with predominately local force units. Recently a high incidence of booby trap and mine activity has occurred. Primary emphasis has been placed on elimination of the infrastructure and destruction of local force units. Company and platoon size operations have been used, with occasional combat assaults into suspected cache areas.

(3) Operation Burlington Trail was initiated during the reporting period. This mission is to open the road from Tam Ky (BT306204) to Tien Phouc SF/CIDG Camp (BT107153). The operation is conducted on two levels, with cavalry secured engineer units physically repairing the road and infantry companies conducting operations in the Burlington Trail AO.

(4) Operation Norfolk Victory was begun and terminated during the reporting period. This mission was to neutralize Base Area 121 and to extend GVN influence over the Song Ve Valley BS5763). However, deployment of one brigade from the Americal area of operations required premature termination of the operations.

(5) During the reporting period. OPORD's 4-68 and 5-68; covering reception, in-country orientation and training assistance for the 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division, were executed. The 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div was successfully received, processed, trained and deployed to PCV.

(6) OPORD 6-68 (Golden Fleece), establishing rice denial and control operations within the Americal Division AO, was executed during the reporting period. Operations include search and sweep to locate caches, mobile and fixed check points to monitor and control flow of rice, and physical security of friendly harvesters in VC rice growing areas. Golden Fleece operations are closely coordinated and conducted in conjunction with ARVN forces.

(7) OPLAN 17-67 (Golden Valley), continues in effect. It provides for the relief selected SF/CIDG Camps in case of attack.

(8) OPLAN 1-68, provided for deployment of one, three battalion, brigade to three general areas. This plan was executed, in part, as OPORD 7-68 and resulted in the deployment of the 196th Inf Bde (Lt) to the PCV.

(9) Fragmentary Order 2-68 confirmed verbal orders establishing TF Miracle (a two battalion force), and deployment of the TF north to destroy the enemy TET offensive threat against Da Nang.

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e. OPERATIONS.

(1) The frequency and intensity of combat operations in the Americal area of operations varied during the reporting period. During the latter part of March and during the month of April the enemy avoided any major contact. The enemy during this same period placed increased emphasis on the harassment of friendly troops, resulting in a large increase in mine and booby trap incidents during the month of April. Americal Division initiated two major named Operations on 8 April 1968; however, it terminated one of these on 19 April 1968. At the end of the reporting period three major named operations were being conducted, Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, Operation Burlington Trail, and Operation Muscatine. In addition the Americal Division was conducting operations in the Chu Lai TAOR and the Duc Pho AO.

(2) Operation Norfolk Victory began at 0800H April 68, and was terminated at 191800H Apr 68. It was an operation to extend GVN control to the NW in the Song Ve Valley and neutralize NVA/VC elements in Base Area 121. The area for the operation was in Quang Ngai Province generally southwest of Quang Ngai City. The operation began with a combat assault by A,B,C, and D, 1-20th Inf and C/4-3d Inf between 080800H and 081230H April 1968. Other Americal elements that participated in the operation were B/6-11 Arty and E Trp, 1st Cav. In addition, the 4th Bn, 4th ARVN Regt and the 1st Trp of the 4th ARVN Cav Sqdn participated, conducting operation in the eastern portion of the AO. Operation Norfolk Victory was characterized by light scattered contact and the location of several significant enemy weapons and ammunition caches. At 121408H Apr, D/1/20th Inf found weapons cache containing 56 individual weapons and 3 crew served weapons. On the 14th of April, 3 significant enemy positions were located. At 1215H, C/1-20 Inf, vic BS524653, found 2 enemy base camps, consisting of tables, classrooms, a mess hall, 6 large huts, bunkers, medical supplies, and 75 rds of ammo. At 1520H the same unit vic BS519657 found a hospital consisting of 30 huts, a large amount of soiled bandages and medical supplies. At 1845, B-1-20th Inf vic BS502622, found a VC prison which had been evacuated approximately 6-12 hours earlier.

Operation Norfolk Victory was terminated on the 19th of April at 1800H when the 1-20th Inf moved to the Wheeler/Wallowa area of operation, and B Btry, 6-11th Arty moved to the Muscatine area of operation. Final results for Operation Norfolk Victory were :

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	
6 KHA	45 VC KIA (C)	29 IN CIV
28 WHA (EVAC)	32 DET	120 IWC
5 WHA (MINOR)	2 PW/VC	12 CSWC
	1 CIV DEF	

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(3) Operation Burlington Trail began at 0815H April 1968. It is an operation to open the road from Tam Ky to Tien Phouc, neutralize base area 117, locate and destroy NVA/VC forces in the area, and extend GVN control in the area. The operation is being conducted in conjunction with the 6th ARVN REGT of the 2d ARVN Division, elements of the CIDG forces from Tien Phouc Special Forces Camp and the 3d Trp of the 4th ARVN Cav Sqdn. The 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav, 1-6th Inf (-) and elements of the 1-46th Inf are the Americal forces participating. The road was opened to 2 1/2 ton vehicle traffic going from Tam Ky to Tien Phouc. On 18 April 1968 the road was officially opened when a 2d ARVN Div, 50 vehicle convoy, moved from Tam Ky to Tien Phouc and returned, closing at 1810H. Ground action has been light to moderate in the operation. On 19 April 1968 at 1610H vic of BT209140, B-1-1 Cav, F Trp-8th Cav, and C-1-6th Inf engaged an estimated VC platoon. Results of the engagement were 25 VC KIA (C), and 5 IWC. There has been frequent mortaring of friendly units in night defensive positions. Results of Operation Burlington Trail during the reporting period were:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
15 <u>KHA</u>	226 <u>VC KIA (C)</u>
86 WHA (E)	6 NVA KIA (C)
38 WHA (M)	61 IWC
	26 CSWC

(4) Operation Wheeler/Wallowa continued during the reporting period with sporadic heavy contact during February and March and mostly light scattered contact in April 1968. The Wheeler/Wallowa AO continued to be the most active area in the Americal AO during the period. Heavy contacts were reported on the 9th and 10th of February by the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in the northern Wheeler/Wallowa extension. Again on 27 February heavy contact was reported by the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav vic BT2721. During the period 4-9 March 1968, the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav again reported heavy contact vic BT1528. On 11 March 1968, elements of the 196th Inf Bde reported heavy contact vic BT0829. On 21-22 March 1968, elements of the 196th Inf Bde and the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav became engaged southwest of Hoi An. On 5 April 1968, B-4-31st Inf found a large weapons cache vic AT847337. Found were 199 individual weapons and 27 crew served weapons. Results of Operation Wheeler/Wallowa during the reporting period were:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
157 <u>KHA</u>	1640 <u>VC KIA (C)</u>
581 WHA (E)	1070 NVA KIA (C)
369 WHA (M)	622 IWC
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(5) Operations in the Chu Lai TAOR continued during the reporting period with scattered light contact reported. The enemy avoided any major engagements in the area. There was a total of 6 mortar or rocket attacks on Chu Lai base during this period with occasional mortar or rocket attacks on selected friendly fire support bases, battalion bases, and OP's in the area. Results in the Chu Lai TAOR during the reporting period were:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
35 <u>KHA</u>	122 ENEMY KIA (C)
199 WHA	28 IWC

(6) Operations in the Duc Pho AO continued with light contact reported. On 1 March 1968, an enemy trawler was engaged by naval gunfire and American gunships and was either destroyed by the fire or destroyed by the crew with a self-destruction mechanism. Results of Operations in the Duc Pho AO during the period were:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
57 <u>KHA</u>	390 ENEMY KIA (C)
498 WHA	946 IWC
	13 CSWC

(7) Operation Muscatine continued during the reporting period with light to moderate contact reported. Mine and booby trap incidents continued through out the entire period, increasing significantly toward the end of the reporting period. The enemy for the most part avoided major contact concentrating instead on small scale harassing attacks and extensive use of mines and booby traps. On 12 February 1968, elements of the 11th Inf Bde, operating with elements of the 2d ARVN Div became engaged with the enemy vic BS7179. On 23 February 1968, the 11th Inf Bde made contact with the enemy at the same general area. On 16 March 1968, after a combat assault, elements of the 11th Inf Bde made heavy contact with the enemy vic BS7277. On 10 April 1968, D-4-3d Inf found a significant weapons cache vic BS515710 that contained 121 individual weapons, 2 crew served weapons, and large amounts of ammunition. Results of Operation Muscatine during the reporting period were:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
43 <u>KHA</u>	587 VC KIA (C)
235 WHA (E)	4 NVA KIA (C)
43 WHA (M)	258 IWC
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(8) Weather was generally good during the reporting period and did not hinder combat operations.

(9) Americal Division units continued to conduct many combat operations in conjunction with 2d ARVN Div Forces as well as Provincial Forces. In addition, Americal units provided protection for rice harvest areas during March and April and implemented a vigorous plan to deny rice and rice growing areas to the enemy.

(10) Overall enemy losses in the Americal AO during the reporting period were:
4090 EN KIA
2199 Weapons Captured

f. Close Air Support

(1) Missions/Sorties: During the period of 1 Feb 1968, through 30 April 1968, the Americal Division received 778 close air support missions utilizing 1414 air sorties.

(2) Skyspot Missions: The division received 603 requests from subordinate units for Skyspot/TPQ-10 missions, of which 253 were passed and 233 approved. The USAF flew 125 missions utilizing 163 sorties, the USMC flew 2 missions utilizing 2 sorties and the RAAF flew 30 missions utilizing 30 sorties in support of the division. Total skyspot missions completed during the reporting period is 157 utilizing 195 sorties.

(3) FAC Missions: The division received 975 requests for preplanned forward air controlled missions, of which 486 were passed and 453 approved. The USAF flew 311 missions utilizing 627 sorties and the USMC flew 7 missions utilizing 14 sorties in support of the division. The division requested 302 immediate/divert missions utilizing 1216 sorties.

(4) ARC Light Missions: One ARC Light Strike was flown in support of the Division during the reporting period. Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) by forward air controlled as a result of this mission was approximately 15 bunkers opened and partially destroyed, and 5 tunnel entrances uncovered.

(5) Ordnance Expended: Total ordnance expended by close air support during the reporting period is 1325.17 tons of bombs, 289.61 tons of napalm and 5866 rockets.

(6) Damage Assessments: Forward air controllers made the following BDA during the reporting period: 1101 structures destroyed, 229 bunkers destroyed, 1428 meters of trench line opened or destroyed, 251 weapons

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positions and spider holes uncovered, 20 sampans destroyed, 116 secondary explosions and secondary fires observed, and 84 killed by air (KBA) possible.

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g. Training.

(1) The Americal Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all assigned and attached units of the Division during the reporting period. Forty-four courses were completed during the period and 7,853 individual and unit personnel completed training.

(2) Forty-four personnel completed the Division long range patrol techniques training program. A formal Division Recondo Course commenced 29 Apr 68 with sixteen trainees.

(3) 201 junior leaders completed the Americal Combat Leadership Course.

(4) The mobile training team program continued. The following training was conducted by the Division for the 2d ARVN Div:

- (a) Operation and functioning of the M60 machine gun.
- (b) Special FDC procedures including fuze settings.
- (c) Operation of the M72 LAW.
- (d) Medical evacuation procedures.
- (e) Combat first aid.
- (f) Field sanitation and preventative medicines.
- (g) Technical inspection of Artillery, wheeled vehicles and radios.
- (h) Installing and recording mine fields.
- (i) Technical inspection of heavy, earthmoving Engineer Equipment.
- (j) Techniques of Artillery crew drill.
- (k) Ordnance inspection of small arms and crew-served weapons.
- (l) Artillery RSOP.
- (m) Operation of AN/PRC-25 and AN/CRC-106 radio sets.

(5) The 2d ARVN Div assisted this command in April 68 in the orientation training of the 4th Bn, 21st Inf upon its arrival in Vietnam. The training consisted of a practical demonstration of VC techniques of concealment and booby trapping. Correct search techniques were emphasized. The training was conducted in a deserted village near Duc Pho.

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(6) Several training facilities were constructed at the Combat Center during the reporting period.

- (a) A 1400 man mess hall.
- (b) A 40 point, 25 meter small arms range.
- (c) A 50 ft repelling tower.
- (d) Five outdoor bleacher sites.
- (e) A building for the Division Historical Museum.
- (f) A motor park and maintenance building.
- (g) An outdoor theater.
- (h) An improved access road.
- (i) A water well and purification system.

(7) The Division Training Regulation was finalized and sent to the Command Section for approval.

2. Artillery, See separate ORLL for the Division Artillery.

3. Aviation.

a. The Aero Scout Company (Prov), which was activated 1 Feb 68, was declared operation on 8 March. The company employs its aircraft in teams. One observation helicopter and two armed helicopters are employed as a reconnaissance team. Four utility helicopters with three squads of infantry are used to exploit targets acquired by the reconnaissance teams.

This concept has proven to be very effective.

(1) The primary area of responsibility for the company has been in the 11th Infantry Brigade area of operation with emphasis on the Muscatine area.

(2) Results for the month of March include twelve Viet Cong killed, one Viet Cong captured and numerous Viet Cong suspects detained. The infantry platoon was inserted twelve times and thirteen snatch operations were conducted.

(3) On 1 April, while screening for elements of the 4/3d Infantry, three Viet Cong were captured. One of the captured Viet Cong was the equivalent of a colonel. Various weapons were also captured.

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(4) Operations from 1 to 7 April resulted in ten VC/NVA killed and fourteen Viet Cong captured. The period was characterized by an increased use of the Aero infantry squads.

(5) The 1/20th Infantry was supported from 8 to 14 April. Mountainous terrain, double tree canopy and low clouds reduced the effectiveness of the reconnaissance teams. One observation aircraft was shot down by hostile fire.

(6) Operations were conducted in the Muscatine Area from 14 to 30 April. One aircraft was destroyed when it crashed after receiving hostile fire. On 23 April, the infantry squads, while employed as a blocking force, found a salt cache. The cache contained 88,000 pounds of salt.

b. Significant data for the 123d Avn Bn for the reporting period are:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Hours	2,082	2,807	1,889	6,778
Troops	12,253	13,312	13,030	38,595
Cargo Tons	632	206	191	1,029
Sorties	6,433	6,707	8,842	19,982
	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Med Evacs	11	0	1	12
VC KBA	277	12	28	317
VC Captured	0	1	29	30
Structures destroyed	237	43	5	285
Ordinance expended:				
7.62mm	353,000	365,823	281,200	1,000,023
40mm	4,820	5,221	3,304	13,345
2.75" rockets	1,421	1,351	786	3,558

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Aircraft availability during this quarter was as follows:

	UH-1B	UH-1D	UH-1H	OH-23G
FEB	73%	88%	98%	60%
MAR	82%	86%	97%	77%
APR	83%	80%	91%	40%

c. Significant data for the 14th Avn Bn, which is OPCON to the Division, for the reporting period are:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Hours	8,221	9,351	7,652	25,224
Troops	37,326	50,585	49,277	137,188
Cargo Tons	8,490	7,648	8,406	24,544
Sorties	29,379	36,374	32,659	98,385 (?bal)
Medical Evacuation	76	14	39	129
VC KBA	546	293	83	922
Structures destroyed	399	205	476	1,080
Sampans Destroyed	107	99	125	331

Ordinance expended:

7.62mm	881,135	1,060,525	921,347	2,863,007
40mm	13,910	11,142	14,040	38,892
2.75" rockets	6,515	6,128	5,635	18,278

d. Training.

(1) A standardization program for all aviators was initiated.

(2) The battalion continues to utilize quotas for AAMTAP and NETT courses.

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4. Chemical.

a. Organization: During this reporting period, the Americal Division Chemical Section personnel strength increased from 40% to 90% of that authorized by TOE. The increase in personnel has provided more flexibility as well as more capability in the accomplishment of the section's mission.

b. Training:

(1) A weekly training program has been initiated to train those personnel within the section who are not familiar with the plotting and computing procedures necessary to develop radiological fallout data. Even though this data is not currently required for tactical operations, it is a means of insuring that personnel maintain a degree of proficiency.

(2) In March, assistance was provided to the Americal Combat Center in the organization of a CBR course of instruction for presentation to all new in-country arrivals. All available publications and training aids were made available for use in the schools instruction. Specific recommendations were made for items to be covered in the lecture portion of the classes and in the construction and conduct of the gas chamber exercise.

(3) In April, instruction was given to personnel of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment on the operations of the M1132 Mechanized Flamethrowers and the M1132 Service unit, which were recently received by the unit.

c. Operations:

(1) On 30 January 68, a command letter was published which required units to submit CS Contamination Reports following the bulk employment of riot control agent (RCA) CS1. A format for reporting required information was enclosed as Americal Division Form 718A. This report was considered essential, so that a division contamination chart and decay record could be maintained based upon an effectiveness of CS-1 for up to 60 days. Information provided in the report included ate and time of drop, type burst (air or ground), and average height of burst. This information is available for use to assist in planning operations. The report has also proven useful in accounting for the CS-1 used.

(2) A survey of the protective masks available within the division was conducted in February which revealed that a shortage of approximately 15% existed at that time. These shortages existed primarily in headquarters and support units as opposed to the combat units. Action was initiated through logistic channels to eliminate shortages. As of this date there remains a shortage of approximately 5% in the small and medium sizes.

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was enclosed as Americal Division Form 718A. This report was considered essential, so that a division contamination chart and decay record could be maintained based upon an effectiveness of CS-1 for up to 60 days. Information provided in the report included date and time of drop, type burst (air or ground), and average height of burst. This information is available for use to assist in planning operations. The report has also proven useful in accounting for the CS-1 used.

(2) A survey of the protective masks available within the division was conducted in February which revealed that a shortage of approximately 15% existed at that time. These shortages existed primarily in headquarters and support units as opposed to the combat units. Action was initiated through logistic channels to eliminate shortages. As of this date there remains a shortage of approximately 5% in the small and medium sizes.

(3) During this reporting period, major subordinate commands which conduct chemical activities, were requested to submit weekly reports. In addition to the activities conducted which the units report, planned operation for the following week are also reported. This information has assisted immeasurably in keeping abreast of all chemical operations when time does not permit frequent visits to all units. From these reports, problems with the supply of munitions, equipment, and personnel are quickly identified so this action may be initiated.

(4) SFC Gomer Spencer was detailed as the Chemical representative on the Division IG Team on 1 April 1968.

(5) A complete listing of all approved herbicide targets within Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces were obtained from the I Corps Chemical Advisor on 12 April 1966(?). This is the first time such a list has been made available to the division. After a thorough examination of the targets, it was noted that many of the targets are located within the Americal AO. It is felt that many of these targets were approved prior to the Americal Division occupying their present AO and at a time when pacification of these areas had not been affected. Now that many of these target areas have been pacified to an acceptable degree, those targets may not still be desirable. A study will be conducted to determine which targets are still desired. An overall determination will be made of specific target areas within the division AO for the conduct of herbicide operations with desired priorities and submitted to III MAF in the immediate future. It was also noted that many of these targets within the Americal AO were submitted by ARVN/GVN agencies.

5. Engineer. Primary engineer effort in the Americal Division AO (Area of Operations) was directed at LOC (Lines of Communications) maintenance,

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repair, and new construction.

a. Route 1 had primary emphasis with four Engineer battalions committed to the road.

(1) 19th Engr Bn: Southern I/II Corps boundry[sic] to BS756496.

(2) 39th Engr Bn (DS Americal Div): BS 756496 to BS 695635 and from BS 643733 to Chu Lai main gate.

(3) 104th ARVN Engr Bn: BS 695635 to BS 643733.

(4) 9th Engr Bn, SMC: Chu Lai main gate to North edge of Americal Division AO.

b. The road from Thang Binh to LZ Colt, BT 175418 to BT 114375, respectively, was opened by 39th Engineer Battalion; completion date 6 April 1968.

c. The road from Route 1 to Thon Nai BT 248255 was opened by 26th Engineer Battalion.

d. The road from Tam Ky, BT312822, to Tien Phuoc, BT 118142, was opened as a pioneer road in support of operation Burlington Trail by 26th Engineer Battalion. the 39th Engineer Battalion is now in the process of upgrading this road.

e. All LOC's in Americal AO have remained enemy targets for interdiction. The majority of below listed incidents occurred during the TET Offensive, during period 1-29 February 1968:

(1) Road mines: 136

(2) Bridges destroyed: 19

(3) Culverts destroyed: 51

(4) Road craters or trenches: 41

6. Signal.

a. With the departure of the 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division in February, the Division Communications Systems was relieved of its previous heavy commitment in support of a four brigade force. However, a concurrent redistribution of divisional support and base units has required a realignment of communications facilities, necessitating establishment of radio relay systems to support the Division Engineer Battalion, which had previously been supported by wire circuits within the Chu Lai TAOR, and General

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Support Artillery batteries, employed separately on Fire Bases in the AO.

b. Significant increases in reliability [sic] of division radio relay and carrier systems and individual circuit reliability were accomplished throughout the Division system. Since early February, systems re-reliability has not dropped below 99% and circuit reliability has been maintained above the 98% level--a marked improvement from the previous quarter. This improvement is attributed to increased emphasis on individual training and experience in trouble-shooting procedures at all echelons.

c. The Division Fire Officer, acting in his additional capacity as area cable coordinator, has initiated and supervised several projects to upgrade and expand base camp communications for the Chu Lai base. These have included:

(1) Expansion of dial telephone service to the division CP area. Initial cutover to the Chu Lai Dial exchange provided only 210 locals for the HQ area, so that only a portion of the headquarters was served by dial service. Since that cutover, however, an additional 103 dial instruments have been installed. Completing the dial service to the CP.

(2) Supervision of completion of dial exchange outside cable plant facilities and the assignment of cable installation priorities, which has resulted in the installation of 46 dial instruments to service the Division Support Command OA. Continuing supervision and shifting of priorities will provide for the most effective utilization of the dial facilities as the project nears completion.

(3) Supervision of upgrading and cleanup projects to remove ?D-/TT field wire in the vicinity of the Division TOC/FSB complex. By rerouting existing and installation of new circuits over multipair cables and by the installation and revitalization of TOC/FSB multipair distribution cables, circuit quality has been increased, trouble-shooting procedures have become easier and more efficient, and the appearance in the TOC FSB complex is greatly improved.

(4) Initiation of a project to reroute Americal local telephones in the Division CP using new multipair cable. The completion of this project will improve circuit quality and reliability of Americal locals as well as improve the general appearance of cable/wire installations throughout the Division CP area.

d. Concurrently with the Division project of vitalizing the Division TOC, the Signal Officer planned and supervised the revision and installation of communications facilities to support TOC operations. A telephone console was fabricated and installed providing ready access to Brigade TOC's using direct circuits and a system of lights and automatic ringing facilities for ease of operation. A FM radio remote console was constructed providing a capability of 6 FM radio nets in a compact but versatile configuration, for convenient access by Division TOC duty personnel.

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In addition, two monitor radio speakers were installed on the observation platform to allow the CG or other visitors to the TOC access to any one or combination of nets without interfering with normal TOC operations. The overall efficiency of the TOC and operating personnel has materially improved as a result of these features.

e. (C) The Division Cryptographic Distribution Authority, although losing one account with the loss of the 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division, has initiated action to activate two new accounts (one with a non-divisional CS Engineer Battalion, and one with the division aviation battalion). Although KY-28's are currently on hand in limited quantities, aircraft modifications and installation of mounting kits has not yet been completed. However, the DISTRA and Signal Office continue to monitor the program and have established, in conjunction with the Division G3 and Aviation Officer, priorities for installation of the aircraft security devices for Commanders and Operations Officers' Command and Control ships on initial issue. In addition, the Division has requested allocation for maintenance training classes from USARV for KY-28 and XY-38 speech security devices, since currently no division crypto maintenance personnel are qualified to repair these equipments.

f. The division message review board has continued very active and with continuing command interest and supervision, has been extremely successful in reducing high precedence traffic within the division. The results, in association with increased emphasis on air messenger and the initiation of an extensive division ground messenger service, have effectively reduced high precedence message traffic to a minimal level (currently only 34% of total traffic). In addition, an overall reduction of total message traffic has been effected, reducing message traffic from a previous weekly average of 2000 to 24000 to a current average of 600-700 messages per week.

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E. (U) LOGISTICS:

1. (U) The major personnel change during the period 1 Feb through 30 Apr 68 was the departure of LTC Thomas H. Eblen? and the arrival of LTC Frank ?. Clarke as the new Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 on 12 Feb 68.

2. (U) Major supply shortages continue in construction and barrier material (especially penepime and lumber); radios, particularly AN/VRC-12 2nd PRC 25 series; organic equipment for infantry jackets (60 days overdue); and lack of replacement M113-1's for the M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. Two new Battalions arrived in country with virtually no supply problems. The exchange of chrome chambered M16's for non-chrome chambers is 50% completed, an increase from 36% at the beginning of this reporting period.

3. (U) Maintenance problems continued to be encountered in procuring major repair parts or assemblies (radiators, engines, etc.) rapidly enough to meet demands, in maintaining Fill in ASL (decreased from 62% to 59% during reporting period), and in maintaining adequate stocks of rifle cleaning equipment (cleaning rods, chamber brushes, and pipe cleaners being critical).

4. (U) The main supply route through the Americal Division AO, Highway QL1, continues to be classified as secure. However, the unpaved surface creates hazardous dust clouds and the attendant maintenance problems.

5. (U) The Americal Division Base Development Board met 11 & 12 Feb 68 and determined the minimum construction required to meet operational requirements. A Base Development Study Group from USARV visited the Division on 22-27 Feb 68 to review the plan. A mess hall, bleachers and central issue facility were completed in March 1968 at the Americal Combat Center.

6. (U) The Americal Division was tasked for the logistical support of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division during its initial in-country reception and training period. The Division also supported the brigades' subsequent move north out of the Division AO.

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F. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

1. (U) GENERAL. This report covers the significant organization, activity, and lessons learned during the period 1 February to 30 April 1968.
2. (U) ORGANIZATION.

a. The G5 Section of the Americal Division is an augmentation to TOE 7-4E and is organized according to paragraph 25, TOE 7-4E as follows:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
ACofS, G5	<u>AUTH/ACT</u> LTC/LTC	1	1
Asst G5	MAJ/MAJ	1	1
Asst G5	/1LT	0	1
Admin Supv	E-7/E-7	1	1
Clerk Typist	E-4/E-5	1	1
Lt Truck Driver	E-3/E-4	2	1

Asst G5 will return to CONUS o/a 1 June 1968.

b. Changes in personnel during the reporting period were as follows:

Departed:	SFC Fisher	10 Feb 68
	MAJ Hall	10 Mar 68
	SSG Parker	22 Apr 68
	SP4 Rauskin	9 Apr 68
Joined:	1LT Jarret	3 Mar 68
	SP4 Gozzard	21 Mar 68

c. The G5 section is augmented by three Civil Affairs Platoons which are under the operational control of the G5, Americal Division. The 4th and 6th platoon are organic to the 29th Civil Affairs Company and the

51st platoon is attached to the company. the 29th Civil Affairs Company is under the command and control of the US Office of Civil operation and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). The 4th CA platoon is an area support role in the Duc Pho AO, the 6th CA platoon is in an area support role in the Chu Lai AO, and the 51st CA platoon is in an area support role in northern Quang Tin Province and southern Quang Nam Province. These platoons coordinate civic action programs in their areas of responsibility and act as liaison agents between US military and civilian agencies.

d. The organic brigades and battalions of the division have principal duty civil affairs officers.

e. The 29th Civil Affairs Company provides a displaced persons team to each Province Senior Advisor in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. These teams assist the Province Advisors in the control of refugees, and maintain records of relief and supplies.

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3. (U) OPERATIONS.

a. On 9 March, the G5 held a meeting for Civic Action Officers in the Americal Division AO. The meeting gave an opportunity for a mutual exchange of information between Civil Affairs Officers, ARVN Advisors and CORDS personnel. Mr. Gary Ayers, Deputy for Civil Operations, Quang Tin Province, explained the capabilities and limitations of the CORDS program. Mr. Michael Korin, CORDS Agriculture Representative, ???, Quang Tin Province, gave the agriculture posture for Quang Tin Province and Vietnam in general. He stated that both lack of initiative on the part of the farmer and lack of water were the main reasons the Spring Harvest fell short of the anticipated yield. The G5 explained that the Americal Division Civic Action Imprest Fund can only be used to assist projects that are of a self-help nature. He cautioned against duplication of effort in areas where there is dual support.

b. On 18 April 1968, a Civil Affairs meeting was held in the office of the Americal Division G5. The meeting was held in order to orient newly assigned personnel. The G4 and CORDS representatives discussed civic action operations and clarified coordination channels between elements of the Division, the GVN province and district officials and the US Advisory teams. The G5 instructed that the office of the ACoFS, G5, Americal Division would be the focal point for all coordination of functions in the G5 area of interest.

c. Throughout the period, the G5 has been coordinating the movement of CORDS supplies from the Sand Ramp at Chu Lai to Tam Ky and Quang Ngai City. The following is a listing of the various supplies transported for CORDS by the Americal Division during the reporting period:

<u>SUPPLIES</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Cement	1,341 tons
Tin	289 tons
Rice	408 tons
Lumber	75,423 Bd Ft
Ammunition	80,510

d. In order to maintain civic action program coordination throughout the Division area, the Americal G5 attends weekly staff meetings held by the Province Senior Advisors at Tam Ky and Quang Ngai.

e. The Americal Division continues to support the large refugee hamlet at Phuoc Thien.

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4. (U) CIVIC ACTION/REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

a. In support of the GVN program of revolutionary development, the G5 Americal Division, has continually maintained close coordination with CORDS in Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and Quang Nam Provinces.

b. Since 1 February 1968, Americal Division elements have performed the following MEDCAP activities:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF VISITS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>
Division Artillery	31	2,402
Division Surgeon	5	9,000
196th Inf Bde	43	3,689
198th Inf Bde	29	39,539
11th Inf Bde	81	14,084
*3d Bde, 4th Inf Div	14	1,478
14th AVN Bn	0	0
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav	10	530
26th Eng	<u>2</u>	<u>83</u>
Totals	215	61,805

* 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div departed the Americal Division on 26 February 1968

c. Units continue to participate in self-help projects throughout the Division area. The Division assisted in the following projects during the period 1 February to 30 April 1968:

- 3- Dispensaries
- 18 - Schools
- 17 - Wells
- 1 - Bridge
- 2 - Marketplaces
- 130 - Refugee housing units
- 12 - Garden plots
- 2 - Playgrounds
- 1 - Church

d. The following items were contributed by units and individuals:

Clothing	-	3,191 lbs
Food	-	205,075 lbs
Lumber	-	41,305 Bd Ft
Soap	-	20,523 bars
Money	-	406,502 \$VN

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e. In order to assist the immediate relief for the people of South Vietnam from the Viet Cong TET Offensive, COMUSMACV designated 22 February 1968 to 2 April 1968 as a period for the members of the US Armed Forces to demonstrate the compassion and sympathy which they felt for the Vietnamese people. A fund raising campaign - TET Aggression Relief Project (TARP) was established. Members of the Americal Division contributed a total of 218,810 \$VN to TARP.

5. (U) a. This report covers organizational and unit activities of G5 (PSYOP) Americal Division during the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968. At the end of the reporting period the PSYOP section was staffed as follows:

PSYOP Officer	1	O-4
Asst PSYOP officer	1	O-3
Administrative NCO	1	E-6
Clerk-typist	1	E-4
Driver	1	E-4

b. In direct support of the division is Detachment 3, 7th PSYOP Bn, consisting of 2 officers and 9 enlisted men. These personnel presently comprise 1 audio-visual (HE) and 3 combat loudspeaker (HB) teams. The HE team consists of 1 officer and two enlisted men while the HB teams consist of 2 enlisted men augmented by 2 Kit Carson Scouts. The loudspeaker teams provide ground, (w)aterborne, and aerial broadcasts [sic] in support of tactical operations and civic action projects in each brigade area. The audio visual teams is in support of division and is used to show films on health and education and provide general entertainment throughout the division area of operations. The 7th PSYOP Bn also supports the division with the production of leaflets, posters and tape recordings. A quick reaction leaflet can be obtained within 36 hours, however, a normal time frame for product on of an original leaflet has been 6 to 10 days.

c. The US Air Force, 9th Air Commando Squadron, provides C47 Aircraft for large leaflet drops. The O2B aircraft broadcasts during daylight hours and drops limited amounts of leaflets on designed target areas.

d. Join United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAC) provides support in the form of leaflets, tapes and films in the Vietnamese language. These films are shown by the audio-visual team throughout the division area of operations to local populace audiences.

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6. (U) PSYOP ACTIVITIES FEBRUARY - APRIL 1968

a. Leaflets

	<u>Disseminated</u>	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Avg Per Tgt</u>
February	42,325,000	396	107,000
March	69,666,750	477	146,000
April	38,473,490	440	90,000
Total	150,465,240	1,313	115,000

b. Loudspeaker broadcasts

	<u>Aerial</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
February	59 hrs 55 min	267 hrs 30 min	7 hrs
March	124 hrs 45 min	235 hrs 30 min	25 hrs 30 min
April	112 hrs	301 hrs	5 hrs
TOTAL	296 hrs 40 min	804 hrs	37 hrs 30 min

c. Movies

February	43	36	5,350
March	83	66	14,825
April	174	104	19,500
TOTAL	300	206	39,675

d. Leaflets developed by PSYOP section, Americal Division

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-134-68	Rallier - Le Kiet	Chieu Hoi
7-135-68	Defeat for 2nd NVA Division	Anti-NVA
7-144-68	Vehicle Accidents	Pro-GVN
7-145-68	Avoid Explosives	Rewards
7-202-68	Don't Run from US Forces	Pro-GVN
7-203-68	Rewards	Rewards
7-233-68	Health Hints	Anti-NVA
7-234-68	The Three Delays	Anti-NVA
7-235-68	Bombs Not Leaflets	Anti-NVA
7-237-68	Planes Will Return	Anti-NVA
7-238-68	Don't Wait to Die	Anti-NVA
7-239-68	Promises and Facts	Anti-NVA
7-247-68	Freedom or Death	Anti-NVA
7-248-68	198th Bde is Here to Help	Pro-GVN
7-263-68	Rallier - Farmers Asscn.	Chieu Hoi

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-263-68	VC Recruitment - Que Son	Anti-VC
7-264-68	VC Dissension - Que Son	Anti-VC
7-265-68	48th Bn - Battle Losses	Anti-VC
7-266-68	72nd Bn - Sickness	Anti-VC

e. PSYOP in support of major operations.

- (1) WHEELER/WALLOWA
 - (a) Leaflets: 48,187,000
 - (b) Aerial Broadcasts: 71 hrs 35 min.
 - (c) Ground broadcasts: 217 hrs
- (2) MUSCATINE
 - (a) Leaflets: 12,333,000
 - (b) Aerial broadcasts: 43 hrs. 25 min.
 - (c) Ground broadcasts: 93 hrs.
- (3) Burlington Trail
 - (a) Leaflets: 3,206,000
 - (b) Aerial broadcasts: 2 hrs. 50 min
 - (c) Ground broadcasts: 10 hrs. 30 min.
- (4) NORFOLK VICTORY (8-19 Apr 68)
 - (a) Leaflets: 1,359,000
 - (b) Aerial broadcasts: 5 hrs. 20 min
 - (c) Ground broadcasts: 2 hrs.

f. "Chieu Hoi" program

(1) Hoi Chanhs by sector 29 Jan 68 - 30 Apr 68

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
Quang Nam	6	14	45	21	86
Quang Tin	2	9	19	24	54
Quang Ngai	-	27	25	35	87
Total	8	50	89	80	227

(2) Hoi Chanhs by operation 29 Jan 68 - 30 Apr 68

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
Wheeler/Wallowa	8	23	64	28	123
Muscatine	--	5	7	3	15
Burlington Trail	--	--	--	17	17
Norfolk Victory	--	--	--	10	10
Total	8	28	71	58	165

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(3) Hoi Chanhs Turned in to Americal Division 29 Jan 68

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
Quang Nam	1	1	2	4
Quang Tin	-	-	1	1
Quang Ngai	5	-	3	8
Total	6	1	6	13

g. Volunteer Informant Program (not previously reported)

(1) Number of Informants 1 Dec 67 - 30 Apr 68

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
3/4 Inf	4	-	-	-	-	4
11th Bde	-	-	34	57	69	160
196th Bde	1	2	4	8	11	26
198th Bde	2	4	-	1	5	12
39th Engr Bn	17	46	47	14	41	165
1/1 Cav	-	-	-	-	3	3
Total	24	52	85	80	129	370

(2) Total payments (\$VN) 1 Dec 67 - 30 Apr 68

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
3/4 Inf	14,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	14,000
11th Bde	-----	-----	60,300	195,460	94,460	350,220
196th Bde	3,000	1,250	68,700	9,500	15,300	97,750
198th Bde	1,200	3,000	---	100	2,450	6,750
39th Engr Bn	13,500	54,200	67,350	26,450	79,950	241,450
1/1 Cav	-----	-----	---	---	3,500	3,500
Total	31,700	58,450	196,350	231,510	195,660	713,670

7. (U) a. Chieu Hoi Campaign.

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Chieu Hoi campaign:

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	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
February	11,050,000	14 hrs 30 min	63 hrs	-
March	20,000,000	51 hrs	30 hrs 45 min	14 hrs
April	21,242,000	56 hrs 40 min	20 hrs 30 min	3 hrs
Total	52,292,000	122 hrs 10 min	114 hrs 15 min	17 hrs

(2) this campaign has been marked by a significant decrease in the number of Hoi Chanhs during the reporting period (Detailed statistics are listed in par 2f). an analysis of the campaign indicates that the drop off occurred during February after the VC TET offensive and continued into March and April when ground action was less intense then during the pre TET months. The VC TET Offensive coupled with the decision to temporarily suspend dissemination of propaganda had significant effects on this campaign.

Not only was there a minimal number of Hoi Chanhs accepted at the Chieu Hoi Centers during February but the after effect of the suspension of the program has resulted in a loss of momentum and credibility. The non-availability of required leaflets during February had a detrimental effect on the attempts to revive this campaign although a considerable portion of aerial loudspeaker time was devoted to this campaign.

(3) The majority of Hoi Chanhs continue to come from the areas where the military action is the most intense. The high percentage of Hoi Chanhs from the Wheeler/Wallowa area of operation bears a direct relationship to the successful military operations conducted by the Americal Division in Quang Nam province.

b. Rewards Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Rewards Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
February	18,121,000	21 hrs 45 min	70 hrs	-
March	19,940,000	20 hrs 55 min	44 hrs 30 min	3 hrs 30 min
April	5,371,000	-----	154 hrs 30 min	----
Total	43,432,000	42 hrs 40 min	269 hrs 15 min	3 hrs 30 min

(2) this campaign has been marked by a significant increase in the number of voluntary informants who have given information concerning both enemy activity, and munitions and arms locations. Since its inception in December 1967, the program has more than tripled in size and all brigades are now actively participating in the payment of rewards to civilians who voluntarily provide such information (Detailed Statistics are listed in par 2g). Of particular significance was an incident that occurred on 26 February 1968. At Que Son (D) Quang Nam (P) A Vietnamese civilian guided US troops to an arms cache which resulted in the recovery of 53 Nosing Nagant?? rifles and 1 7.62 light machine gun. For this information the informant was paid 65,000\$VN.

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(3) Consistent results have been obtained from Operation Muscatine. This area has produced approximately 50% of all material turned in and has been marked by the large number of children who are acting as informants. Approximately 75% of all payments in this area are made to children under 16 years of age. Feedback indicates that both the printed propaganda and the loudspeaker broadcasts are understood and have been received favorably by the civilian populace.

c. Pro GVN Campaign

(1) During the period the following effort was expended in support of the pro GVN Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
February	7,550,000	7 hrs	28 hrs	-
March	11,630,000	13 hrs 15 min	119 hrs 45 min	8 hrs
April	5,210,000	11 hrs 25 min	60 hrs	2 hrs
Total	24,390,000	31 hrs 40 min	207 hrs 45 min	10 hrs

(2) A substantial increase has been shown in the scope of activities of the audio visual (HE) team. In April 1968 104 hrs of movies were shown which was more than the total output of the previous two months. The HE team has previously been utilized in only one brigade area. Present utilization permits the team to operate throughout the entire Americal TAOR.

(3) The combat loudspeaker (HB) teams of Americal Division have conducted various waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts in support of GVN Campaign during the reporting period. These missions were conducted aboard U.S. Army and Navy watercraft, using Military Policemen as crew members.

(4) On 11 Apr 68, a leaflet was disseminated in support of Operation Burlington Trail. This leaflet was targeted at the civilian populace and concentrated on enumerating the many economic benefits that would emerge as a result of opening the road from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc. It requested the support of the civilian populace to report any VC activity and 100,000 copies were disseminated along the entire 20km route by UH1D helicopter.

d. Anti-NVA Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the anti-NVA Campaign:

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	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>
February	1,600,000	-----	10 hrs
March	10,900,000	-----	-----
April	2,975,000	2 hrs 30 min	-----
Total	15,475,000	2 hrs 30 min	10 hrs

(2) On 16 Feb 68 a leaflet was developed by the Americal Division PSYOP to capitalize on the losses suffered by the 2nd NVA Division in Que Son and Duy Wuyen districts. Aerial dissemination was made on known locations of the 2nd NVA Division within the division area of operation.

(3) On 22 Apr 68, a campaign was initiated against MR5 headquarters with the objective of causing disruption of activities[sic], dissension amongst the members and possible defection of personnel. This campaign consists of the dissemination of ten leaflets and five taped messages combined with air strikes on designated targets. It is programmed for a two week period and is expected to terminate early in May 1968.

(4) On 30 Apr 68 PSYOP OPLAN "Summer Victory" was developed and distributed. This contingency plan is designed to counter any propaganda effect the enemy may claim to gain out of offensive action conducted during May 1968. This month is considered ideal for propaganda exploitation as 6 separate North Vietnamese and Communist anniversaries occur during this month.

e. Anti-VC Campaign.

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the anti-VC campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
February	4,104,000	16 hrs 49 min	86 hrs 30 min	7 hrs
March	7,150,000	40 hrs 35 min	40 hrs 30 min	-----
April	3,675,000	41 hrs 25 min	66 hrs	-----
Total	14,929,000	98 hrs 40 min	193 hrs	7 hrs

(2) The campaign conducted to counter the VC TET offensive although eventually considered effective indicated a need for more preparation for such contingencies. Printed propaganda and tapes were not available for usage at the operating level until 8 Feb 68. This coupled with the absence of the armed propaganda personnel (who had been released for TET) initially left a complete void in the PSYOP campaign to counter the VC offensive.

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(3) On 25 Apr 68, two leaflets were developed which were targeted specifically against the 48th and 72nd VC Battalions. Intelligence reports had indicated vulnerabilities in both units pertaining to malaria (72nd Bn) and high combat losses (48th Bn). These leaflets will be disseminated in support of Operation Burlington Trail (72nd Bn) and Operation Muscatine (48th Bn) early in May 1968.

(4) On 27 Apr 68, two leaflets were developed which were targeted against the VC and local populace in Que Son (D), Quang Nam (P). Intelligence reports had indicated dissension amongst local cadre and an impending recruitment - drive. These leaflets will be disseminated throughout the district supported by loudspeaker broadcasts early in May 1968.

G. Inspector General Activities:

1. (U) Inspector General Activities during the last quarter (Feb - Apr) included the conduct of one formal Annual General Inspection, six unit Pre-Annual General Inspections, inspection of fourteen headquarters general and special staff sections in preparation for the forthcoming USARV AGI during the first week of July, and two open messes. In addition, the office conducted an inquiry into the state of morale of two units and processed 223 complaints and requests for assistance.

2. (U) Materiel Readiness and funds were the areas found to be the most deficient throughout all the units inspected.

3. (U) the complainsts[sic] and requests for assistance processed by the office averaged 73 per mont, with a high of 92 received during the month of April. A total of three actual complaints received during the period were considered justified. The bulk of the requests and complaints were in the categories of Malassignments, Medical Treatment, and a variety of items grouped under unit administration.

4. (U) The past quarter saw the organization of an inspection team consisting of 22 members drawn from units within the division, and include inspectors for automotive, food service, supply and materiel readiness, chemical, security, funds, health and sanitation, weapons, and ammunition for the conduct of Pre-Annual General Inspections.

5. (U) The new Inspector General reported in on 30 April and will assume his duties upon departure of the present IG on 6 May 1968.

6. (U) Future plans include the continuance of the vigorous Pre-Annual General Inspection of selected divisional units.

H. (U) Information:

1. (U) During the period 1 February 1968 through 30 April 1968 the Information Office continued as a clearing agency for news releases from the brigades, as well as a news-generating office. Support was provided to the news media, both military and civilian as follows:

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Number of Printed Releases: 166
Number of Pictorial Releases: 262
Number of Home Town News Printed Releases: 677
Number of Formal Press Interviews or Briefings: 5
Number of Correspondents Provided Support: 80

2. (U) Significant events and activities were as follows:

a. During the latter part of February, the Americal Division was given the responsibility of providing support for the 3d Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division upon their arrival in-country. The information office was given the responsibility of providing full PIO support until the brigade's organic PIO arrived. The Information Office immediately set out to obtain approval from MACOI for the public announcement of the brigade's arrival in-country. The request, which was staffed through G2, G3, included a complete news release and was sent as a secret message (DA From 173) on 25 February. The first public announcement of the brigade's location in Chu Lai was monitored on AFVN radio during the first week of March. By that time the brigade's organic PIO had arrived and was given assistance in setting up an effective news dissemination unit.

b. Two new battalions were added to the Division during April. The 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry became a part of the 198th Infantry Brigade, while the 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry was added to the 11th Infantry Brigade. A confidential message was staffed through G3, G2, requesting public announcement of the battalions' arrival. After several days had passed, Colonel Post, USARV-IO, was queried as to whether or not announcement of the new battalions could be made, to which an affirmative was given.

c. Also in April, two new operations were begun by the Division. They were Operation Burlington Trail, which was still in progress at the time of this report, and Operation Norfolk Victory, which has terminated. Announcement of these operations was handled in the same manner as announcement of the new units. As soon as approval for announcement was received, each figured prominently in our daily summaries. A number of news releases and photo-features were submitted by the brigades involved in the operations.

d. During the past quarter, plans for publishing a division magazine and newspaper were finalized and the layout for the magazine was handcarried to Tokyo for publication by Pacific Stars and Stripes. It was learned that Pacific Stars and Stripes has a tremendous backlog of jobs and has over-extended itself. Because no written contract had been made our requirement automatically went to the bottom of the priority list. This led to a delay in the publishing of the magazine. The newspaper was still in the final planning stages at the time of this report, although the firm, Image Public Relations, had been decided upon to publish the first issue. Subsequent printings of the newspaper may be done by another firm, depending upon a report from the assistant division IO who is compiling information from USARV-IO.

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e. During the past quarter, service by the division photo-lab was substandard due to a number of reasons. Because of a post water shortage, water is turned off to the photo-lab, except for limited periods daily. Thus, it became impossible for the photo-lab to meet the increasing demands from the Information Office, along with their other commitments. With the departure of Lt Walters at the first of March the lab was left without a full time OIC. His replacement is admittedly no expert on photography.

f. Distribution of Stars and Stripes: The information Office continued to monitor the distribution of Stars and Stripes during the reporting period. An new distribution list was prepared and implemented in February 1968. The list proved to be a workable one, since distribution was made to unit locations rather than unit parent headquarters. Frequent additions and delegations [sic] were made to the list, as the division's strength and assigned units changed. The 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division received Stars and Stripes from the Americal Division during their stay in Chu Lai. The division is presently receiving its authorized allocation of Stars and Stripes, transportation and pilfering of papers has been reduced, and are no longer major problems.

g. Commanding Information Guidance, 4th Qtr, FY 1968: The division's Command Information Guidance was published and distributed to all subordinate commands with the Command Information Guidance supplied by USARV. The division's guidance added six topics to the Command Information program, with two topics for each of the three months. Additionally, the "M-16" and "safety" were added as general topics, for implementation throughout the quarter. The guidance and the supporting materials have improved the effectiveness of the Command Information Program for the division.

h. Other Publications:

- Fact Sheet - DEROS
- Fact Sheet - Mailing Mistakes
- Fact Sheet - War Trophies
- Fact Sheet - Heat Injuries
- Fact Sheet - Reenlistment
- Fact Sheet - Marihuana [sic]

Revision of the Americal Division's History

A letter explaining the importance and the provisions for procuring the seven USARV Pocket Guides.

i. Additional Support: The 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and two new maneuver battalions came under control of the Americal Division during the reporting period. all units received Command Information Packets, which included fact sheets, histories, Chain of Command Photographs, and guidance letters. This unit was detached from [sic] the Division on 12 March 1968.

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Section II

Lessons Learned, Commanders' Observation, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. Personnel, Administration, Morale, Evaluation and Recommendation.

A. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline.

(1) Subject: (U) Morning Reports

a. Observation - A problem in Morning Reports has arisen in the area of promotions from PVTR E-2 to PFC E-3.

b. Evaluation - Orders are being cut by HQS, Americal Division, promoting EM to PFC, after they reach the Division. However, some of the EM on orders as PVT's are already PFC's. Since reassignment orders from the Replacement Detachment have all men listed as PFC, The Detachment is left with PVT's E-2 in the Strength-By-Grade section. Furthermore, some promotion orders do not reach the Detachment until the men have already been dropped.

c. Recommendation - An established policy has to be formulated to prevent mistakes in picking up replacements. A closer check and updating of EM's 201 file prior to departure from CONUS would help.

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2. Subject: (U) Airport Liaison Team

a. Observation- The Liaison Team has no way of knowing what time of the day or night that replacement personnel will arrive at the Americal Division or the number of personnel that will arrive.

b. Evaluation- Not knowing in advance, the Replacement Detachment cannot provide adequate transportation or hot meals for the new replacements. This causes them to have to stand outside at the airport and await transportation. Also, they have to be fed C-Rations.

c. Recommendation- A phone call or manifest should be made available to the Replacement Detachment prior to the departure from Cam Ranh Bay or Long Binh of new replacements, This would enable the Liaison NCO to have transportation and hot meals waiting for the replacements. Also, this would give the detachment time to prepare billeting space. The finance and personnel teams could be notified and could add additional men, if needed, to expedite overall processing. The manifest would also give the mess sergeant a chance to request adequate rations and to prepare a hot meal rather than serve C-Rations.

3. Subject: (U) Career Group Reenlistment Option

a. Observation. Difficulty has been encountered in obtaining Career Group reenlistment options from HA, USARV. Major problem is the situation which requires forwarding the request by mail and then waiting a considerable length of time before receiving a reply.

b. Evaluation. The time frame between counseling an individual, requesting an option, and receiving an answer is usually over a long period of time. In most cases this has an adverse effect on the reenlistment program, i.e., EM declining reenlistment, etc.

c. Recommendation. Present policy is to check with Division Personnel Management to determine if the division has the facilities to retrain the individual into the desired career group. If the individual can be retrained within the division, he is immediately discharged and reenlisted for the unit which can conduct the retraining. Result is putting "personnel" into personnel and a marked improvement in the division reenlistment rate.

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4. SUBJECT: (U) Transportation of Special Services Supplies
and Equipment

a. Observation. An effective troop recreational program requires the transportation of Special Services equipment and supplies. Because these items are not combat essential, shipping priority is very low and consideration should be given to use of water shipment if facilities are available for docking. Troop morale is very important to a combat unit, and every effort must be made to provide recreational equipment and supplies.

b. Evaluation. The existing system in Vietnam is inadequate.

c. Recommendation. The movement of recreational equipment and supplies be considered for shipment by water whenever possible, and the shipping requirements for this method of transportation be increased accordingly.

5. Subject: (U) Rest and Recuperation Allocations to Hawaii

a. Observation. Many service members serving in Vietnam meet their wives and/or families in Hawaii. Some units deployed from Hawaii and have members' families residing there. These factors increase the demand for Hawaii allocations.

b. Evaluation. That a means should be sought whereby units mentioned above can receive more Hawaii allocations.

c. Recommendation. That R&R allocations to Hawaii be increased for the Americal Division based on the fact that several units have deployed from Hawaii, and many dependents remained there.

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6. SUBJECT: (U) US/Vietnamese Police Relations

a. Observation. US Military Police have experienced limited success in achieving harmonious working relations with the Vietnamese National Police and the ARVN Military Police.

b. Discussion. The Vietnamese police agencies that the US Military Police come in frequent contact with are the ARVN Military Police and the National Police. The ideal combined police team incorporates all three of the police organizations. However, the ARVN MP and National Police level of training, discipline, and efficiency is far below that of the US MP. Further, the disparities in background, culture, and language make it difficult to achieve understanding between the US and Vietnamese police. The rate at which American units displace and the relatively short time that any individual remains at one location also inhibits the development of rapport on a person-to-person basis. Therefore, the Vietnamese police representative sees a constant parade of new faces and greater repetition of combined police efforts that succeed for varying lengths of time. Very few military police operations have well established and successful combined police programs. One example of success in combined police operations occurred recently as a result of close cooperation between a brigade Provost Marshal and a MACV District Advisor. (District advisors do not have police advisors on their team. The nearest representative is the CORDS Public Safety Officer at province level. The district advisor, usually a combat arms officer, does not have the experience nor the time to devote working closely with the police chief.) The brigade Provost Marshal assigned a military NCO and three policemen to a detachment district headquarters for the purpose of working with the district police chief. The results were far more successful than expected. By being available 24 hours a day, the military police developed harmonious professional relationships resulting in local police improvement and the formation of an effective combined police team. The individual policeman's confidence rose knowing that an American MP was present to support him, and police influence was soon extended beyond the steps of the police station. The military police NCO found that by assisting the local policeman in a variety of ways, i.e., improving police station defenses, instructing in police marksmanship, or insuring that a sick dependent received proper medical care; a substantial degree of mutual respect and friendship was formed. The effectiveness of this team quickly proved itself. The combined team working with Popular Forces and provincial reconnaissance units under the control of the district chief began ferreting out VC suspects, confiscating medical supplies and other goods destined for VC use, and cutting deeply into local black market and narcotics operations.

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6. SUBJECT: (U) US/Vietnamese Police Relations (Continued)

c. Recommendation. That whenever possible close and continuous contact be established at district level and below to insure an effective combined police operation. In dealing with the Vietnamese Military Police, the Provost Marshal must make immediate contact with the nearest ARVN Military Police Battalion or company and initiate exchange program, social events, and civic action projects. Effective combined police operations will soon result from these efforts. The assistance rendered by the 23 Military Police to the ARVN Military Police Company in Quang Ngai led to the permanent assignment of two ARVN military policemen at Chu Lai.

7. Subject. (U) Personnel (Staff Judge Advocate)

a. Discussion. The TOE for an infantry division provides for five officers, one warrant officer, and four enlisted men. This is based upon a troop strength of approximately 15,000. This division's general court-martial jurisdiction numbers approximately 24,000 or sixty percent above the strength upon which the TOE is based. In addition, this section furnished legal services to 5,000-10,000 other military personnel of all services in the division area of operations who are not under our GCM jurisdiction. The authorized strength of the office should be increased to insure that adequate legal services are available.

b. OBSERVATION. This section submitted a request in November 1967 that the authorized strength can be increased to seven officers (+2), one warrant officer, and seven enlisted men (+3). Recommend continue emphasis be placed on this request.

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B. (C) Operations.

1. Subject: Use of Frag Grenades in Tunnels or Spider Holes.

(a) Observation. When checking tunnels or spider holes, it is common practice of some to throw in a fragmentation grenade.

(b) Evaluation. Many injuries have been attributed to this practice due to fragments of the grenade and debris from the tunnel which strike the bystander.

(c) Recommendation. When checking tunnels or spider [sic] holes, use frag grenades only as a last resort. First call "come out" in Vietnamese, then if no one comes out, throw a smoke grenade or CS grenade into the tunnel. Only then, if you think you have a VC still in the tunnel, should one throw a frag grenade into the tunnel. Concussion grenades would be the best if they are available.

2. Subject: Protection of Radios.

(a) Observation. On several occasions radios have been damaged and made inoperative due to a small arms fire and shrapnel from mortar rounds.

(b) Evaluation. Radios must be protected to insure that communication is not lost.

(c) Recommendation. RTO's should be instructed to place their radios under ground, i.e., in a hole or sandbagged area. This should be a common practice each night to protect the radio in case of a mortar attack or intense small arms fire.

3. Subject: Scout Dog Operations.

(a) Observation. Scout Dog Dickie was moving with the main body of a patrol in a choke chain when he alerted to the flank. Checking out the alert the infantry found fresh foot printers in the area.

(b) Evaluation. Scout Dogs will alert personnel outside the body of a patrol even though they are not in a working harness and are not with the point element.

(c) Recommendation. All scout dog alerts must be checked even if no apparent reason for the alert is evident.

4. Subject: Scout Dog Operations.

(a) Observation. While on a search and clear operation Scout Dog Rover alerted and refused to enter a trail through a hedgerow. The infantry checked the area and found nothing.

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4. Subject. Scout Dog Operations (Continued)
(a) Observation. (Continued)

Still the dog alerted. An M26 hand grenade was detonated in the area as a precaution causing a secondary explosion which left a crater 3 feet wide and 2 feet deep.

(b) Evaluation. Even though an initial search reveals nothing, extra precautions may pay off with lives saved. Obviously there was an explosive device placed along the trail.

(c) Recommendation. Always double check scout dog alerts even through the initial search reveals nothing. Detonation of a hand grenade, as in this instance, or bypassing the suspect area should be carefully considered.

5. Subject. Scout Dog Operations.

(a) Observation. When using dog teams while searching of dwelling or on point, the dogs must be used to the best tactical advantage. When searching dwellings, the dog and handler with ample security would be allowed to enter the dwelling first. On point, the dog and handler with ample security should lead, primarily in those areas infested with spider holes and tunnels. Dogs should be rotated on point and given ample time to rest.

(b) Evaluation. On numerous occasions, dogs have been able to pick up a scent while on point even though not in the initial direction of travel. Dogs have alerted to scents in an around dwellings which may not be visible to the observer.

(c) Recommendation. Scout dogs should be used where tactically possible. The acuity of their senses is a great benefit to the infantry platoon or company.

6. Subject: The use of CS Riot Agent Grenades in the Night Defensive Perimeter.

(a) Observation. During a recent operation, the patrol base from which a company was operating was subjected to a ground attack by an estimated company size force of Viet Cong. The terrain was mountainous, the foliage thick and visibility was near zero because of rain clouds. Each man in the company was armed with a minimum of four fragmentation grenades and one CS grenade in addition to individual and crew served weapons. Because of low visibility and thick vegetation, it was difficult to locate targets by means other than sound; the heavy foliage prevented accurate throwing of hand grenades even at targets which were observed.

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6. Subject: The use of CS Riot Agent Grenades in the Night Defensive Perimeter (Continued).

(b). Evaluation. During the heaviest period of the attack, CS grenades were employed. Since all individuals in the unit had protective masks there was no danger to friendly elements. The employment of CS not only broke the attack by forcing the enemy to withdraw but also the effects of the non toxic agent caused many of the enemy soldiers to give away their positions so that small arms fire was effective.

(c) Recommendation. The principal advantage of CS in this circumstance is that it is an area weapon whose effects were not hindered but enhanced by the same weather conditions which limited the effects of fragmentation grenades. The use of CS was even more effective because it affected only those personnel who did not have protective masks, i.e., the enemy.

7. Subject: Procedure for Indicating PZ's.

(a) Observation. During a recent operation, a rice paddy was used for a pick up zone. Smoke was used to indicate the position of the lead and rear helicopters. The man who was to throw a smoke grenade to indicate the lead ship's position threw his smoke grenade in the water, causing it to work improperly. However, the smoke for the rear ship did function properly, causing confusion among the pilots and troops who were to be lifted out.

(b) Evaluation. In damp areas extreme caution must be taken to insure that smoke grenades do not become wet or submerged in water so that they work properly.

(c) Recommendation. When using a rice paddy for a PZ be sure to keep smoke grenades out of the water. The problem can be eliminated by removing the pin and placing the smoke grenade on a dike before releasing the safety lever.

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8. Subject: Elimination of Snipers.

(a) Observation. Units of this command have developed the following technique to counter sniper tactics. As soon as a sniper fires, the friendly units returns fire and requests aerial observation of the area from where the fire was received. When an aircraft is over the target area, the attacking unit moves into the hamlet or hedgerows where booby traps are usually emplaced. If the sniper tries to run out of the hamlet the aircraft places fire on the enemy which usually causes him to take cover in a trench, tunnel or bunker. The spot is then marked with smoke and the ground troops move in and kill or capture him. When the aircraft fails to spot anyone running from the hamlet a thorough search of every house and bunker is made. This technique usually brings results. The success of such operations depends primarily on the reaction time required to bring an aircraft on station. The battalion command and control ship is used and is on station over the target area in five minutes or less in most instances. If the enemy force is determined to be greater than two or three snipers, helicopter gunships are called to reinforce the command and control ship. This technique probably would not be practical in areas where large organized enemy forces are encountered.

(b) Evaluation: Most hamlets have one or two snipers who take friendly units under fire from well concealed spider holes in hedgerows around the hamlets. The spider holes usually have well concealed escape routes which the snipers use as soon as the friendly unit begins to move toward the sniper's position. Experience has shown that the sniper will usually do one of two things as the friendly unit closes in on the hamlet; he will run out of the back side of the hamlet by a route which cannot be observed by ground troops, i.e., usually by a trench; or he will hide in a well concealed place on the interior of the village, i.e., in a well, a house with a false wall, a hole in the ground with well camouflaged cover, etc. The snipers often place booby traps near the area they fire from.

(c) Recommendations: That commanders make maximum use of aircraft to help ground troops locate and eliminate an elusive enemy.

9. Subject: Increased Protection for M113 Against HEAT Projectiles.

(a) Observation: All of the anti-tank weapons employed by the VC/NVA are HEAT projectiles which use the shape charge principle. Anything which can be done to affect the stand-off distance- cause the round to detonate early- will degrade the effects of the round. It is a troop SOP, Troop E, 1st Cavalry that the trim vane on the M113 ACAV's be carried in a vertical or forward position. The vertical position is generally better since it allows one to knock down small trees and brush without damage to the trim vane.

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The trim vane can easily be placed in this position by attaching a rope or chain to the vane and anchoring it somewhere on the front of the ACAV. Several filled sand bags are placed between the trim vane and the front slope of the ACAV to keep the trim vane vertical. Thus when a B-40 rocket or a 57mm recoilless rifle round hit the trim vane it will detonate. Then depending on the point of impact the jet stream of the round will pass through either several inches or perhaps as much as three feet of air space before hitting the frontal slope of armor. By this time much of the penetration power of the jet stream has been dissipated.

(b). Evaluation: Recently during an operation one of E Troop's vehicles took a direct frontal hit from a B-40 rocket on its trim vane. The round hit almost in the very center of the vane, resulting in a very large hole. However, it was almost impossible to tell where the jet stream hit the hull. There was no damage to the engine compartment and the vehicle continued in action. After the action was over it took approximately 10 minutes to put on a new trim vane.

(b) Recommendation: That a test be conducted to determine the value of having the trim vane placed out as in swimming.

10. Subject: Inter-communication of Crewmembers on Helicopters.

(a) Observation: The wind wash over the microphone of aircraft crewmembers causes a rushing, crackling noise to come through the inter-phones and distorts voice communication to the point of inaudibility. This is particularly applicable with the OH-23G helicopters when the door runner leans out of the aircraft to observe a target.

(b) Evaluation: It was discovered that if the microphone on the crewmember's helmet is covered with a thin layer of foam rubber or similar material it reduced the rushing, crackling noise and made inter-communications much clearer.

(c) Recommendation: This innovation should be brought to the attention of other aviation units, and particularly those units utilizing the OH-23G helicopters for armed visual reconnaissance.

11. Squad Radio Systems.

(1) Observation: The squad radio system, AN/PTR-4 and PRR-9, has proven to be inadequate for short range communication between the platoon and squad leaders. On a variety of missions ranging from internal platoon nets to usage on perimeter bunker defense nets, it has been experienced during actual combat operations and during testing situations, on flat terrain where the sources of transmissions were lost repeatedly at distances of 40-50 meters.

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The sets have been calibrated and re-calibrated by higher echelon personnel with appreciable improvement in performance. Consequently because the set do not provide the platoon or squad leaders with the communications capability necessary for shortrange transmissions when they are forced to use line of sight contact, the radio sets are unsuitable for usage under the existing terrain and tactical requirements. Too, on several occasions during the time of battle when it was found that assigned frequencies further renders the particular squad radio sets not conducive to the expediency necessary for battlefield operations.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Platoon leaders need a small lightweight radio with which they can communicate at short distance to their squad leaders, during combat operations in the field.

(b) Because of the difficulty in laying and maintaining field wire for internal communication with the TA-1 hand powered set, the TA-312 and the TA-43/PT sets among individual bunkers and command posts in a static defense position, there is a great and urgent need for a small-squad, short range radio system that will provide the source for communicating the coordination of a perimeter defense.

(3) Recommendation: There is a very pressing need for a field radio set which is lightweight and is easily handled as a new squad radio but one that will provide reliable communications at short ranges for the platoon and squad leaders during combat operations within 500 meters and will not be greatly affected by the loss of line of sight. Preferable, the system would be most advantageous should it become a single unit device for a chest mount with an earplug and a helmet mounted boom mike (such as aviators employ) for clandestine operations.

12. Ground to Air Marking System

(1) Observation: During the hours of reduced visibility when friendly elements become heavily engaged with overwhelming-size enemy forces the adjustment of air to ground supporting fires has been far too slow for effective employment and extremely dangerous when employed in support of the friendly ground element. Of course, fires from supporting aircraft cannot be utilized until all friendly positions within the battle area have been detected by aircraft pilots. Because of this mandatory requirement, it becomes rather difficult to mark friendly element locations adequately so that they may be quickly identified by the aircraft pilots without pinpointing the friendly positions for the enemy.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Prompt identification of all friendly positions on the ground to supporting traffic.

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(b) Accurate identification and marking of friendly positions for supporting aircraft without concurrently delineating friendly held boundaries for the enemy forces.

3. Recommendation:

(a) It is necessary to develop a device that can be rapidly employed by the friendly ground elements to designate their exact outer boundaries (i.e., defensive perimeter, assault line, or combat fire an maneuver formation) which would be easily and quietly identifiable for the pilots, without compromising the exact position of the friendly ground forces.

(b) There is the requirement for a small durable, lightweight, and compact lighting device that would project and image of an arrow into the sky with the same intensified beam given off by the strobe lighting device. Such an instrument would be most invaluable not only for highlighting friendly boundaries rapidly and effectively for the supporting aircraft pilots but also such a device could be utilized to direct the supporting fires on enemy locations to be destroyed without disclosing the friendly locations.

C. TRAINING

1. Signal Trouble-Shooting

(a) Observation: Operator training received by personnel at the United States Army Signal School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and Fort Gordon, Georgia, adequately prepares the student as an operator in his specific MOS, however in most instances the operator lacks sufficient training to conduct an effective trouble shooting procedure to sectionalize, localize, and isolate the component (s) that fails. This is particularly predominate with personnel in MOS 31M.

(b) Evaluation: In order to overcome this problem a mobile maintenance team/instructor group traveled to all signal battalion operating sites and presented instruction in trouble shooting methods. This is being done on a continuing basis.

(c) Recommendations: That operator training in schools be extended in depth and that instructions on trouble shooting techniques be extensive enough to train operators in proper procedures to sectionalize, localize, and isolate component failures.

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2. Signal Power Equipment.

(a) Observation: It has been determined that school trained personnel operating signal equipment which required power generators knew little or nothing about maintenance and operation of the power equipment. As a result, several generators have been deadlined due to improper maintenance performed by the operators.

(b) Evaluation: Through a study of the power generator problems within the units, it was determined that signal equipment and correct operation of power generating equipment at the service schools. In an effort to improve maintenance programs, classes were conducted for all operators, mechanics, and supervisors by a technical representative from USAMECOM, which proved to be beneficial to all concerned.

(c) Recommendation: That service schools incorporate classes for communication equipment operator personnel in operation and maintenance of power generating equipment, and that units which are experiencing similar problems utilize the USAMECOM technical representative training program.

D. Intelligence (C)

1. Discussion: More and better information can be obtained from a PW when time is taken to coordinate OB information with that of the interrogation section.

Observation: We have found that through this coordination the useless harassment of the PW is prevented and timely intelligence is made faster and easier.

2. Discussion: Coordination between the CI Section, II Section and OB Section has produced reliable intelligence from unreliable sources.

Observation: Instead of pushing CI agent reports aside we have this information and compared it with information from the Section. Now, when an agent report gives an enemy location or installation we have a means of verifying it by the use of readouts on SLAR, VR, APD, and IR missions received from II section. We also feed back to the CI Section evaluation reports on the agents information. Thus CI is better able to judge the effectiveness of their agents.

3. Discussion: Our coordinated efforts with the II Section in establishing a "Targeting Team" has enabled us to produce more extensive and timely intelligence.

Observation: We have found that by setting up a separate team of two

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men from the OB Section and two men from the II Section, with both sections plotting their information on the same Situation Map, we are able to arrive at probable enemy locations, fortifications, movements, etc. This information is used by Americal Division Artillery in plotting their H&I fires and G2 Air for airstrikes. When possible a feed back on the effectiveness of the artillery is sent to us for the purpose of checking our effectiveness. this same information is used to evaluate CI agent reports.

4. Discussion: More effective intelligence on the enemy has been obtained through the coordination and cross-training of each OB Specialist and through daily briefings on current enemy activity each man has been able to acquire a working knowledge of the enemy situation.

Observation: As a result of this coordination, we have found that the officers are able to carry on more liaison with subordinate units because the men in the section are capable of satisfying most requests that enter our office without the aid of an officer. Most important, we have been able to instill the confidence in the men that is necessary for a smooth and efficient operating team.

5. Discussion: We have found that it is necessary to have a filing system that can enable us to find information with speed and ease.

Observation: At one time we were forced to waste time hunting through papers for facts to prove a point or assist in writing a report. Now our files are set up with an index system and there are also catalog files that are crossed referenced for quick access to immediately needed information such as letter box numbers, code names, AKA's and personalities.

6. Observation: A separate targeting section has been created.

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7. DISCUSSION: A vehicle is essential to the operation of an II Section. This is used to pick up photography and maps and to provide transportation of AO's to and from their aircraft.

Observation: The II Section has no vehicle and the detachment is presently minus three 1/4 tons and one 3/4 ton truck out of the eleven vehicles authorized. A priority five was assigned by the G-4.

1. SUBJECT: Problems Encountered with Detector Seismic Intrusion.

a. Observation: The AN/PSR-1, Detector, Seismic Intrusion, Model A-150A is an effective device and can be a great aid in early warnings of enemy approaches into an area, when conditions favor its capability. There are several prominent disadvantages inherent in the system that must be overcome scientifically or reduced significantly if the detector intrusion device is to be employed effectively and reliably as an early warning device in the defense of combat fire support bases, observation and/or listening posts, and rifle company-size perimeters.

The Seismic device picks up any and all vibrations in the earth not only those of low intensity within close proximity to the geophone (i.e. the sounds of suspected enemy footsteps for which it was designed to detect), but it also picks up other vibrations in the earth of higher intensity and at ranges far greater than specified for the probes; prime examples of which are impacting artillery, airstrikes, and helicopter rotor wash. It further detects movements of friendly personnel walking far to the rear of employed positions and picks up the rustling noises of the wind in the bushes and tree lines. The net results for the detection of enemy movement is drowned by the variety of other sounds or fatigue which clouds the operator's mind and render the system valueless.

A second disadvantage of the device is the dependence on pre-positioned geophones and reliance on land lines to return the detected vibrations from the geophone to the console.

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By having to place the sensors in positions, one also alerts the enemy to the fact of its presence and further telegraphs the friendly interest in the specific area. Thus enemy either attempts to circumvent the area or destroy the device. Moreover, the reliance on wire subjects the system to the hazards of tracked vehicles, shell-fragments, policed-up by civilians and so on.

A third disadvantage of the Seismic Intrusion Detector is the fact that it is a restricted limited area system; unless a considerable number of sensors are available, one cannot pinpoint the suspected location to a specified point on the ground and therefore must rely upon an area type weapon to take the enemy under fire.

(b) Evaluation: The AN-PSR-1, Model X-150, Seismic Intrusion Detector picks up excessive background noises which make it ineffective toward the specific purpose for which it was designed. Once the probes are employed along likely avenues of approach, the instrument confines the efforts toward a relatively small restricted area which has no outlet for flexibility,

(c) Recommendations: Based on the preceding disadvantages, the Seismic Intrusion Detector should either be replaced or supplemented with an instrument of sound amplification nature which would incorporate the following capabilities:
Distinguish detection of foot movement with a minimum of background noises.
Sensors whereby the operator may avoid dependance upon wire and pre-positioning. A variable scan capability to allow either for large sector coverage (60 degrees) or for small sector coverage (5-10 degrees); either of which should be applicable to the effective range of the basic small arms (400-500 meters).
The practical instrument must be light in weight and compact, similar to the starlight scope, so that it may be easily carried and operated by an individual rifleman.

2. Subject: Observation of Vietnamese Nationals

a. Observation: Units within this command employ a number of Vietnamese nationals as permanent labor or daily labor.

b. Evaluation: Due to the possibility of infiltration of enemy agents into the area it is necessary that all Vietnamese national employees be carefully guarded and observed while working.

c. Recommendations: That Vietnamese Nationals employed as laborers be kept in the sight and control of US guards at all times, and that the minimum acceptable control of one (1) US guard for each ten (10) Vietnamese Nationals be enforced.

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3. Subject: Safeguarding SOI's.

a. Observation: Operational commitments require that certain personnel carry SOI's or SOI extracts on their person.

b. Evaluation: SOI's or SOI extracts, when carried by the individual, can be lost or compromised by poor safeguarding procedures.

c. Recommendations: That all SOI's or SOI extracts be secured by means of a dog tag worn around the neck of the user. It is further recommended that SOI's or extracts be returned to classified storage facilities at the end of each working period unless operational commitments dictated otherwise.

4. Subject: Gathering of Intelligence Information from Civilians in Enemy Controlled Areas.

a. Observation: In an area in which the enemy still exerts a considerable amount of influence, willing cooperation, in the form of agent reports from the civilian populace, is at times nonexistent. This fact has hampered our efforts in these locations since intelligence has had to depend upon aerial reconnaissance flights and information gained as a result of operations.

b. Evaluation: The "Snatch" has proved an effective method for gathering timely intelligence of a specific area. This operation is well suited to the Air Cavalry Troop. The "Snatch" team consists of a UH1H containing an infantry fire team.

When a suitable individual is located by the reconnaissance element, the infantry team is inserted for the capture, hence the term "Snatch", while the reconnaissance team provides cover and cuts off possible avenues of escape. The detainee is then returned to the base camp where he is interrogated by an IPW team. Items of interest are usually location and strength of enemy in the area, supply and weapon caches, and recent enemy activity. If the interrogation is productive, the detainee may be asked to lead ground elements into the area so as to further exploit pertinent information. Immediate response to intelligence of this sort is essential to the success of the operation.

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c. Recommendation: The Air Cavalry employs the "Snatch" most effectively. Its helicopters provide [sic] the requisite surprise, often lacking when ground elements move into the area. By combining fire power and maneuverability, the helicopter is supremely suited for fixing and isolating the prospective detainee. The detainee can be quickly transported to base camps where trained IPW teams are available for proper evaluation of information. This fact allows the commander to commit his ground elements quickly, and upon reliable intelligence. It is also important to note this tactic is effective only in relatively open terrain where aircraft can maneuver while maintaining visual contact with the prospective detainee, thus closing off his avenue of escape.

5. Subject: Detainees

a. Observation: Past experience with detainees seized in the field have led to the conclusion that these detainees who are interrogated immediately after capture provide the most information. The field commander and his interrogator have the advantage over the military intelligence teams by their being present in the environment of the detainee when he is captured. The detainee, if he has committed a suspicious act, knows that his captors were witnesses, and that point in the interrogation is understood by both parties; therefore establishment of such an act is the questioning is unnecessary and time is saved. Any information given by the detainee is usually easily described and understood as both parties are located in the area of concern. Reaction to useful information is immediate and the normal 12-24 hours "read-out" waiting time is avoided. The administrative and travel time involved in processing detainees is bypassed by immediate interrogation and the effect of the detainee still being in the shack [sic] of capture is an aid to the interrogator.

b. Evaluation: Immediate interrogation is best accomplished by trained interrogators. This can be done by having trained intelligence teams make frequent trips to the field, especially when intelligence on a locale indicates that the inhabitants are involved in enemy activities or may provide information. An alternative proposal would have selected individuals from battalion sized units trained in interrogative techniques.

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c. Recommendations: More information is gleaned from a detainee when he is interrogated immediately after capture. Standing plans should be in effect to provide units with interrogator-interpreters or to send an interrogator upon request. It is also suggested that RVN interpreters newly assigned to subordinate units be given training in the techniques of proper interrogation.

6. Subject: Enemy Information

a. Observation: Accurate, up-to date intelligence information upon which to base offensive sweep operations is normally difficult to obtain, due to the time required to process and disseminate reports from the various intelligence sources available. Usually the receipt of an intelligence report occurs 2 to 15 days following actual collection of information contained in the report. The fact that VC normally do not remain in one specific area more than 1 day at a time complicates the continuing problem of accurately locating the enemy.

b. Evaluation: Additional methods for gathering current intelligence and verifying reports just prior to offensive action are necessary to the conduct of successful operations. One such method is reconnaissance of targets by heliborne aero scouts. This unit has successfully obtained current information concerning specific areas by directing an aero scout element to "Snatch" or pick-up suspected VC or individuals living close to or within these areas. These individuals often provide information upon which to base immediate offensive action.

c. Recommendation: That aero scouts, when available be employed to reconnoiter a number of potential targets to aid in the selection of that specific area most likely to contain the greatest concentration of VC.

7. Subject: The Hand-Held Camera Program

a. Observation: The hand-held camera when used by aerial observers is valuable for measurement and verification of visually sighted and suspected targets. Photography obtained in this manner has also been an aid in briefing FAC pilots prior to air strikes.

b. Evaluation: Imagery interpreters are widely employed as aerial observers in RVN, but II personnel are not normally trained in aerial photographic techniques prior to assignment in-country. Furthermore, II Sections do not have the necessary camera equipment for the program, which necessitates borrowing the needed equipment.

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c. Recommendation: That imagery interpreters be school trained in the use of hand-held cameras for aerial photography and that cameras and associated equipment be included in the TOE of field-based II Sections.

8. Subject: Target Folders

a. Observation: In targeting operations, best results are achieved by maintaining two sets of target folders; one for hard targets such as tunnels and fortifications, and the other for soft targets such as cultivation, population location and movements, and individuals observed evading friendly sweeps.

b. Evaluation: The use of this system keeps the folders relatively uncluttered, and permits rapid recognition of enemy movement into an area as well as more accurate estimates of strength.

c. Recommendation: Hard and soft targets within an area of operations should be recoded in separate target folders to facilitate recognition of enemy activity.

9. Subject: Operations Against the VC Infrastructure

a. Observation: One of the most difficult problems which confronts tactical elements is the identification of infrastructure personalities encountered on operations. It is not feasible to have all suspects encountered in the field transported to the detention facilities for screening. Best results are obtained when a local GVN official is available to be transported to the area where the operation has been conducted upon the request of the tactical unit commander. These officials are usually quite knowledgeable of the area and the populace where the operation was conducted, and are often able to identify infrastructure suspects to be detained for interrogation.

b. Evaluation: Coordination with local GVN officials during infrastructure elimination operations proves beneficial in three ways:

Personnel known by local authorities to be part of infrastructure are efficiently apprehended. Field interrogation of individuals determined to be members of the infrastructure often leads to the apprehension of other personnel and equipment in the immediate area.

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E. (U) LOGISTICS

1.(U) Subject: Activation of a unit in RVN>

a. Observation: Trained supply personnel were not assigned to this unit prior to the reception of a majority of its authorized strength. As a result very little TOE equipment, with the exception of aircraft and other mission essential equipment, was available in February. Although the unit had the ability to complete its combat task, it was unable to adequately complete other requirements.

b. Evaluation: Effective supply operations are dependent on trained supply personnel. Necessity demands that trained supply personnel be available during all phases of activation, including initial planning conferences.

c. Recommendation: Supply personnel should be assigned prior to unit activation to insure the timely receipt of required equipment.

2.(U) Subject: Use of Multiple DA Form 2765-1

a. Observation: Initially requisitions submitted to the 58th General Depot were submitted on the one part DA Form 2765. Although the use of the single form is accepted by depot, problems in identifying outstanding requirements were more difficult since the commodity managers had only the machine run status list to identify unit requisitions. Later DA Form 2765-1 which has several parts was used to better advantages.

b. Evaluation: By using the multiple DA Form 2765-1, the commodity managers are able to pull a skin copy and use this skin copy to identify documentation for which follow ups are submitted. The overall results are a smoother flow of supplies from the depot to the requesting unit.

c. Recommendation: That DS units use DA Form 2765-1 when submitting requisitions to depot.

3.(U) Subject: Report Passing Actions

a. Observation: Qui Nhon Depot will attempt to fill IPD 02/05 passed from DSU's from stocks on hand. If stocks are unavailable, Qui Nhon will pass the 02/05 requisition to 14th ICC and will not establish a due out, due in, or have any obligation to supply the part even if stockage is received after the 02/05 requisitions have been passed Stocks will be released against IPD 12 due cuts.

b. Evaluation: Critically needed supplies can [sic] have been misdirected by Qui Nhon Depot using only a passing action for 02/05.

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requisitions. 723d Maint Bn Tech Supply has utilized a 02/05 reference deck system to notify the receiving section of all outstanding 02/05 due outs. Although 02/05 requisitions passed to Qui Nhon, a due out to customer, and due in from depot are established. When a stockage requisition is received by warehouse, the reference deck is screened for outstanding 02/05 due outs. The reference card is annotated and forwarded to NCR 500 van as a receipt. When the customer's 02/05 requisition is received the reference card has been deleted and the items are put into stock. The priority 02/05 due in/due out/reference deck system has worked exceptilnally [sic] well since its implementation four months ago.

A similar system is used in the 23d Supply and Transport Battalion.

c. Recommendation: That Depots give serious consideration to adopting the principle of establishing due outs for IPD 02/05 requisitions utilizing a procedure compatible with equipment and procedures available.

4.(U) Subject Material Handling at Small Unit Level

a. Observation: Materials handling equipment is now in widespread use by all support units except those at consumer battalion level. Except for some class III, all distribution of supplies in Americal Area of Operation is supply Point type. Because of austere truck authorization in using units (9 each 2 1/2 ton trucks per Infantry Battalion), Battalion Service Platoons are sorely pressed to keep bulk supplies moving forward.

b. Evaluation: Infantry Battalion Basic Loads (Class I - 9 tons Class IV - 4 tons Class V - 57 tons) total 709 tons, or 28 each 2 1/2 ton load equivalentents. One hundred percent overload of trucks, which is normal on hard surface roads, is still 14 truck equivalentents, or an increase of 5 each 2 1/2 ton trucks over current Light Infantry Battalion TOE authorization. Palletization of bulk items such as rations and ammunition is universal but no lift equipment is available to the end distributor, the Battalion Service Platoon.

c. Recommendation:

(1) That M-543 medium wrecker and a pallet sling be authorized each Infantry Battalion.

(2) That each Infantry Battalion be authorized a minimum of 14 (preferable 18) 2 1/2 tong trucks.

5.(U) Subject: Modification of TOE 17-106G (Armored Cav Sqd) by the Addition of six 500 Gallon collapsible drums, pump unit, and sling equipment.

a. Observation: When cavalry troops with tanks and APC's operate away from roads for extended periods of time, Class III resupply by truck mounted service units is precluded. There are no provisions for any other type of refueling apparatus in our present TOE.

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b. Evaluation: Presently borrowed 500 gallon collapsible drums are flown out to the unit by CH 47 helicopters. A portable 50-100 GPM pump is used to refuel the vehicles from the fuel bladders. authorization for collapsible drums and pump unit is required for armored units operating in terrain impassable to trucks.

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c. Recommendation: That TOE/MTOE authorization be made from collapsible drums and pump units to overcome the operational resupply problems that arise when operating track vehicles for extended periods in areas which cannot be resupplied by road.

6.(U) Subject: Helicopter resupply of Battalion and Larger Units for Protracted Periods.

a. Observation: Service Platoon of Light Infantry Battalion is responsible for the procurement, processing and delivery of all classes of supply when supported units are not accessible via road. Equipment with which to accomplish this assigned task is distributed by TOE to the supported units but should be centralized in the Service Platoon. Authorized equipment represents about 10% of the actual requirements for sustained heliborne resupply and does not include types of all slings needed.

b. Evaluation: A complete study of the overall aspect of aerial resupply is needed at DA of CDC level. Required equipment should be incorporated into a table of allowances for use by units thus engaged.

c. Recommendations:

- (1) Table of allowance authorization
- (2) Deletion of slings from TOE's.
- (3) Deletion of all slings of less than 8 feet length and 10,000 pounds capacity.
- (4) Increase of 12' x 12' cargo nets and larger with a rated capacity of 10,000 pounds minimum.
- (5) Development of a sleeve type cargo net with a bottom end jettison or quick release to permit immediate retrograde of sling by delivery helicopter.

7.(U) Subject: Shortage of Antennas

a. Observation: The supply system has been unable to satisfy demands for the AT-892 Short, Flexible Antenna (FSN 5820-8990-3803) on the AN/PRC-25 Radio.

b. Evaluation: Research revealed that a similar antenna was in supply channels. This antenna is the short antenna (FSN 5820-253-1674) for use on the PRC-10 radio. Performance tests proved that the transmission and reception using this adaptation was equal to the regular AT-892 antenna.

c. Recommendation: That in instances where the PRC-25 short antenna is not available the PRC-10 short antenna be modified as a substitute.

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8. (U) Subject: Reduction of Battlefield litter of potential use to the enemy.

a. Observation: Substantial amounts of waste material is generated in field environments which cannot be disposed of adequately by troops. Some examples of which are C-ration cans, ammo box wire, and expended smoke grenades.

b. Evaluation: Currently enemy forces make use of these items to provide shrapnel for their boby [sic] traps and mines. The high exploding rate of most commonly used battlefield explosive makes even light objects quite lethal.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That all wires and banding straps be removed from ration and ammo cartons prior to issue to field.

(2) That maximum use be made of soft aluminum containers in supplies like rations, smoke grenades and beer/soda. Such cans may easily be rendered useless by a pocket knife or bayonet.

9. (U) Subject: Water Resupply in Inaccessible Areas.

a. Observation: When field units are employed in areas of heavy vegetation resupply of water and other items is difficult.

b. Evaluation: The use of the 5 gallon plastic water bottle and a slack rope eliminates the need for the ground unit to clear LZ. A snap link should be fastened to the handles of the water bottle and the snap link attached to the rope by means of a half-turn (friction from sliding melts the handles of the water bottle precluding the direct attachment of the handles to the rope). One man on the ground with the end of the slack rope can control the descent of the water bottle by increasing or decreasing the amount of slack.

c. Recommendation: This procedure should be publicized so that units with similar situation may make use of the idea. With a little ingenuity this method will work for resupply of many items which can not be free-dropped.

10. (U) Subject: Combat Load for the Individual Soldier

a. Observation:

(1) In order for the individual soldier to accomplish his assigned combat mission, he must have the necessary equipment to sustain himself in the field for a specified period of time. All of the individual fighting men of a rifle company must carry either an M16 Rifle, CAR 15 Rifle, M14 Sniper Rifle, M79 Grenade Launcher, and or an M60 machine-gun. 9,000 rounds of machinegun ammunition, 900 rounds of M79 grenade ammunition, 360 rounds of machinegun plus four fragmentation grenades per individual, 72 smoke grenades, 200 flares, 70 pounds of demolitions and a minimum of 18 claymore mines, are required to be carried by the personnel of a rifle company.

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(2) The above equipment coupled with the required rucksack, poncho and poncho liner, pistol belt and suspenders, two first aid pouches and packs, bayonet, four canteens filled with water, air mattress, entrenching tool, rifle cleaning pouch and material, extra socks toilet articles, a change of clothing, and nine meals of C-rations, brings the average weight of equipment load to approximately 85 pounds per man.

(3) During the hot weather season, the weight of the equipment greatly reduces the maneuverability of the individual soldier and is one of the major contributing factors causing heat casualties.

b. Evaluation:

(1) the poncho, poncho liner, and air mattress create unnecessary additional weight and bulk for the combat soldier, especially when items are wet.

(2) LRP rations must be made available in larger quantities than are presently being issued for the combat soldier, in an effort to reduce the excessive weight of three days supply of C-rations.

c. Recommendation:

(1) To bring relief to the individual soldier during the hot weather season, his combat load must be reduced to a maximum of 40 pounds. Therefore, it is essential that the combat soldier be provided lighter weight sleeping gear and rations. This could be accomplished very readily by a light weight poncho and a lightweight hammock. Both items must be durable, waterproof, and have the capability of being folded into a pocket size package. The use of such items will eliminate the necessity for carrying the bulky poncho, poncho liner, and air mattress.

(2) In addition, the LRP (Long Range Patrol) rations or a similar lightweight substitute should be issued exclusively to the field soldier during the hot weather season. The exclusive use of the LRP type rations would reduce the three days ration weight by 13 pounds and further lessen the volume of C-rations.

11.(U) Subject: Red Ball Expanded (RBX) Procedures.

a. Observation:

(1) The 723 Maintenance Battalion's use of RBX program to acquire critical repair parts in anticipation of deadline was minimal through 31 Jan 68

(2) Prior to March quantities authorized to be placed on RBX were exceptionally restrictive, ranging from 10% to 25% of 15 day safety level quantity.

(3) Critical items of equipment were going deadline before repair parts were requisitioned on a Red Ball request, causing delays in returning end items to serviceable status.

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(4) A concerted effort was initiated by Battalion Material Section to RBX critical repair parts based on previous deadline experience and future parts projections from organic maintenance elements, and Division Base Maintenance Officers.

b. Evaluation:

(1) RBX procedures have produced small but sufficient quantities of critical parts, e.g. APC track, sprockets, road wheels to preclude deadline.

(2) Several factors contribute to the success of the RBX:

(a) Referral of the RBX to CONUS supply sources on an expedited basis has opened additional supply resources. Material Readiness Expeditors (MRE's) at Qui Nhon Depot are limited to repair parts immediately available at the Depot. The average time from submission of RBX request to receipt of repair parts in 3 1/2 to 4 weeks from CONUS sources.

(b) 1st Log Command's upward revision of percentages DSU's may RBX (25% of R.O.) has significantly contributed to improved RBX performance.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That continued and broadened use be made of Red Ball expanded system.

(2) The Maintenance Battalion Tech Supply Officer, Materiel Section, be assigned responsibility for coordinating RBX matters between Materiel, Tech Supply and Division Base Maintenance Officers.

12.(U) Subject: Shortage of Repair Parts

a. Observation:

During the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968, track shoes for M113 series vehicles became very critical. Although sufficient quantities were on requisition the supply system was not responding to the demands placed upon int.

b. Evaluation:

Upon querying the Supply Depots, Inventory Control Center and USARV all reports indicated that track shoes were on hand in the majority of Supply Depots. Follow-up action was not taken on requisitions placed into the supply system.

c. Recommendation:

All requisitions for combat essential repair parts should use the Red Ball Expanded requisitioning system to the maximum extent.

13.(U) Subject: Engineer Mechanical Equipment

a. Observation:

Many deadline generators in the past were the direct result of improper, or inadequate operational maintenance.

b. Evaluation:

Due to climate conditions, it is imperative that the operation and maintenance of generators and other engineer mechanical equipment be strictly adhered to. Under the present TO&E for direct & support Artillery Battalion, generator operators are not authorized.

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c. Recommendation:

Personnel located at fire bases should be taught the fundamentals of operating and maintaining generators. These persons should then be assigned the sole duty of generator operators. This would permit a marked reduction of deadline generators.

14. (U) Subject: Generator Maintenance

a. Observation:

Personnel operating signal equipment that required power generators know little or nothing about operator maintenance and proper operation of the power generators. As a result several generators were deadlined because of improper maintenance performed by the operators.

b. Evaluation:

Through a study of the power generator problem with the units it was determined that signal equipment operators had received little or no training on operator maintenance and correct operation of power generating equipment at the service schools. In an effort to improve the battalion's maintenance program, classes were scheduled and taught to all operators, mechanics, and supervisors by a technical representative from USAMECOPM which proved to be beneficial to all concerned.

c. Recommendation:

That service schools incorporate classes for communication equipment operator personnel in operator maintenance and correct operation of power generating equipment, and that units that are experiencing similar problems utilize the USAMECOM technical representative training program.

15. (U) Subject: Rapid Deteriation [sic] of Switchboard Wire.

a. Observation:

Under normal operating conditions switchboards in the Chu Lai Republic of South Viet Nam area have a tendency [sic] to become defective because of a fungus growth which is a result of climatic conditions in the area.

b. Evaluation:

In an effort to combat the problem of rapid deterioration of wiring as a result of fungus, the battalion used a variety of solvents. These solvents later proved to be damaging to the wiring eventually causing it to become defective.

c. Recommendation:

That units experiencing similar difficulties place a high wattage electric light bulb in the rear of switchboard near the wiring. In those cases where it is impractical to use an electric bulb the wiring may be sprayed with a diluted solution of lysol disinfectant once a week.

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16.(U) Subject: Inoperative Headsets as a Result of Moisture [sic].

a. Observation:

Constant use, in addition to climatic conditions in the Chu Lai, Republic of South Viet Nam area causes an excessive amount of moisture to accumulate in headsets used by switchboard operators, rendering them inoperative.

b. Evaluation:

In an effort to rectify this problem the battalion instituted a program in which headsets are used on a rotating basis and those sets not being utilized are placed into a small metal box containing a 100 watt bulb for a period of 8 - 12 hours.

c. Recommendation:

That units experiencing similar problems utilize the above process and if necessary submit requests for modification of their existing TO&E for the authorization of additional headsets to attain sufficient number so that a number of headsets can be placed in the hot locker for "drying out".

17.(U) Subject: Base Development

a. Observation:

Special staffing is required for a Base Development office from division resources.

b. Evaluation: A major effort is required to develop a base plan for future construction. With a division in combat and with a Base Commander type role, much of the Division's Staff's efforts have to be in areas detracting from direct combat support operations. A better solution might be to organize a separate headquarters that takes care of post type functions to include Base Development, so all attention of the Division Staff can be directed to support combat operations.

c. Recommendation:

That consideration be given to organizing a headquarters to perform base type functions in the future.

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F. ORGANIZATION.

1. SUBJECT: Division Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company

a. Observation. All division LRP companies are organized by MTOE 7-157E PAC 3/68, which [sic] deletes most of the support personnel from the company including the operations officers, mess and maintenance sections, and medics.

b. Evaluation. There are presently three feasible solutions to the above stated observation. One, the required support personnel can be assigned to the unit and carried as excess. This is not a satisfactory solution as it deprives, in many cases, other units of required personnel and those personnel carried excess can not be promoted or draw pro pay. Secondly, the unit can be attached to a battalion for all required support. This, again is unsatisfactory, as most commanders are reluctant [sic] to accept and [sic] additional workload [sic], such as this, without any increase in authorized support personnel. The third choice is to require the unit to perform its own support; however, this results in a degradation of the operational capabilities of the company.

c. Recommendations. It is recommended that all operational and support personnel required by the unit in order to be self-sustaining be restored to the Division LRP Company.

G. CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION.

1. SUBJECT: (U) The misuse and misappropriation of self-help items by Vietnamese recipients.

a. OBSERVATION. There has been increasing evidence that self-help items are being sold, misused, or diverted from intended purposes in violation of stated policy.

b. EVALUATION. All items given to Vietnamese civilians should be distributed in a manner best suited to prevent misuse. e. g., soap can be cut in half prior to issuance. Soap in this state is difficult to sell or market. Medicine should be issued in the smallest possible quantity. Food and clothing should be given out in full view of GVN officials and with as large an audience as possible. When dealing with building materials, each piece should be ostentatiously and methodically counted in front of the recipient, and he should be carefully and firmly informed as to what is expected. When Vietnamese military personnel are present, it is imperative that they be notified, through an interpreter, that the materials are for the civilians only, and that their military superiors will be informed in the event of the materials are diverted from their intended purposes.

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c. RECOMMENDATION. All personnel placed in a position to distribute self-help supplies, to include small unit commanders, should be well versed in the methods of issue necessary to prevent misuse.

2. SUBJECT: (u) Indigenous Medical Personnel.

a. OBSERVATION. Use of Americal personnel exclusively during MEDCAPs will eventually cause the people to depend solely on the US for proper medical treatment. Medically trained Vietnamese are disregarded by their own people and are not as readily trusted as the medically trained US personnel.

b. EVALUATION. Within the Americal AO most hamlets have a village nurse who has received a limited amount of training. When American units conduct MEDCAPs in the area, these nurses are often hesitant to identify themselves as nurses either because they have not been active in their profession or they are unfamiliar with US methods, procedures and medicines. These nurses are afforded little opportunity to improve or maintain their present knowledge due primarily to the fact that they can do little without equipment and medicine. As a result, many rarely do what they could do to improve the health of the local community.

c. RECOMMENDATION. Recommend that greater emphasis be placed on making use of these nurses during MEDCAPs. Utilization of native medically trained personnel should be increased to the point that the Vietnamese are doing the bulk of the work and the US personnel are used only in the instructional, supervisory and supply roles.

3. SUBJECT (U) MEDCAP.

a. OBSERVATION. The majority of Vietnamese taking advantage of the MEDCAP program are sincere in their desire for and need of treatment. A few people take advantage of the confusion which usually prevails. One example would be a patient returning to MEDCAP several times with an imaginary cough solely to get more of the pleasant tasting cough syrup.

b. EVALUATION. In order to avoid duplication and needless utilization of medical talent and waste of medical supplies, some check on indigenous personnel attending MEDCAP must be established.

c. RECOMMENDATION. MEDCAP personnel should establish a record of all persons seen and list the diagnosis on a card catalogue basis. The number the card is given in the file should be identical to individual's ID card number.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

1. SUBJECT: (U) PSYOP Effectiveness.

a. Observations. There appears to be some correlation between PSYOP

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effort expended in support of a particular campaign and the results obtained.

This is particularly true as far as loudspeaker [sic] broadcasts are concerned in areas where the literacy rate is low.

b. Evaluation. Effort expended in the Chieu Hoi, and Rewards campaigns and results obtained are as follows:

Chieu Hoi Campaign

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
Leaflet effort	26%	29%	55%
Loudspeaker effort	24%	27%	19%
Hoi Chanhs	50	89	64

Rewards Campaign

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
Leaflet effort	43%	28%	14%
Loudspeaker effort	24%	27%	19%
Informants	85	80	124

2. SUBJECT: (U) Exploitation of Hoi Chanhs.

a. Observation. One of the prime uses of Hoi Chanhs has been to exploit them as a personal contact to urge other members of their unit to rally. Maximum use is made of broadcast appeals, both aerial and ground and hand written messages, reproduced in leaflet form and dropped in the target area. However, a different approach must be made to each Hoi Chanh dependent upon whether he is VC and has a family in the local area or is NVA and has a family in North Vietnam.

b. Evaluation. If the Hoi Chanh is from a VC unit, assurance must be given and action taken to insure that his family is in a safe area to prevent retaliation against them once he identifies himself. The Hoi Chanh from NVN will seldom permit his name to be used in dissemination for fear of repercussions which might be taken against his family in North Vietnam.

3. SUBJECT: (U) PSYOP Indoctrination.

a. Observation. Information concerning the intent and application of PSYOP within the Division was not being disseminated to the individual soldier. In the course of his duties the soldier has need to know specifically about the provisions of the Chieu Hoi and Rewards campaigns.

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b. Evaluation. Indoctrination classes have been presented to all new arrivals in the Division. Particular emphasis has been given to the Chieu Hoi and Rewards campaigns as they apply to the individual soldier. The actions expected if confronted by a potential returnee or informant are emphasized. During the period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68, 21 classes were presented to 1,594 individuals. Classes will continue for all future arrivals in the division.

4. Subject: Use of Kit Carson Scouts.

a. Observation. Problem of transporting Armed Propaganda Team personnel every two weeks from Danang to Chu Lai resulted in lack of continuity amongst combat loudspeaker (HB) team members and loss of man hours. These personnel augmented the HB teams and provided a means of face to face communication with target audiences.

b. Evaluation. To overcome the problem described above, 2 Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) were used to augment each HB team. These men selected for their capability to conduct face to face communication are now employed full time by the division. The result has been a more harmonious, united team effort and more productive hours of ground broadcasting accomplished.

5. Subject: (U) Limited PSYOP Resources.

a. Observation. The capabilities presently organic to the 7th PSYOP Bn have not provided the desired degree of support for this division. The input from this division represents only 15% of the total mission placed upon the 7th PSYOP Bn. The need for timely, localized leaflets required to exploit specific situation cannot be met by the battalion. Supported units are therefore required to use preprinted less localized and therefore proportionately less effective leaflets to cover their area of interest.

b. Recommendation. This problem can be overcome by making available to the division its own propaganda development and printing capability. The division has on hand components of a Mod 1 85 multilith press but is awaiting receipt of a Pioneer 2 platemaker before it can be fully utilized. To enable this division to fully exploit all propaganda opportunities in the most timely fashion two additional teams are required. It is therefore recommended that one each HC (Printing) and one each HD (Propaganda Operations) team support this division so that the maximum advantage may be taken of psychological opportunities as they occur.

6. Subject: (U) MTOE Availability.

a. Observation. Lack of valid authorization for PSYOP personnel and equipment causes problems in establishing data for requisitioning replacements of personnel and equipment.

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Present personnel organization is based on MACPD letter to USARV dated 6 Jun 66 subject: Augmentation of Psyops Personnel. Equipment distribution is based upon verbal direction from MACPD and USARV.

b. Recommendation. The MTOE be approved and disseminated as soon as possible.

7. Subject: Audio Visual "Jeepster".

a. Observation. The Kaiser "Jeepster" used to transport the equipment and personnel organic to the audio visual team was practically useless during the reporting period. The loss of this vehicle, due to the lack of repair parts, curtailed the activities of the team. Some use was made by replacing the organic vehicle with a substitute 3/4 ton which indicated that with certain modification, this vehicle would prove a more suitable piece of equipment for this team. The problem has been not only the long lead time in replacement of parts for this commercial vehicle but also the inability of the "jeepster" vehicle to withstand the rigors to which it is exposed.

b. Recommendation. That action be taken to obtain the substitute vehicle for the "jeepster" referred to in the MACV - Psychological Directorate meeting of October 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

NELS A. PARSEN, JR
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

Inclosures:

1. ORLL - 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry
2. Americal Division Troop List.

AVHGC-DST

CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968.
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (RI) (U).

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 6 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GOPP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, Americal Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning morning report, page 61, paragraph A(1): Nonconcur. Problem is strictly and internal one within the Americal Division and has been solved by the division AG.

b. Reference item concerning airport liaison team, page 62, paragraph 2; Concur. the Americal Division has a liaison NCO located at the 22d Replacement Battalion at Cam Ranh Bay. His duties include providing the Americal Division the number of replacements scheduled for shipment to the Americal Division and their estimated time of arrival at Chu Lai.

c. Reference item concerning transportation of special services supplies and equipment, page 63, paragraph 4: Concur. Water shipment of special services supplies and equipment from the supply depot in Saigon to the supply point in Qui Nhon which serves Americal is satisfactory using a Sea/Land Vessel.

d. Reference item concerning rest and recuperation allocations to Hawaii, page 63, paragraph 5: Nonconcur. it is not the intent of this headquarters to give preferential treatment in regard to R&R to personnel whose families are located in Hawaii. The policy of this headquarters is that all individuals desiring R&R to Hawaii will be given equal opportunity to compete for allocated quotas.

e. Reference item concerning personnel (Staff Judge Advocate) page 65, paragraph A7. MTOE documentation IAW AR 310-31 as changed by DA Circular 310-44 to support this request has not been received at this headquarters. A standardized MTOE was submitted by USARV to DA in February and the Staff Judge Advocate Section was not addressed.

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f. Reference item concerning inadequate range for AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9 squad radios, page 70, paragraph B11. These radios are normally capable of providing reliable communications within their planned ranges. Recommend unit submit Equipment Improvement Report (EIR) in accordance with paragraph 3-7.4, TM 38-750. The Electronics Command (ECOM) coordinator, 1st Logistical Command, will direct and ECOM equipment representative to contact the unit and determine corrective action required.

g. Reference comments concerning telephone communication, page 71, paragraph B11 (2) (b). The basic means of communications in a static defense position is wire or cable, which should be entrenched for protection. Back-up is provided by organic radio equipment.

h. Reference item concerning ground-to-air marking system, page 71, paragraph B12: Concur. Request that unit submit additional justification and information on requirement as outlined by USARV Regulation 705-2 so that action may be initiated under ENSURE procedures.

i. Reference item concerning problems encountered with detector, seismic intrusion, page 75, paragraph 1: Concur. However, a comprehensive program is presently in progress to evaluate several types of new sensors including acoustic, seismic, and magnetic. These sensors already incorporate some of the changes recommended. After the evaluation these sensors will be made available to all US divisions.

j. Reference item concerning the hand-held camera program, page 79, paragraph 7. Nonconcur that imagery interpreters should be school trained in the use of hand-held cameras. Concur that cameras should be allocated to the imagery interpretation section of the MID. USARV records indicate that the Americal Division was issued two Ashai Pentax cameras. The division signal photography laboratory is capable of accomplishing the necessary printing and enlarging requirements for hand-held camera program. A requirement for 492 polaroid aerial cameras has been submitted by ENSURE action. Although no shipping instructions have been received, it is anticipated the cameras will arrive in Vietnam within the next six months. These cameras will require no photo lab support, and no special schooling in view of the relative simplicity of the polaroid system.

k. Reference item concerning operations against the VC infrastructure, page 80, paragraph 9: Concur. Since the program against the VC

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infrastructure is basically a Vietnamese program, it is necessary to have GVN representatives with any operation targeted against the infrastructure. Field interrogations are an important part of any operation against the infrastructure in order to obtain and exploit perishable intelligence information.

1. Reference item concerning report passing actions, page 81, paragraph 3: Nonconcur. Currently the system provides for USARV depots to pass O5 and higher priority requisitions that cannot be filled to the option of referring supply action to another depot or passing the requisition out-of-country. The latter option results in the item being shipped directly to the requisitioner; however, replenishment stocks could arrive in-country in the interim that would not be issued against the high priority requisitions. High priority requisitions for PEMA principal items or those on the Command Control List are not passed out-of-country but established as a due-out by the 14th ICC. When the items arrive in-country the depot is directed to make shipment to the requisitioner. This system has the disadvantage that items falling into this category are not shipped directly to the customer. It does; however, result in the requisitioners with the highest priority obtaining items as early as possible.

m. Reference item concerning material handling at small level, page 82, paragraph E4. Operation of division distributing points by the division supply and transport battalion in a TOE 7-4G organized infantry division is intended to preclude excessive handling of bulk supplies at the small unit level. It is recognized that the internal organization of the Americal Division is different than other in-country infantry divisions. Additionally, the majority of logistical support is provided by the US Navy in an over the beach type operation. The US Navy in this type of operation provides distribution to the beach area. The designated unit with direct support from combat service support is responsible for moving the supplies to the final destination. These supplies are basically bulk palletized packages. In light of the foregoing the recommendation for additional equipment is valid. It must be pointed out that additional equipment will require an increase in personnel. Personnel spaces are at a premium and therefore USARV cannot support the request until such time as spaces become available or are identified as trade-off from within the Americal Division. Should internal space trade-offs be identified, MTOE action IAW 310-031 as changed by DA Circular 310-44 will be required.

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n. Reference item concerning modification of TOE 17-106G, page 82, paragraph 5: Concur. To refuel operating track vehicles in areas that are inaccessible to refuelers, the armored cavalry squadrons should be authorized with the 50 GPM or 100 GPM pumping assemblies and 500 gallon collapsible drums. In addition, the POL conversion kit for the M548 (tracked cargo vehicles) should be considered as an alternate means of bulk POL delivery to units operating in terrain impassible to trucks. The quantity of pumps, collapsible drums and/or conversion kits for the M548 should be determined by the units operating under the conditions described in paragraph 5, page 82. When the requirements are determined, the unit should submit MTOE action. A BOI for pumps and collapsible drums can be approximated by equating one pump and two collapsible drums to one truck mounted tank and pump unit or one M49 series truck, as presently authorized in the unit's TOE.

o. Reference item concerning combat load for the individual soldier, page 84, paragraph 10: Concur. LRP rations have been requisitioned in increased quantities and are available in all depots for issue in lieu of Meal Combat Individual. Recommend that the Department of the Army evaluate the proposal for provision of a lightweight poncho and hammock.

p. Reference item concerning division long range patrol (LRP) company, page 89, paragraph F1. All infantry division long range patrol companies have been standardized at a strength of 118 individuals. Paragraph 3e, Section I, MTOE 7-157E, PAC 3/68 states that the unit is dependent upon other brigade units for higher echelon administrative support. Modification to restore the units as self-sustaining will require MTOE action IAW 310-31 as changed by DA Circular 310-44.

q. Reference item concerning MTOE availability, page 92, paragraph 6. MTOE 7-4G is presently undergoing staffing at DA and once completed will be disseminated. MTOE's submitted to DA during the same time frame are being distributed. Approval of MTOE 7-4G is expected shortly.

r. Reference item concerning audio visual "Jeepster", page 93, paragraph 7: Concur. The primary problem encountered in maintenance of the Jeepster vehicles is that of nonstandard parts and assemblies. This same situation exists with regard to drive lines and other major components. The result is that parts must be ordered and maintained. The Jeepster vehicle is to be replaced by the standard Truck, Cargo, 3/4 Ton, M-series vehicle modified for audio-visual use. The 6th Psychological Operations Battalion advises that the first contingent of these

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vehicles have been shipped from CONUS. A letter is being forwarded to the 4th Psychological Operations Group requesting detailed information on the parts problem of each individual Jeepster vehicle. With this information Philco-Ford will be in a better position to support the jeepsters pending their replacement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
nc

C.S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished
HQ, Americal Division

GPOP-DT (7 May 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968.
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 AUG 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed with one exception.

2. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2j: This headquarters does
not concur with the use of II's as aerial observers and aerial photo-
graphers. The present II training program is straining to produce
sufficient II's to support Vietnam requirements. The provisions of
FM 1-80 (the guide for the training of aerial observers) should be
followed and the utilization of II's as aerial observers is unwarranted.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

2 Incl
nc

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
WHEN SEPARATE FROM CLASSIFIED
INCLOSURE(S) _____

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HEADQUARTERS

4TH BATTALION, 21ST INFANTRY, 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96217

XIXTH-IN

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

TO: Commanding Officer
11th Infantry Brigade
APO US Forces 96217
ATTN: Brigade Historian

1. Reference. Regulation Number 870-2, your headquarters, subject as above, dated 14 April 1968,

2. Inasmuch as this unit closed in-country on 14 April 1968, and assumed responsibility for assigned area of operations on 25 April 1968, this report will concern itself entirely with Section 1, and include details in preparation for overseas movement (POM).

SECTION 1, OPERATIONS:

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. Command: the deployment of this battalion was effected with minimum disruption and loss of time. The battalion arrived in-country generally well equipped, physically fit, highly motivated, and ready to assume its full share of the 11th Infantry Brigade's mission.

B. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline: At deployment date, this battalion moved with no major personnel problems. Administration, Morale and Discipline aspects of deployment were considered with no major problem areas. The following points relating to movement of dependents should be noted:

(1) Adequacy of Instructions Received: The instructions concerning movement of dependents were excellent. Most problems which arose in this field were due to the individual himself in that several waited until the last minute to decide if they wanted their dependents to remain on post or be shipped to CONUS.

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(2) Movement Orders to facilitate transportation of dependents: The movement orders were handled so as to facilitate each individual. Once again the only problems in this area were those resulting from last minute decisions as to disposition of dependents. Those who requested orders within a reasonable period of time were able to clear and clean quarters, have their household goods picked up and depart as per scheduled date.

(3) Dependent Processing Centers: Although we did not have an opportunity to personally contact the Department Processing Center, we received several outstanding comments on the manner in which they aided dependents in their processing and clearing of quarters and arrangements for transportation.

(4) Clearance of quarters: As to our knowledge the clearance of quarters was excellent. We received no complaints from personnel within our battalion nor from USARHAW Household Section.

(5) Arrangement for mainland travel: Arrangements for dependent travel presented no problems. In cases where the EM had deployed prior to his dependents departure, the Dependent Processing Team helped in making the necessary arrangements.

(6) Organization for handling movement of dependents: USARHAW initially published a letter concerning the movement of dependents. Upon receipt of this letter the S1 conducted a block of instruction concerning dependents movement with each company in the battalion. All personnel who were authorized government travel were then required to complete a form stating their desired date for shipment of dependents, disposition of automobiles, etc. In addition, the battalion processed approximately 20 families not authorized government transportation. These personnel received the same instructions with the exception of dependents and household goods transportation. The problem which existed here was one of Finance. However, this was alleviated through an authorized partial payment for the purpose of movement of dependents to CONUS.

C. Intelligence and Counterintelligence: Upon receipt of deployment schedule, weekly intelligence briefings were conducted in an effort to give commanders a better understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather in the deployment area. The lack of press coverage enabled this unit to prepare and execute the move without undo pressure from civilian agencies.

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D. Plans, Operations, Training and Organization. AR 220-10 was used in accomplishing the mandatory training in POM. Emphasis was placed on counterinsurgency training to include ambush/counterambush, and practiced search and destroy operations utilizing mock villages. In addition, weapons training, both individual and crew-served, was stepped up considerably utilizing live fire at every possible opportunity. Included in the training program were subjects dealing with area orientations, environmental considerations, legal status of individual soldiers in the host country, political, religious and ethnic history and customs. Throughout this pre-deployment phase, the general and special staff sections of USARHAW assisted in the organization of the training of the battalion. Their initial and continued support was outstanding. Organization of the battalion immediately prior to deployment was:

- (1) Number of officers, by grade: 1 LTC; 2 MAJ; 12 CPT; 28 LT.
- (2) Number of Warrant Officers: 2 CW2.
- (3) Number of Enlisted Men: 890 EM of which 868 deployed.

E. Logistics:

(1) This section at the report covers the activities of the S-4 section during the deployment under the final movement directive issued by USARPAC on 5 February 1968.

(2) Deployment time frame. The deployment of the Battalion from Hawaii is summarized below. A rear detachment was authorized but no required nor utilized.

<u>Element</u>	<u>Total Troops</u>	<u>Depart Hawaii Initial Element</u>	<u>Last</u>
Advance Party	32	30 Mar 68	
Surface Cargo	3	24 Apr 68	
Security			
Air Cargo	42	5 Apr 68	8 Apr 68
Main Body	836	9 Apr 68	24 Apr 68
Total Troops	913		

- (3) Preliminary Planning.

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(a) To fulfill the need for a fully coordinated movement plan, USARHAW published a Logistical Letter of Instructions dated 12 January 1968. The above letter provided sufficient instructions and guidance to include a D minus schedule of specific actions to be taken by the Battalion. In addition the Battalion established a schedule of actions required of each Company to insure that all USARHAW suspense dates were met.

(b) Beginning in January 1968 this unit began receiving information from our parent unit regarding additional accessory and WABTCC items that this unit should attempt to deploy with. AMCAL CONF AVDF-GC 0732 dated 231112Z January 1968, sub: Additional Equipment, gave specific guidance on what items are essential. We requested the procurement of approximately 120 items. Of this amount 4 items were issued, 30 ea - 16" Fans, 9 ea - 30" Fans, 2ea - Pastry Cabinets and 1 ea- Patient Table. However, the unit was able to acquire through a multitude of semi-official channels approximately 20 additional items which fall within the scope of the guidance put forth by our parent unit.

(c) Close coordination was established and maintained with the USARHAW G-4, Transportation Officer and S&MC. A program of instruction was set up to train our key personnel in the proper packing and crating techniques. The Inspection Division, USARHAW S&MC, agreed to conduct a 100% POM inspection in the following three phases, in order to allow us to continue training as long as possible.

1. Phase I: All items for surface shipment which represented approximately 2/3 of all TOE equipment (Total 299 STON).
2. Phase II. All weapons that would accompany the advance party.
3. Phase III: All remaining equipment accompanying the main body in the Air Movement. (Total 102 STON)

(4) Operations.

(a) The unit successfully completed their Battalion ATT on 10 Mar 1968, and immediately began preparing for deployment. A Battalion stand down was conducted and maintenance priority given to vehicles, generators and all other items going by surface. All items having published ESCs had and [sic] ESC inspection within 24 hours of commencing the POM inspection Phase I & III.

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On 13 March 1968, 0800 hours all items of equipment going by surface were separated by commodity (Eng, Sig, Ord, Etc.) to facilitate a rapid and efficient inspection. As soon as an item has passed the inspection it was packed and crated for shipment.

(b) As a result of our parent units experience we requested a total of 76 type II conexs in order to attempt shipment of all equipment in conex containers. We loaded 63 conexs for surface and 13 for air shipment. We were able to ship approximately 95% of all equipment (minus vehicles) by conex containers. The only palletized items shipped were those that were required to be lashed on the deck of the ship ie. acid, compressed gas, POL, etc. On the air shipment only the ammunition, C-Rations and personnel records were shipped as individual pallets.

(c) Throughout the packing and crating period a team, from S&MC, was available in the Battalion area, to assist us in any oversized, oddshaped or any item presenting a particular problem.

(d) Marking and Documentation. In order to relieve the unit of administrative details, the terminal prepared all Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD) for both vehicles and general cargo. The Battalion was required to mark all vehicles and general cargo with the required information ie. UIC, Project Code, Wt., Cube, etc.

(e) Security of Intransit Cargo. The unit furnished 3 men to accompany the surface shipment and 42 to accompany the air shipment. Their primary purpose was to provide security upon arrival in-country.

(f) The Terminal Movements Control Branch coordinated the convoy of vehicles and movement of general cargo to port. They also provided all transportation for Air Cargo and PAX to Hickham AFB.

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(g) Personal Baggage. The USARHAW Transportation Officer established a schedule for shipment of the entire Battalion's Personal Baggage over the period of one week, beginning 1 April 1968. This arrangement worked out very well and allowed the individual soldier the maximum use of his personal items prior to deployment.

(h) Manifesting. All manifesting was coordinated at Battalion Level. The configuration of the allotted aircraft was such that it allowed each Company to manifest its personnel on one flight thus maintaining maximum unit integrity. The individuals name, rank, service number, weight, and NOK emergency data were all that was required by the Air Force. No problems were experienced in this area.

(5) The following schedule indicates the actual out loading of the Battalion.

(a)	121800Z Mar 68	POM Insp. Phas I	
(b)	230200Z Mar 68	All cargo & vehicles + 3 PAX to port	
(c)	241815Z Mar 68	SS Xavier Victory sails with 298 STON of vehicles and general cargo for the 4th Bn, 21nf.	
(d)	271800Z Mar 68	POM Insp. Phase II	
(e)	310900Z Mar 68	Advance Party departs	
(f)	011800Z Apr 68	POM Insp. Phase III	
(g)	011830Z Apr 68	Shipment of pers Baggage to mainland.	
(h)	051735Z Apr 68	C-124 Mission No 1030	10 PAX 27,295 lbs cargo departs Hickham AFB
(i)	052015Z Apr 68	C-124 1031	10 PAX 26,010 lbs cargo
(j)	061750Z Apr 68	C-124 1032	10 PAX 27,295 lbs cargo
(k)	062005Z Apr 68	C-124 Mission 1033	5 PAX 29,370 lbs cargo Departs Hickham AFB
(l)	071815Z Apr 68	C-124 1034	26,400 lbs cargo
(m)	081515Z Apr 68	C-141 1036	7 PAX 60,354 lbs cargo
(n)	100900Z Apr 68	B-707 1038	163 PAX
(o)	111700Z Apr 68	B0707 1039	161 PAX
(p)	111700Z Apr 68	B-707 1040	154 PAX
(q)	130700Z Apr 68	C-141 1041	45 PAX 7,954 lbs cargo
(r)	130800Z Apr 68	B-707 1043	154 PAX
(s)	131000Z Apr 68	B-707 1042	159 PAX
(t)	132400Z Apr 68	All elements close Chu Lai	

(6) Problems.

(a) The continuing arrival of requisitioned items until the date of departure of the final aircraft created certain problems in formulating loading plans, packing and crating and arranging transportation from the Battalion area to Hickham AFB. These were overcome due to the flexibility of the 61st MAW, Hickham AFB in adjusting their flight plans.

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(b) This Battalion was instructed (Ref Americal AVDF-GD0035, 2 Jan 68) not to requisition jungle fatigues as they were available incountry and would be issued upon our arrival. The Battalion had resources available to issue each man 1 set of jungle fatigues minus boots. This was accomplished on 18 March 1968. Each man was further instructed to deploy with one set of regular fatigues. When our advance party arrived they discovered that no arrangements had been made to procure or issue jungle fatigues for our Battalion. They immediately initiated action to correct the situation, but the lead time was insufficient to procure these items prior to the arrival of the main body. Consequently the troops had to make do with only two sets of fatigues for a period of approximately 11 days. By this time all in processing had been completed, the Companies were widely dispersed and it became increasingly difficult to issue and properly fit the individual soldier.

(c) Conclusion. The deployment of this unit was executed in a smooth, efficient and professional manner. The cooperation and support of the USARHAW Staff and the 61st MAW, Hickham AFB was outstanding. The move was completed with an absolute minimum of problem areas that were under our control. The two problems cited above are significant, but certainly not critical and in no way inhibited our ability to accomplish our mission.

(7) Recommendations.

(a) In order to alleviate the problem of late arriving equipment is necessary to cancel all requisitions at D-30 days that have an EDD of D-7 or less.

(b) The problem encountered with the jungle fatigues can be alleviated by requiring all deploying units to obtain and issue said items prior to actual deployment. This will also require a shorter inprocessing period and eliminate some of the immediate logistical requirements inherent in a move of this type.

F. Other items listed in basic format considered not applicable to this unit for the purposes of this initial report.

(1) Section 2, Lessons Learned - Omitted.

(2) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information - This section omitted for the same reason as previously mentioned in paragraph 2 of this report.

JAMES E ARMSTRONG
LTC INF
Commanding

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968.
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (RI) (U).

Americal Division Troop List
(As of 1 Apr 68)

1. HQ, AMERICAL DIVISION

HHC, Americal Div
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
26th Engr Bn
123d Avn Bn
 406th TC Det
 449th Sig Det
 F Troop 8th Cav
523d Sig Bn
23d MP Co
258th Pers Svc Co (Attached)
Co E, 51st Inf (LRP)
63d Inf Plat (Combat Tracker Team)
3d Mil Hist Det
Americal Combat Center (PROV)
 408th RR Det
 415th RR Det
 601st RR Det
14th Avn Bn (OPCON)
 71st Aslt Hel Co (OPCON)
 174th Aslt Hel Co (OPCON)
 176th Aslt Hel Co (OPCON)
 178th Aslt Hel Co (OPCON)
Americal CA Co, PROV (OPCON)
 4th Plat, CA Co (OPCON)
 6th Plat, CA CO (OPCON)
 9th Plat., CA CO (OPCON)
O/L6, Det 31, 5th Weather Sqdn (USAF) OPCON)
Tactical Air Control Party, Americal (OPCON)
39th Engr Bn (Area Support)

2. AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

HQB, Div Arty
3d Bn, 16th Arty
3d Bn, 18th Arty
3d Plat, G Batt, 29th Arty, Searchlight (OPCON)
Brty G, 55th Arty (.50 Cal) (joined but not assigned/
 attached, as yet)