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AGDAM-P (M) (25 Apr 68) FOR OT RD 681060 30 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal
Division, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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AMERICAL DIVISION
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
FOR PERIOD

1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968

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(Drawing of the Americal Division Shield)

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SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

A. Command

1. (U) General Officer Assignments.

a. Brigadier General George H. Young Jr. assumed duties as Assistant Division Commander on 1 November 1967.

2. (U) The following distinguished persons visited the Americal Division during the reporting period.

a. Hubert H. Humphery, Vice President of the United States, 1 November 1967.

b. Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, 21 and 22 December 1967.

c. Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific, General Dwight E. Beach, 16 and 17 November 1967.

d. General William C. Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, visited the Division several times for operational guidance and orders.

B. Personnel, Administrative, Morale, and Discipline.

1. (U) Formation of Consolidated AG Section. During the early part of November 1967, a consolidated AG Section was formed. Section was formed by integrating the personnel and functions of the AG Sections for the 196th LIB and 198th LIB with the Division AG Section. In the latter part of December 1967, the AG Section of the 11th LIB was also integrated. In spite of a lack of advance planning for the consolidation, consolidation was effected with few major disruptions in operations.

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2. (U) Personnel. A consolidated Personnel Services Division, Adjutant General Section, was formed under the ROAD concept to service the newly activated Americal Division units. On 15 November 1967 the Personnel Services Divisions of the 196th and 198th Light Infantry Brigades, formerly separate commands, merged to form the nucleus of the new organization. On 25 December 1967 the Personnel Services Division of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade joined the merger to complete the organization.

a. Personnel Management.

(1) The most significant area in the newly created Personnel Services Division affected by the organization of the Division was the Personnel Management Branch. Little pre-planning was done prior to the merger of the elements that became organic to the Division to prepare for Division control and operation of personnel functions. Initial encounters with strength accountability, procedures in all area, and monitoring of personnel utilization were staggering. Each Personnel Services Division of the three Brigades had been operating under different local procedures in most of the personnel areas. Further, the brigades were all organized under different TOE's which complicated uniform reporting and control. Consequently, it was necessary to immediately publish regulations and procedures in every area to insure uniformity and responsiveness of the personnel management system.

b. Infusion.

(1) Since the three brigades organic to the Division arrived in-country on different dates, the infusion problem was made even more complicated. Different percentages had to be applied to each brigade in computing rotational humps. Since the 196th was on its second year in-country, it came under the 15% rotational policy. The 11th LIB and 198th LIB having recently arrived in-country, came under the 25% rotational policy.

(2) The 196th LIB, on its second year in-country, cannot rotate more than 15% of its authorized strength in any month. Therefore, that brigade cannot receive more than 15% from the 198th LIB or the 11th LIB. The 196th LIB's hump months of June and July fall in the 198th LIB's and 11th LIB's first year so they can receive up to 25% but are limited to giving the 196th LIB only 15% without creating a rotational hump in the 196th.

(3) The same situation exists with the 198th LIB and 11th LIB. The 11th LIB's hump is in December which falls within the 198th LIB's second year in-country. Consequently, these two brigades can only exchange 15% between each other.

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(4) Newly activated units are all considered to be in their first year in-country and therefore come under the 25% rotational hump policy. Infusion plans for these units are being formulated accordingly. Additionally, infusion plans have been formulated for attached units for which this headquarters was assigned responsibility for infusion.

(5) During this quarter approximately 30 officers and 520 EM were infused. Approximately 4000 additional personnel must be infused to reduce rotational humps in accordance with established ceilings (15% and 25%). To maximum extent possible, infusion will be accomplished within the Division. Where this is not possible, external infusion will be utilized.

c. Awards and Decorations.

(1) Prior to the activation of the Division, many of the brigades and other separate units were processing and approving recommendations for awards under locally established policies and procedures. Consequently, when approval authority was centralized at this headquarters, it was necessary to standardize policies and procedures. This was accomplished by the publication of a comprehensive directive covering all areas of the awards and decorations program.

(2) One significant policy established concerned posthumous awards. These awards must be processed and forwarded to DA within 30 days of the individual's death. To expedite processing a policy was established whereby the recommendations would be forwarded directly to the Commanding General for approval without being reviewed by a board of officers.

(3) During the period 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68, 3126 awards were processed. This was possible through a streamlining of procedures and more efficient use of personnel.

3. (U) Replacement Operations.

a. The Replacement Detachment underwent several significant organizational changes. During the month of November 1967, preparations were made for the relocation of the Replacement Detachment to the beach area of Chu Lai. This move was accomplished on 15 December 1967. Additionally, the detachment adjusted its procedures to incorporate the Americal Division Combat Center within its mission. Finally, the replacement facilities were expanded to accommodate an average of 1000 replacements a week, rather than 300 per week which normally processed at the old area.

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b. The movement of the Replacement Detachment created problems, some slight, others more difficult, but most of which have been solved by the ingenuity, dedication, and long hours of all personnel concerned.

(1) The new area was far below standard for occupation by replacements. Many days were spent, both prior to and after relocation, in improving billets and facilities to create an above standard area for new replacements. Work still continues as further improvements are made in both the essential and recreational aspects of the detachment area.

(2) Difficulties were encountered in obtaining the necessary tools and equipment for the remodeling of the new area. Wood, screens, nails, door-hinges, paint, etc., were all needed, and eventually obtained, to improve the facilities.

(3) A lack of organic transportation was a difficult problem. The truck requirements for troops, supplies, mess, and movement of equipment all combined to climax an already existing shortage of vehicles. The day long continual operation of the available vehicle, plus an all out effort to get deadlined vehicles running again, was still not enough to handle the needs of the unit. Assistance was requested and received from the 23 S & T Bn in the form of a 2 1/2 ton truck with driver on a daily basis.

c. The incorporation of the Replacement Detachment with the Division Combat Center created the need for a new operation within the detachment: The task of providing the replacements with TA-50-901 equipment and weapons. Problems in this area resulted in coordinating with the Division units for pick up and issuance of equipment, and in the shortage of TA-50-901 equipment and weapons in several units.

(1) Units are notified immediately after the 0700 and 1300 hrs formations and given the breakdown of both personnel who have graduated and personnel who need to be issued equipment. Failure of units to respond causes replacements to remain a day longer in the replacement det. Additionally, some units initially retain their personnel in their area for 2 or 3 days to issue them weapons and equipment.

(2) Equipment requirements for attendance at the Division Combat Center are a rifle, steel pot with helmet liner, and web gear. Some units have been deficient in providing replacements of one or more of these essential items. To avoid delaying the replacements, they are started in class without the necessary equipment. As a result, some replacements were unable to zero their weapons and to participate in certain phases of the training program.

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d. The increase in the number of replacements created the problem of expanding replacement operations. A new, more efficient system of accounting for each individual was put into effect. 20 GP tents were erected to house replacements. Ten of these were replaced by Webtock kits and more are planned. Requisitions for supplies (cots, bedding, paper plates, cups, etc.) had to be submitted and rushed through as new replacements arrived. The new mess hall has not been completed, but the mess section has responded efficiently with the limited facilities available. Control of replacements was a problem, but replacements are now divided into groups under control of replacement NCO's.

e. A problem was encountered with the arrival of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade from Hawaii. Many replacements had to be assigned to bring the Brigade up to strength. This required coordination with Brigade S-4 at Duc Pho for weapons, which usually arrive about three days later. TA-50-901 equipment for the 11th Brigade replacements was readily available but later became difficult to obtain. Also, the problem of shipping replacements to Duc Pho after graduation was solved by close coordination with the Chu Lai Air Terminal.

4. (U) Administrative Services.

a. Reproduction. Frequent power outages denied the full use of electric driven duplicating machines. It was necessary to retain manually operated machines to continue operations. During the reporting period, approval was obtained to requisition two 1250 Multilith Presses, one Meteorite Camera and one Bruning 2100 Copier.

b. Publications and Blank Forms. With the activation of division units, a heavy requirement was placed on the AG Publications Section to support subordinate units until their accounts were established and initial requisitions filled.

c. Orders. Authority to publish special orders was retained by division headquarters to relieve field commanders of an administrative task, improve quality, and reduce administrative personnel requirements.

d. Messages. Strong emphasis was placed on the reduction of electrically transmitted messages and the assignment of correct precedence on messages. Although there was a significant reduction of electronically transmitted messages and misuse of message precedence, the message format was favored over correspondence format and the volume of messages processed increased. During the reporting period, there was a shortage of multiple copy producing message forms. However, by using the standard Joint Message-Form (DD Form 173) with a ditto master carbon, multiple copies could be reproduced.

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This was necessary since more copies were required when courier service was used.

e. Distribution. The delivery of the Stars and Stripes to outlying units was extremely difficult. This was especially true when papers for two days arrived at the same time and on receipt of the Sunday paper with its supplement. Established courier flights were used to deliver the papers. However, two days load of paper could not be carried on the flights; consequently, delivery to units was delayed. By closer coordination with the units, every visitor or liaison officer to the headquarters was tasked to carry papers back for his unit.

5. (U) Postal.

a. Operation Silver Star.

(1) Operation Silver Star (Christmas mail season) officially started on 1 Oct 67. However, the amount of incoming mail did not increase until 1 Nov 67. During the month of November the APO received an average of 20,000 lbs of mail daily. 30,000 lbs of mail was received daily during the month of December. The volume of incoming mail returned to normal during the month of January. Out-going mail increased by 2,000 lbs daily during this reporting period.

(2) During the period 1 Nov thru 31 Dec 67 the APO personnel strength was augmented by 20 non-postal EM's. This augmentation was the major factor in the successful accomplishment of the APO's mission during the Christmas mail season.

b. Postal Support to the Americal Division Brigades.

(1) The 198th LIB joined the division in early November. A separate postal section was set up at the brigade rear. This arrangement proved to be very effective during the Christmas mail season.

(2) The 11th Infantry Brigade joined the division in late December. A separate postal section was set up at the brigade rear located in Duc Pho. Incoming mail for the brigade was massed at APO 97374 and was transported to the brigade location with division organic helicopters. The brigade started receiving mail directly from Da Nang Aerial Mail Terminal effective 1 Jan 68. However, until 12 Jan 68, the APO 96374 was still receiving a portion of the brigades mail at Chu Lai. This misrouting of mail was partially due to overlapping [sic] of the mail sacks and pouches by the brigades former postal activity, APO 96557.

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c. Organization of the Americal Division APO. The division APO was organized by the integration of four (4) Division and brigade level postal sections. Necessary division postal directives were drafted. Americal Reg 65-1, Bulk Money Order Purchase, was published and distributed. Postal orientation material for newly assigned personnel was published and distributed.

d. Relocation of the Division APO. The division post office was relocated on 20 Nov 67 during the Christmas mail season. This was accomplished in order to provide adequate space for the enlargement of the Division Post Exchange. This relocation created logistical problems both in the transportation of mail matter and postal personnel. The new location of the APO was selected primarily due to availability of two Butler buildings which were vacated when a Marine Corps unit left Chu Lai. The present location of the APO is too far from all troop concentration areas.

6. (U) Reenlistment.

a. A Division Reenlistment Officer was assigned on 23 January 1968.

b. A problem was encountered in obtaining reenlistment option assignments from Headquarters, USARV. In the past assignments were obtained by telephoning the Reenlistment Branch at HQ, USARV. This was considered inadequate in that extreme difficulty was encountered in reaching the office by telephone. The problem is currently being resolved by forwarding all requests by mail. Time is saved at both headquarters and in this manner communication lines are not tied up for long periods to properly transmit the personnel data needed to obtain an assignment.

7. (U) Special Services.

a. A field collection library for six units was received and is ready for issue at such time as a suitable facility becomes available.

b. Film accounts were re-validated for all units. This is an annual requirement.

c. Photo lab facility in the Signal Battalion area was completed (except for plumbing) and equipment therefore was requisitioned and issued. Five other photo labs are planned to be operational in the near future.

d. Miss Beth Carney, Service Club Hostess, arrived and began setting up Service Club facility in the Maintenance Battalion Area.

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e. A total of 7,500 Christmas gifts from the USO Gift Program was received and distributed.

8. Finance.

a. The period from 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968 has been marked by a complete reorganization of the finance office due to a change in service concept from decentralized to consolidated finance service. As a result of this, detailed integration plans were drawn to consolidate the three separate brigade finance sections with the existing division finance office. In order to insure a smooth personnel transition, personnel were assigned to similar positions within [sic] the consolidated finance office. Operating elements were integrated in stages, first the military pay branches were placed immediately under the control of the Division Finance Officer; daily disbursing functions were also assumed immediately to facilitate deactivation of the brigade disbursing accounts. Integration timetable was as follows:

(1) On 25 October 1967, the 198th LIB finance section DSSN 5408 was integrated.

(2) ON 14 November 1967, the 196th LIB finance section DSSN, 5308 was integrated, final deactivation completed on 10 January 1968. Finance Officer Americal Division was appointed liquidating officer for the local depository account previously maintained by the 196th LIB finance section.

(3) On 21 December 1967, the 11th LIB finance section was integrated, final deactivation completed on 31 December 1967.

b. The Division Finance Office is presently organized under MTOE 12-37E with an authorized strength of 4 commissioned officers, 3 Warrant officers and 90 enlisted men, present strength provides a normal servicing capability of 16,000 troops. The office is also operating under the modified pay system, i.e. pay records maintained at finance, with the exception of attached units totalling approximately 4,000 individual pay accounts whose pay records are maintained by their unit personnel officers. The following is selected workload statistics for the period:

	<u>November 1967</u>	<u>December 1967</u>	<u>January 1968</u>
Payrolls Prepared	142	226	216
Regular Monthly Vouchers	10,551	20,057	19,580
PCS Travel Vouchers	1,610	1,790	2,443
TDY Travel Vouchers	144	158	238
Counter Payments	3,173	4,026	6,189
Allotments Processed	1,709	1,582	2,515

Analysis of above figures indicates that the office has been

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operating beyond its staffed capability, this has been accomplished by reallocation of personnel within sections during peak workload periods.

c. In order to provide better customer service and to compensate for unit dispersion, procedures as follows have been implemented:

(1) Forward service teams with roving cashiers assist unit base camps on a scheduled basis.

(2) A Form has been designed for direct communication from individuals serviced by the finance office on any pay inquiries; replies are furnished on the same form. This form serves a dual purpose, it saves manhours by eliminating trips to the finance office and in addition it is a good management tool as it points out areas in pay administration needing attention.

(3) An in-processing team has been permanently stationed at the Division Replacement Detachment; in essence it is a self contained finance office as it provides complete finance service, i.e. voucher preparation, computation and disbursing. Procedures are also in effect for members to purchase U.S. Treasury Checks for cash. All personnel are in-processed and paid on the same day to prevent loss of time.

9. (U) Operations with National Police. During the reporting period this office conducted a total of 32 raids and ten resources control checkpoint operations in conjunction with the National Police. Military Police furnished security, area control, and general supervision. The operations were conducted within the Americal Division TAOR, primarily along National Highway #1.

10. (U) PW Activities. With the arrival of the 11th Infantry Brigade in the Division TAOR, a total of 4 PW Collection Points have been operating. Results for the period have been as follows:

<u>TYPE DETAINEES</u>	<u>NUMBER PROCESSED</u>
Prisoners of War	249
Civil Defendants	70
Innocent Civilians	205

11. (U) Convoy Operations. On 6 Jan 68, the Division Provost Marshal assumed responsibility for the escort of division convoys proceeding along Highway #1 between Quang Ngai and the division northern boundary. The 11th Inf Bde continues to escort convoys between Quang Ngai and the division southern boundary. Convoy results are as follows:

Number of vehicles escorted - 2,648
Number of miles travelled - 8,068

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12. (U) Inspector General

a. Inspector General activities during the last quarter (Nov-Jan) included the conduct of five formal annual general inspections, two special inspections of open mess administration, three special unit fund inspections, and several courtesy inspections of various activities. In addition, the office conducted one inquiry involving a letter written to President Johnson and processed 182 complaints and requests for assistance.

b. The area found to be most deficient during inspections was nonappropriated funds.

c. The complaints and requests for assistance processed by the office averaged 61 per month, with a high of 80 received during the month of January, 9 of which are pending action. Three out of a total of seventeen actual complaints received during the period were considered to be justified. The remainder of the actions were requests for assistance or advice. The bulk of the requests and complaints were in the categories of "assignment/reassignment)" "conduct of individuals" and "disciplinary matters."

d. A complete turn over of officer personnel occurred during the past quarter. The office experienced no major difficulties in the reshuffle primarily because of the assignment of an experienced Inspector General to the section, and an extensive overlap between the arrival of the new assistant IG and the departure of the outgoing assistant IG.

e. Future plans include a continually active program of annual general inspections with increased emphasis on material readiness.

13. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. The Staff Judge Advocate section continued to furnish legal services to the Commanding General, his staff, and subordinate units. Visits were continued to subordinate units. Advice and assistance were given to Article 32 investigating officers, counsel of special courts-martial, presidents of special courts, and summary courts.

b. During the period, the section expanded from 4 officers and 4 enlisted men to 7 officers and 12 enlisted men when the legal sections of the three separate brigades were absorbed. The section could not effectively use 12 enlisted personnel but the brigades, Support Command and Division Artillery each needed a legal clerk. These units were furnished a clerk from this office.

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c. Military justice activities comprised the largest area of activity. During the period November 1967 - January 1968 this command tried 4 general courts-martial and received 62 special and 18 summary court-martial cases for supervisory review. Defense counsel also were furnished for several Article 32 investigations that did not result in general courts. The rates for general special, and summary courts-martial during the period were 0.0607, 1.03, and 0.3? respectively. The rates reflect the average number of cases per month per thousand troop strength.

d. The number of legal assistance cases and cases involving counseling of personnel on disciplinary matters during the period were 723. For a portion of this period the brigades had their own legal officers to handle their cases.

e. During the period 40 claims were approved for payment for loss or damage to personal property of servicemen.

C. Intelligence & Counterintelligence

1. (C) Quang Tin-Quang Nam

a. Activity in the Quang Tin-Quang Nam Provinces resulted from Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, enemy initiated ground and mortar attacks against friendly installations and enemy interdiction of LOC's with mines and boobytraps. During the reporting period 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68, there were a total of 26 mine and booby trap incidents reported along Highway 1 (5 in Nov, 5 in Dec and 16 in Jan).

b. On 6 Nov 67 elements of the 3/1st Air Cav captured documents from a KIA, identified as being a member of the MR-5 Staff Section, containing information on MR-5 attempting to activate the 401st Sapper Regt consisting of the 405th, 406th, 107th and X20th Battalions. The documents also mentioned the establishment of the 408th Sapper Bn by MR-5 for the B-3 Front. In addition, MR-5 had established a Sapper Training School which could graduate up to 600 students a year. These documents substantiate information provided by Maj Huynh Cu, former MR-5 Military Training Officer, who defected in Mar 67. Maj Cu stated that MR-5 was to place a special emphasis on the activation and use of sapper units and the NVA may establish a Sapper Branch. This information also agrees with a marked increase since mid-1967 in the conversion of local force infantry units in southern I Corps to sapper units, the establishment of a sapper unit for each district and activation of [sic] a sapper support unit for regimental and divisional size units operating under MR-5. On 9 Nov 67 elements of the 3/1st Air Cav contacted the 3rd NVA Regt/2nd NVA Div vicinity AT 981 345 resulting in 45 NVA KIA and 3 x 75mm RRs captured or destroyed. On 9 Nov 67 the capture of PFC VU VAN BA (NVA) further confirmed the infiltration of two (2) battalions of the 68th NVA Arty Regt (122mm Rockets) into

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DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P). On 23 Nov 67 elements of the 196th LIB contacted the 2nd Bn (aka 8th Bn), 3d NVA Regt, 2nd NVA Div vicinity BT 0832 resulting in 128 NVA KIA and 53 wpns CIA. On 25 Nov 67 the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div terminated its role in Operation Wheeler and its Op-Con to the Americal Div. From 12 Sep - 25 Nov 67 (Operation Wheeler) the brigade accounted for 793 VC KIA (BC), 39 VC PWs, 5 NVA PWs and 220 wpns captured. The brigade had engaged all three regiments of the 2nd NVA Div during this operation. Since joining the Americal Div (then Task Force Oregon) in April 1967 the brigade has conducted 6 major operations (Malheur I, Malheur II, Hood River, Benton, Cook and Wheeler) accounting for 2046 VC KIA (BC), 383 NVA KIA (BC) 41 NVA PWs, 76 PWs, 15 VC Returnees and 738 wpns captured. The 196th LIB assumed the Wheeler AO from the 1/101st Avn Bde and the 198th LIB moved from Duc Pho to assume the defense of the Chu Lai Base and Americal Div Hqs.

c. On 5 Dec 67 elements of the 3/1st Air Cav engaged an enemy force vicinity of BT 015 375 resulting in 17 NVA KIA (BC). Captured documents from the KIA indicated they were all top ranking cadre of the 2nd NVA Div, one being the CO of the 3rd NVA Regt, Maj Tran Ngoc Toan. The captured documents contained plans for a large scale offensive to be initiated by the 2nd NVA Div in the Que Son Valley area around the end of the year. Immediate processing of the documents was initiated and appropriate counter plans were formulated. On 9 Dec 1967 elements of the 3/1st Air Cav contacted elements of the 1st MF Regt/2nd NVA Div vicinity BT079478 - BT065484 resulting in 124 NVA/VC KIA. Several PWs captured in the contact stated they had been on a large rice gathering mission. On 13 Dec 67 a Hoi Chanh led friendly elements to a weapons cache vicinity AT 970 286 containing 19 wpns and assorted quantities of ammunition. On 14 Dec 67 elements of 3/1st Air Cav contacted the V-15 LF Co and possible support elements of the 2nd NVA Div vicinity BT 2044 resulting in 60 NVA/VC KIA (BC). On 26 Dec 67 a Hoi Chanh led friendly elements to a weapons cache vicinity BT 034 182 - BT 037 202 containing 140 wpns and assorted quantities of ammunition. On 26 Dec 67 three (3) Hoi Chanh informed the 3/1st Air Cav that a multi-regimental size attack was to be initiated in the near future against LZ Ross and LZ Baldy. This information agreed with the offensive plan outlined in the documents captured on 5 Dec 67.

d. On 2 Jan 68 enemy activity in the Que Son Valley area indicated the movements and concentration of large size enemy forces. On the morning of 3 Jan 68 ground, mortar and rocket attacks were initiated against friendly bases in the Que Son area (LZ Leslie, LZ Ross, LZ Colt and LZ Baldy). The 3/1st Air Cav and the 196th Inf Bde had moderate to heavy contact with the three (3) subordinate regiments and several support battalions of the 2nd NVA Div throughout

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the Que Son-Hiep Duc Valley area. By 10 Jan 68 elements of the Americal Div had stopped the major offensive of the 2nd NVA Div and had inflicted losses of 892 NVA KIA (BC), 244 VC KIA (BC) and 109 wpns captured against the 2nd NVA Div and local support units. In coordination with the offensive by the 2nd NVA Div, local and main force units initiated a series of attacks against friendly installations and outposts. On 2 Jan 68 elements of the 409th Sapper Bn and the 706th LF Co attacked the Ly Tin SS hos resulting in 30 VC KIA (BC), 70 VC KIA (P), 1 PW and 15 wpns captured. On 7 Jan 68 elements of the 72nd LF Bn attacked a friendly outpost vicinity BT 274 233 resulting in 13 VC KIA (BC). From 2-4 Jan 68 a series of ground and mortar attacks were initiated against outposts and friendly installations in Tien Phuoc and Hau Duc districts resulting in 56 NVA/VC KIA (C) and 60 NVA/VC KIA (assessed by Hau Duc (D) Chief). ON 16 Jan 68 rallier Ta Dinh Sau confirmed the existence of the 31st NVA Regt, 341st NVA Div was presently located in a base camp in Dai Loc (D), Quang Nam (P) preparing for operations after the "TET" holidays.

e. On 24 Jan 68, A/3/21 (196th Bde) discovered a signal cache vic BT 054 218) containing 90 pieces of signal equipment (including 25 pieces of radio equipment). (Division TOC entry #30)

f. From 21-27 Jan 68 ARVN elements operating vic BT 2618 were engaged with company to battalion size enemy forces resulting in 45 VC KIA.

g. On 27 Jan 68 elements of the 196th Bde engaged the 72nd LF Bn vicinity BT 2020 resulting in 212 VC KIA. A PW captured in the contact stated there were to be large scale attacks in the Tam Ky/Chu Lai area in the next few days.

h. On 30 Jan 68, mortar/small arms fire attacks were directed against District Hqs and US forward bases in northern Quang Tin (P) and southern Quang Nam (P). Thang Binh (D) Hqs, Que Son (D) Hqs, Hoi An City, LZ Ross (BT 0235) and LZ Baldy Bt 1345) were major targets for these attacks.

i. On 31 Jan 68, enemy forces initiated ground/mortar/rocket attacks against Duy Xuyes (D) Hqs, LZ Baldy, Tam Ky City, Chu Lai Air field and surrounding installations. Chu Lai air field received 48 x 122mm rockets and a large number of 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 3 aircraft destroyed, 10 aircraft damaged and the destruction of two bomb dumps and an ammo dump. Reaction by the Americal Division forces accounted for 302 enemy KIA on 31 Jan 68. At Tam Ky the 70th MF Bn, 72nd LF Bn, V-15 LF Co, V-12 LF Co, 706th LF Co, 74th LF Co, V-16 LF Co and 78th LF Co initiated a two pronged ground attack against the District Hqs, Regional Forces Hqs

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and Tam Ky air field. Other units identified in contact were the 105th LF Co, E-90 LF Co and 70th Co/409th Sapper Bn (destroyed An Tan bridge). Confirmed enemy losses in the attack on Tam Ky City were: 486 VC KIA, 92 Individ wpns and 6 C/S wpns CIA. The 70th Co/409th Sapper Bn sustained 5 VC KIA and 1 VC in the attack on An Tan Bridge (BT 498 066).

2. (C) Quang Ngai

a. Activity in Quang Ngai Province was characterized by light to moderate contacts with LF/MF/NVA units, coordination attacks against friendly installations, small scale harassing attacks and interdiction of LOC's with mines and booby traps. During the reporting period, 1 Nov 67 -31 Jan 68 there was a total of 17 mine and booby trap incidents reported along Highway 1 (0 in Nov, 12 in Dec and 5 in Jan).

b. In Nov 67 the 1/14 Inf reacting on intelligence indicating enemy infiltration and staging activity initiated an operation in the Vuc Liem area west of Duc Pho. From 1 Nov 31 Nov 67 the operation accounted for 48 NVA KIA (BC), 41 VC KIA (C), 2 NVA PWs and several base camps destroyed. The 2 NVA PWs were from the 130th Bn, 250th NVA Div. Captured documents from KIA in several of the contacts indicated that rear elements of the 22nd NVA Regt Hqs and regimental support companies had established base camps in the area. On 11 Nov 67 elements of the 198th LIB engaged a local force unit attempting to cross a river vicinity BS 792 473 resulting in 19 VC KIA (BC). On 27 Nov 67 a rallier confirmed the existence of the newly activated 81st LF Bn. The battalion has its base camp in the vicinity of Base Area 121 and conducts operations in Nghia Hanh, Tu Nghia, and Son Tinh Districts.

c. During Dec 67 the 1/14 Inf continued its operations in the Vuc Liem area accounting for 36 NVA KIA (BC and 6 VC KIA (BC). During the month the 11th LIB arrived in Duc Pho (D) and became the 3rd organic brigade of the Americal Division. The brigade conducted in-country training at the Duc Pho base and then began to conduct routine search and destroy operations within the Duc Pho AO. On 3 Dec 67 the 48th LF Bn, 506A LF Sapper Co, 21st LF Sapper Co, and the P-31 LF Co coordinated to attack the Chua Bridge and Binh Son (D) Hqs. The VC succeeded in overrunning the headquarters. Friendly artillery, air support and ground troops accounted for 35 VC KIA (BC). On 25 Nov 67 a nurse from the 95th Sapper Co had stated the 95th Sapper was coordinating with the P-31 LF Co to attack Chau O Bridge and Binh Son (D) hqs before 15 Dec 67. On 30 Dec 67 a Hoi Chanh from the 506 A LF Sapper Co informed allied forces of an attack which was to take place against Nghia Hanh (D) Hqs around the first of the year. Source also stated he had seen the 48th LF Bn in western Son Tin (D). On 31 Dec 67,

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the 2nd ARVN Div supported by Americal gunships engaged the 48th LF Bn and elements of the Son Tinh (D) force vicinity BS 570 782 resulting in 111 VC KIA (BC) and 37 wpns CIA. During Dec the 95th LF Sapper Co was accepted as a confirmed unit operating in eastern Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts; the 1506th MF Engineer Bn was dropped from Order of Battle holdings. Order of Battle intelligence indicated the battalion had dispersed sending units to Kontum and Quang Tin Provinces with only 7 sqds still operating in Quang Nghia Province.

d. On 2 Jan 68 the 406th MF Sapper Bn, 83rd LF Bn, 506A Sapper Co and several local force units coordinated to attack Nghia Hanh (D) Hqs. Prompt reaction to information received from the rallier on 30 Dec 67 enabled friendly forces to be prepared for the attack. Results of the attack were 72 NVA/VC KIA (C), 30 NVA/VC KIA (P), 5 PWs, 1 Hoi Chanh and 20 wpns captured. On 17 Jan 68 elements of the 1/14 Inf and 1-52 Inf engaged the P-31 LF Co, 95th Sapper Co, T-18 LF Co (aka V-20 LF Co) and possibly the 21st LF Sapper Co in the area bounded by the coordinates BS 7288 - BS 7290 - BS 7390 resulting in 87 VC KIA (C), 7 PWs (4 from the V-20 LF Co, 2 from the P-31 LF Co and 1 from the 95th LF Sapper Co), and 35 wpns captured. A search of the area on 18 Jan 68 by the 1-52 Inf produced an additional 13 VC KIA (BC) and 3 wpns captured. During the contact on 17 Jan 68 involving the 1/14 Inf, 3/4th Inf Bde and 1-52 Inf, 198th LIB, the total KIA figure for the Americal Division since its activation on 20 April 67 (then Task Force Oregon) went over the 10,000 NVA/VC KIA (BC) mark.

e. On 31 Jan 68 Quang Ngai City came under a four pronged mortar/ground attack by LF/MF/NVA units in Quang Ngai Province. The 406th MF Sapper Bn headed a thrust against the Citadel (MACV and 2nd ARVN Div Compound) and the Quang Ngai Jail. The 83rd LF Bn, 120th MF Montagnard Bn, 401st Sapper Regt and 506A LF Sapper Co attacked the 4th ARVN Rgt Hqs and 2nd ARVN Div Training Center at Quang Ngai airfield. the 48th LF Bn and 95th LF Sapper Co combined to attack the Son Tinh RF-PF Training Center and the bridge north of Quang Ngai City. Other enemy units identified in the attack were the 107th NVA AA Bn (position west of Quang Ngai City to protect withdrawing elements), 21st LF Sapper Co, T-18 LF Co, C-19 LF Sapper Co, 81st LF Bn, Mo Duc and Duc Pho District units and the Quang Ngai Province Hqs unit. Preliminary reports indicate that elements of the 409th MF Sapper Bn (Quang Tin (P) and the 407th MF Sapper Bn (Kontum (P) also participated in the attack. The enemy force succeeded in releasing over 600 PWs from the Quang Ngai Jail. Confirmed enemy losses for 31 Jan 68 were: 556 VC KIA, 35 VC, 207 indiv wpns and 38 C/S wpns CIA.

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3. (C) Military Intelligence Detachment.

a. The provisional detachment has continued to provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to the Americal Division during the reporting period. In addition, it has been given the responsibility of screening, selecting and initial orientation of the Kit Carson Scouts. This will be accomplished by the CI Section with the aid of ARVN interpreters as instructors. Orientations have slated to be one week in duration and the prospective scouts will billet and mess with the ARVN interpreters.

b. Personnel strength of the Detachment is adequate in relation to that authorized by TOE 17-30E, for an infantry division MID. Recommendation that the detachment be organized under a division TOE have been made.

c. The procurement of supplies continues to be less than satisfactory since the detachment is still a provisiona [sic] unit. The amount of expendable supplies authorized has been increased but non-expendable items must still be requisitioned through HHC. Efforts to transfer the property account from the 525th MI Group have remained stymied pending the issuance of a UIC for the detachment. General Orders 1746 authorizes an amount of equipment which is inadequate to perform the mission of a division MID.

d. Order of Battle Section

(1) During the reporting period, the OB Section continued to produce timely intelligence concerning the enemy situation in Southern I CTZ. During this period there was almost a complete turnover of personnel. In spite of this, newly assigned personnel have rapidly adjusted to their duties and have performed in an outstanding manner.

(2) Significant projects completed by the Order of Battle Section during the period were as follows:

(a) Published a 138 page OB Study on enemy units in Southern I CTZ and distributed over 80 copies to higher, subordinate and adjacent headquarters.

(b) Prepared intelligence estimates and overlays for the projected 2nd NVA Division Winter-Spring Offensive in Que Son Valley.

(c) Completed and published an SOP for the Order of Battle Section.

(d) Conducted liaison visits with USSF/CIDG camps, advisory groups and subordinate brigades.

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(e) Aided in the preparation of G-2 briefings for General Westmoreland, General Abrams and General Johnson. Also conducted informal briefings for newly arrived personnel requiring knowledge of enemy situation.

(f) Initiated an enemy unit location and installation plotting map to enhance the Order of Battle intelligence effort.

e. Imagery Interpretation Section

(1) During the reporting period the Imagery Interpretation Section completed all planned renovations on their buildings and work area. Visual reconnaissance declined toward the end of the period due to nonavailability of aircraft.

(2) The following projects were completed during the quarter ending 31 January 68:

(a) Produced 23 Imagery Interpretation Reports containing information extracted from immediate read-out of tactical imagery.

(b) Completed 5 Intelligence Estimates and assembled 30 mosaics for use in planning tactical operations.

(c) Up-dated targeting files and map supplements to include the extended Americal TAOR.

(d) Assisted Imagery Interpretation personnel for the 198th Bde and the 11th Bde upon their arrival at the Americal Division.

f. Interrogation Section

(1) During the reporting period the Interrogation Section interrogated and classified 517 detainees at the Americal Collecting Point. Detainees were classified as follows:

(a) Prisoner of war	232
(b) Civil Defendants	70
(c) Returnees	25
(d) Doubtful cases	0
(e) Innocent civilians	190

(2) The Interrogation Section has continued to support the Navy in its coastal patrol operations and have provided interrogation support to the Marine Combined Action Program.

(3) On 7 December 1967 documents found on the body of a regiment Commander were exploited by the Americal Interrogation Section which revealed OB and operational directions for the 2nd NVA Division on an upcoming offensive. This information proved invaluable and aided in thwarting the enemy in achieving his objectives.

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(4) During this period the Interrogation Section screened and forwarded to the Combined Documents Exploitation Center four (4) tons of captured documents, in support of five (5) operating brigades. 200 captured weapons were evacuated to III MAF during the reporting period.

g. Counterintelligence Section

(1) During the reporting period the CI Section worked closely with the Chu Lai Industrial Relations Office and the Americal Provost Marshal in the implementation of the Indigenous Employees Program. In addition, the CI Section took over the mission of the 7th CI Team for the first Marine Air Wing providing CI Support to them.

(2) Thirteen semi-annual CI inspections were conducted during the period and several courtesy inspections were performed. In addition technical assistance was provided to Americal Division Headquarters and subordinate units to include fingerprinting and security clearance processing of personnel in the Division.

(3) The CI Section has taken over the responsibility for interviewing, screening, orientating and distributing Kit Carson Scouts to the various brigades in the Americal Division. Several interviews have been conducted at the Chu Hoi Centers at Quang Ngai and Tam Ky. Since this program has just begun, results are as yet inconclusive.

(4) Americal Reg 381-2, Volunteer Informant Program was prepared by the CI Section and published on 13 Oct 67. In addition leaflets, and posters were designed by the CI Sections to implement this program. The CG also signed a letter emphasizing the program.

(5) An employee pass system was established for the Chu Lai installation and passes issued to IRO under the direction of the CI Section. Weekly liaison visits to Tam Ky and Quang Ngai were initiated during this time.

h. G2 Air Operations

(1) The G2 Air Section has continued to support the Americal Division during the reporting period. A total of 71 photographic missions were requested of which 33 were completed prior to the date no longer of value.

(2) A 7th Air Force study team (Project Compass Eagle Team produced Supplementary Photographic Intelligence Reports (SUPIR) of ten infrared photographic missions of the same Americal target area flown during a one month period. Analysis of the ten SUPIRs

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revealed the following:

a. Four times as many missions were detected when the aircraft flew the mission at 1000 feet as were detected when the aircraft flew at 2000 feet.

b. The SUPIR revealed a significant number of emissions which were not detected or listed on the Immediate Photographic Report (IPIR)

c. Comparative analysis of succeeding infrared missions can detect changes in the level of activity within the target area which can serve as an indicator of enemy presence.

3. (C) During the reporting period the division began using a Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) Data Link. the Data Link permits real time ground readout of the imagery as it is obtained from SLAR aircraft. This has resulted in a substantial increase in the number of targets detected as well as making the intelligence available on a timely basis.

4. (C) Intelligence from readout of infrared photography missions is received by message three to eighteen hours after the aircraft has appeared over the target area. The G2 Air section will, as its highest priority project, attempt to improve the timeliness of infrared intelligence.

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D. (C) Plans, Operations, and Training

1. G3 Section

a. General: AMERICAL DIVISION units conducted continuous offensive operations in assigned AO during the reporting period. Contact varied from light to heavy. The Americal Division continued Operations WHEELER/WALLOWA and initiated Operation MUSCATINE. Operations WHEELER and WALLOWA were combined on 11 November.

b. Organization. All units of the AMERICAL Division were either activated, assigned or received during the reporting period except the Division HHC which had been previously activated and organized. The Division troop list, as of 31 Jan 68, is attached as inclosure 1. the following organization actions were completed.

(1) USARV General Order 5712, 5 Nov 67, assigned the 196th and 198th Lt Inf Bdes to the Division, effective 26 Oct 1967.

(2) AMERICAL Division General Orders 1187, 1190, 1191 and 1192, 7 Nov 67, activated and organized the following provisional units, respectively, pending formal activation by USARPAC general orders:

- (a) 23D Administration Company
- (b) HHC and Band, 23d Inf Div Spt Comd
- (c) HHB, 23d Inf Div Arty
- (d) 23d MP Company

(3) USARV General Order 6108, 27 Nov 67, relieved the 335th Trans Co from attachment to the AMERICAL Div, effective 17 Nov 67.

(4) AMERICAL Division General Order 13412, 22 Nov 67, activated and organized the AMERICAL Long Range Patrol Detachment (Prov), effective 22 Nov 67, pending formal activation by USARPAC general orders.

(5) The AMERICAL Combat Center (Prov) was organized, effective 1 Dec 1967, by AMERICAL Division General Order 1298, 25 Nov 67.

(6) Troop C, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav became opcon to the Division on 3 Dec 67.

(7) The following divisional base units were activated by USARPAC General Order 300, 2 Dec 67, effective 8 Dec 67.

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- (a) HHB, 23d Inf Div Arty
- (b) HHC and Band, 23d Inf Div Spt Comd
- (c) 23d Admin Co
- (d) 26th Engr Bn
- (e) HQ and Co A, 23d Med Bn
- (f) 23d MP Co
- (g) 123d Avn Bn
- (h) HQ and Main Spt Co, 723d Maint Bn
- (i) 23d Sup and Trans Bn

(8) The same USARPAC General Order inactivated the following units, effective 15 Jan 68.

- (a) 221st Sup and Svc Co
- (b) 163d Trans Co
- (c) HQ and Main Spt Co, 188th Maint Bn
- (d) 554th Engr Co
- (e) 161st Avn Co
- (f) Co A, 8th Spt Bn
- (g) Co A, 9th Spt Bn
- (h) 265th MP Platoon
- (i) 544th MP Platoon
- (j) 175th Engr Co
- (k) 55th Engr Co

(9) USARPAC General Order 308, 12 Dec 67, activated and organized Company E, 51st Inf (Long Range Patrol), effective 20 Dec 67. USARV General Order 6621, 27 Dec 67, further assigned the unit to the Americal Division, effective 20 Dec 67.

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(10) The 11th Lt Inf Bde arrived in country and joined the Americal Division during the period 15-25 Dec 67.

(11) USARV General Orders 6641, 28 Dec 67, assigned the 406th Trans Det (Hel Fld Maint) and 449th Sig Det (Avionic Maint) to the AMERICAL Div, effective 24 Dec 67. Americal Div General Order 168, 25 Jan 68, attached these units to the 123d Avn Bn, effective 24 Dec 67.

(12) USARV General Order 102, 9 Jan 68, attached the 14th Avn Bn to the Americal Div, effective 1 Jan 68.

(13) USARV General Order 86, 8 Jan 68, assigned the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav to the AMERICAL Div, effective 10 Jan 68. This unit had previously been attached to TASK FORCE OREGON.

(14) USARPAC General Order 3, 2 Jan 68, activated and organized the 523d Sig Bn, effective 10 Jan 68. this is the Divisional Signal Bn.

(15) The provisional units organized by AMERICAL Div General Orders 1187, 1190, 1191, and 1341 were discontinued by General Order 46, 10 Jan 68, effective 10 Jan 68.

(16) The 509th Sig Bn, previously attached to Task Force Oregon, was inactivated by USASTRATCOM General Orders 203 and 204, 11 Dec 67, as amended by USASTRATCOM General Order 1, 15 Jan 68, effective 15 Jan 68.

c. Disposition and movement of units during the period.

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period, units were conducting combat operations as follows:

(a) 196th Lt Inf Bde: CHU LAI TAOR

(b) 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div: DUC PHO AO

(c) 198th Lt Inf Bde: In-country training at Carenten, BS843371, in Duc Pho AO.

(d) 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div: Operation WHEELER

(e) 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div: Operation WALLOWA

(2) Major movement of the units during the period was as follows:

(a) the 196th Lt Inf Bde completed movement from Chu Lai TAOR to Hill 35, BT227319, to replace the 101st Abn Div in Operation WHEELER on 26 Nov 67.

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(b) 3d Brigade, 4th Inf Div moved from DUC PHO AO to LZ Gator, BS568962, to conduct Operation Muscatine on 16 November and further moved to LZ Baldy, BT133453, on 25 Jan 68, to replace the 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div in Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA.

(3) The 198th Lt Inf Bde finished in-country training in the DUC PHO AO and completed movement to CHU LAI on 26 November 1967 to conduct operations in the CHU LAI TAOR.

(4) The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div was released from the AMERICAL Division on 26 November 1967 and moved from the Americal AO.

(5) The 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div was released from the AMERICAL Division on 25 January 1968 and moved from the AMERICAL AO.'

(6) the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav, previously OPCON to the 196th Lt Inf Bde, reverted to Division control on 26 Jan 68 and began to conduct operations in the eastern sector of the WHEELER/WALLAWA AO, generally east of Route 1.

(7) The 11th Lt Inf Bde arrived in country, completed the move from QUI NHON to DUC PHO, BS8055380, on 24 December 1967, and began preparation for future combat operations.

d. PLANS. The following plans or operational orders were in effect or initiated during the reporting period:

(1) WHEELER. Operation WHEELER was in effect at the close of the last reporting period. It has been characterized by battalion combat assaults of the high ground west of TAM KY. Combat assaults were followed by search and destroy operations to find and destroy enemy forces, base camps, and fortifications in the zone. On 11 November 1967 both operations WHEELER and WALLOWA were merged to facilitate coordination and control. The combined operations has continued to date and is known as Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA.

(2) WALLOWA. Operation WALLOWA was in effect at the close of the last reporting period. It has been characterized by intensive aerial surveillance of the HIEP DUC - QUE SON Valley, followed by numerous small unit combat assaults to find the enemy, prior to insertion of ready reaction forces. This operation has been combined with Operation WHEELER.

(3) GOLDEN VALLEY. OPLAN 17-67, GOLDEN VALLEY went into effect within the AMERICAL Division AO on 4 Nov 67. It is a three phase support operation for relief and reinforcement of designated Special Forces/CIDG camps. The normal sequence will be supporting artillery, tactical air and

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army aviation armed helicopter support to conduct spoiling attacks in the vicinity, followed by commitment of ground forces to conduct operations to reinforce or relieve camps under attack. Initially, the 196th Lt Inf Bde has the mission of supporting Operation GOLDEN VALLEY. Effective with change #1 to the OPLAN, 24 Nov 67, the 198th Lt Inf Bde assumed the mission.

(4) HAYSTACK. Operation HAYSTACK was initiated on 13 Nov 67 due to the increasing number of civilians making use of the roads and waterways within the AMERICAL Division area of influence. This operation consists of the brigades of this division making systematic unannounced spot-checks to deny the freedom of movement which the enemy enjoys. The small spot-check operation on both roads and waterways incorporate the use of National Police to actually search indigenous personnel.

(5) MUSCATINE. On 19 December, the AMERICAL Division began a six phase operation called MUSCATINE. The purpose of this operation is to extend GVN control throughout the area north of QUANG NGAI and to relieve the 2d ROK Marine Bde in place. The relief phase of the operation has been completed and the operation continues.

(6) ARVN INTER-CORPS CONVOY. On 21 Jan, a two day operation was initiated to insure the safe passage of an ARVN convoy from north of Saigon to its destination north of the AMERICAL AO zone. the purpose of this operation has been to display to the people of the free world that Highway I is controlled by the GVN and free world forces. While passing through the Americal Division zone, road maintenance in the form of road sweeping, repair and tactical bridging was made available. Road security by reaction forces, armed helicopters, TAC air and artillery was, also, available.

e. Operations:

(1) Combat operations and engagement generally increased in intensity during the reporting period. During the month of December the Viet Cong stepped up attacks on District and Province headquarters and popular and rural forces strongpoints. BINH SON District HQ was hit the night of 2-3 December 1967 with a combined mortar and ground attack. Although the district was not in the AMERICAL AO, the division came to the assistance of Binh Son with gunships, artillery and a ground force, which is normally positioned at the bridge north of the district headquarters. LY TINH headquarters, vic BT480083, received a heavy mortar and ground attack on 2 January beginning at 0200. The attack lasted until 0500, during which time the AMERICAL Division furnished gunships, flareships, artillery and ground forces in support of the defense of LY TINH. During this same period, several of the combined

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action platoon positions came under attack. Results of the LY TINH attack were seven PF-KHA, nine PF-WHA, 30 VC-KIA, and seven AK-47s, one K50 and five B40 RL CIA. During the month of January enemy activity increased significantly. Major attacks were made on Americal Division units. A general buildup of the elements of the 2d NVA Division NW of TAM KY, BT331214, early in January culminated with a major engagement in the 196th Lt Inf Bde AO on 3 January 1968. The 196th Lt Inf Bde continued to be heavily engaged through the 9th of January. Moderate to heavy contact in the Wheeler/Wallowa AO continued through the entire month of January. On the 9th of January 1968 Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA engagements accounted for 192 enemy KIA. Results for Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA for the reporting period were as follows:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
220 KHA	1718 VC KIA
713 WHA (EVAC)	1585 NVA KIA
342 WHA (M)	492 IWC
	115 CSWC

(2) AMERICAL Division initiated Operation MUSCATINE on 20 December 1967. For this operation the division assumed responsibility for combat operations in the 2d ROK Marine Brigade AO. The relief of the ROK Brigade permitted the ROK's to move north in support of the overall III MAF plan to move additional forces to meet the threat in the north. The relief of the 2d ROK Marine AO took place over a 33 day period and was completed on 22 January 1968. The 198th Lt Inf Bde initially was assigned responsibility for Operation MUSCATINE; however the 3d Bde, 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for Operation Muscatine on 25 January 1968 and continued the operation through the end of the reporting period. Units operation in the MUSCATINE AO experienced difficulty with enemy mines and booby traps, and continually suffered casualties as a result. The MUSCATINE AO experienced light-to-moderate contact the majority of the time; however, several heavy contacts were reported during the period of 16-20 January 1968. Results for Operation MUSCATINE through the end of the reporting period are as follows:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
29 KHA	447 VC KIA
119 WHA (EVAC)	7 NVA KIA
15 WHA (M)	101 IWC
	2 CSWC

(3) The CHU LAI Defense Complex experienced two attacks, the first on the night of 23 December 1967 and the second taking place the night of 30-31 January 1968. During the first attack, the CHU LAI

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Defense Command (CSDC) received 25-30 mortar rounds resulting in one KHA, four WHA and damage to two aircraft. During the second attack, CLDC received an unknown number of rocket rounds. This rocket attack was the first of its kind on the CLDC. Results of the attack were two KHA, 19 WHA, three aircraft destroyed, 10 aircraft damaged, numerous buildings destroyed or partially damaged, and one bomb storage area destroyed.

(4) Weather, although making operations difficult at times, did not seriously hinder combat operations during the reporting period.

(5) During the period three cease-fire truces were scheduled. Two of the truces--the ones at Christmas and New Years--were partially observed. There were many violations during these two truces, with 17 official truce violations being reported for the New Year's period. The scheduled truce during the Vietnamese Tet period was cancelled and combat operations were conducted as usual.

(6) Several combined 2d ARVN Div-American Div operations were conducted during the period. On 1 January 1968 the AMERICAL Division, in conjunction with elements of the 2d ARVN Division in Operation MUS-CATINE, engaged a major enemy force. Gunships were sent in support of the ARVN forces and US ground forces were positioned as a blocking force. As a result of the engagement, 111 VC were killed and 37 individual weapons captured. On 12 and 13 January, AMERICAL units conducted a combined operation with two elements of a battalion size force from the 2d ARVN Division in the SE portion of Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA.

(7) During the month of January, the Division's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols began operation in the AMERICAL AO.

(8) The main body of the 11th Lt Inf Bde arrived in country during the reporting period and began movement to the DUC PHO AO to prepare for combat operations. The main body closed LZ Carentan, BS843371, in the DUC PHO AO, on 24 December 1967. The brigade was initially given a small AO in which to conduct local security operations. The brigade assumed responsibility for the DUC PHO AO from the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div on 2 January 1968.

(9) Overall enemy casualty and weapons results for the Americal Division for the reporting period were as follows:

2872 VC KIA
803 WIA
1713 NVA KIA
622 CSWC

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(a) During the period of 1 Nov 67 to 31 Jan 68, the Americal Division received 2166 sorties of close air support. The division received 889 requests from subordinate units for Skyspots/TPQ-10 missions, of which 780 were passed and 525 approved. In support of these requests, 437 sorties were flown by the USAF, USMC, and RAAF in numbers of 160, 255 and 22, respectively. Ninety-two approved missions were not completed. The division received 1080 requests for forward air controlled missions, of which 985 were passed and 850 approved. In support of these requests, 1275 sorties were flown, 142 by the USMC and 1133 by the USAF. The division requested 454 immediate missions and 262 USAF, 178 USMC, 14 VNAF sorties were flown in support of these requests.

(b) During the period of 1 Nov 67 to 31 Jan 68, there were 18 Arc Light Strikes flown in support of the division. Bomb damage assessed (BDA) by forward air controllers list 50 bunkers and caves destroyed, 150 meters of tunnel uncovered, 30 tunnel airshafts uncovered, numerous trails uncovered, and three secondary explosions were sighted.

f. Training.

(1) The AMERICAL Combat Center assumed the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all assigned and attached units of the division on 17 Dec 67. The course is six days in length and is climaxed with a live combat patrol-night ambush. Twenty eight courses were completed during the period 17 Dec 67 through 31 Jan 68, and 2122 replacements finished the training. The POI is attached as inclosure 2.

(2) A program of conducting training courses in long range patrol techniques commenced on 4 Dec 67. The primary purpose of the course is to provide training for new members of the Division Long Range Patrol, (LRP), Co E, 51st Inf, prior to those personnel attending the MACV Recondo School. The training is conducted by the LRP Company. Fifty six personnel completed the training during the reporting period.

(3) A Combat Leadership Course was inaugurated by the Combat Center on 15 Jan 1968. The purpose of this training course is to prepare personnel in the grades of E4 and E5 for positions of a small unit leader such as fire team and squad leader. The course is conducted bi-weekly. Twenty one trainees attended the initial course: 41 personnel will attend subsequent courses. The Honor Graduate and two Distinguished Graduates receive on-the-spot promotions and Americal Division plaques. The POI is attached as inclosure 3.

(4) On 10 Dec 67, the AMERICAL Division implemented a policy for the conduct of refresher training by units rotating back to the fire bases or engaged in defense of fire bases. The purpose of the training is to

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correct deficiencies noted in earlier combat and is tailored to meet the needs of the particular squad or platoon undergoing the training. Marksmanship, squad and platoon tactics, mines and booby traps, and map reading received primary interest during this training.

(5) During early January, the AMERICAL DIVISION commenced a program of providing mobile training teams (MTT's) to the 2d ARVN Division. The purpose of these teams is to tutor 2d ARVN cadre in selected subjects. These cadre then instruct refresher training for ARVN companies and battalions returning to the 2d ARVN Division training center at Quang Ngai for standdown and training. The cadre are assisted by our MTT's. The primary effort, thus far, has been toward infantry tactics and maintenance of small arms, to include the M16 rifle. This program will be continuous, branching into other areas as desired by the CG, 2d ARVN Div and the SA, Military Advisory Team #2.

(6) The 2d ARVN Division assisted this command during Nov and Dec 1967 in the orientation training of the 198th and 11th Lt Inf Bdes upon their arrival in Vietnam. The training consisted of a one-day practical demonstration of VC techniques of concealment and booby trapping. Correct search techniques were emphasized. The training was conducted by members of the 1st Bn, 36th Regt in a deserted village near Duc Pho, RVN.

2. Artillery.

a. Assigned or attached units. See troop List, inclosure 1.

b. Operations.

(1) WHEELER, 11 Sep 67-10 Nov 67.

(2) WALLOWA, 4 Oct 67-10 Nov 67.

(3) WHEELER/WALLOWA, 11 Nov 67-(continuing)

(4) MUSCATINE, 19 Dec 67-(continuing)

c. Other activities.

(1) The searchlights of the 3d Platoon, Battery G, 29th Arty were deployed throughout the AO as follows:

<u>Hr of Searchlights</u>	<u>Unit Supported</u>
4	11th Lt Inf Bde
2	196th Lt Inf Bde
6	198th Lt Inf Bde
4	3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

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(2) The 509th Engr Co continued to extend third order survey control in the AMERICAL Division AO through early December. Weather difficulties caused the survey team to return to their home station, Nha Trang, in early January 1968. The project will resume after the monsoon season.

(3) The following artillery units departed the AMERICAL Division AO on the dates indicated.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date(s)</u>
2d Bn, 11th Arty (-)	5 Jan 68
1st Bn, 21st Arty	24-26 Jan 68
Batteries A and C, 30th Arty	25 Jan 68

3. AVIATION. Significant data for AMERICAL Aviation units as follows:

	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hrs Flown	17,059	19,522	17,328	53,909
Sorties	62,948	68,071	63,767	194,786
ACFT	61	56	94	211
Med Evacs	190	206	474	870
Tons of Cargo	13,104	15,086	15,948	44,138
Passengers	94,904	98,583	82,564	276,051
Ordnance Expended				
7.62mm	1,489,959	1,995,047	1,496,958	4,981,964
40mm	53,222	25,297	31,126	109,645
2.75" Rockets	27,940	23,916	13,716	65,572

4. CHEMICAL.

a. This office requested that USARV make 300 each M173A fuzes available to this headquarters for fuzing 55 gallon drums of CS for drum drops. A message from USARV was received stating that 300 fuzes would be transferred to the CHU LAI ASP.

b. 1LT James C. Raulston, US Army Biological Laboratory, Fort

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Detrick, Maryland, visited the Division chemical section 15-20 Nov 67 to deliver and evaluate ENSURE Item 210, herbicide, blue, spray. Forty of these items were tested by the 196th Lt Inf Bde and the 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div. These items proved to be very effective for destroying rice seed beds, although the spray system in the cans tended to break down after rough handling by field troops.

c. On 7 Dec 67, SFC Bauer of the Division chemical section visited the 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div at LZ BALDY and presented instruction in the rigging of 55 gallon drums of CS-1 for aerial delivery.

d. On 5 January 1968, 1LT McCloud of this section visited the 11th LT Inf Bde and presented instruction in the operations, and care and maintenance of the E-63 Manpacked Personnel Detector (modified) and discussed chemical operations in Vietnam with brigade personnel.

E. On 13 Jan 68, a visit was made by Maj Henry, MACV chemical representative, HQ, III MAF, for the purpose of discussing the processing of herbicide requests. All areas which fall within the Free Herbicide Zone may be defoliated at the discretion of the Division Commander or his designated representative, without further approval from higher headquarters or Vietnamese governmental officials.

f. During the period, the Chemical Office conducted a survey which indicated that serviceable M17A1 protective masks were available for 94.3% of the command. All shortages are currently being procured.

5. ENGINEER.

a. Throughout the reporting period, the major portion of engineer effort was engaged in the minesweeping, repair and maintenance of Highway 1. During the first part of the reporting period there were four battalions engaged in work on Highway 1. The battalions were the 19th Engr Bn (Cbt), the 39th Engr Bn (CBT), the 9th Mobil Navy Construction Bn, and the 9th - Engr Bn (Mar). On 20 January 1968, the 18th Engr Bde accepted responsibility for Highway 1 to the CHU LAI main gate. At the end of the reporting period, the responsibility for the repair and maintenance of the highway rested with the 19th, 39th, and 9th Engineer Battalions. The 26th Engineer Battalion--the Americal Division Battalion, had a portion of the mine-sweeping responsibility.

b. Enemy activity along Highway 1 was heavy during the reporting period. Fourteen bridges were badly damaged or destroyed by demolitions or fire, thirty-four culverts were blown with demolitions, and twenty-two craters or hand-dug trenches were made in the road. Even though the enemy activity on the road was high, the road was not closed for an entire day during the reporting period. The destroyed bridges or culverts were usually discovered by the early morning reconnaissance overflight or by

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minesweep teams. The road was usually open for traffice [sic] again by 1200 hours and was, in all cases, open for traffice [sic] before nightfall.

c. One major east-west road was opened during the reporting period. Companies A and D, 39th Engr Bn, opened 22 kilometers of Route 535 from Highway 1 to LZ ROSS. This task was accomplished during the period 13 December 1967 to 30 January 1968.

6. SIGNAL.

a. The Division Signal Battalion installed, operated and maintained a reliable and responsive division communications system in support of not only the three organic brigades of the AMERICAL Division, but also in support of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf and the 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div, which were OPCON to the AMERICAL Division. This was accomplished without-augmentation to the Division Signal Battalion in either personnel or equipment.

(1) At one point, thirteen VHF systems were terminated at the Division Signal Center, whereas normally eight to nine systems terminate there. This was necessary because of the addition of two brigades to the Division task organization, and included three systems which were required to support three different elements of the 198th Lt Inf Bde's Hq during their initial employment and 30 day training period.

(2) The Signal Battalion also installed, operated and maintained three radio relay terminals in support of the 198th Lt Inf Bde/battalion fire bases, in addition to the normal two systems which is installed from the division to the brigade. These additional terminals provided internal brigade communications to its subordinate battalions, as the brigade equipment had not arrived in-country due to shipping delays from CONUS. During this period, the Signal Battalion operated at 100% commitment of radio relay equipment.

(3) The primary means of division communications continued to be radio relay telephone and teletypewriter, supplemented by FM (secure plain) voice radio and radio-teletypewriter. Wire circuits were used extensively within the CHU LAI base camp area but have not been found to be reliable in non-secure areas.

(4) Emphasis was placed by the Division and the Signal Battalion on the reduction of immediate and flash messages, and handling times in the division communication center. The result has been a substantial reduction in total messages handled and a sharp drop in the average handling time at the communications center. A division message review board, which was instituted during the reporting period, reviews weekly all flash and immediate teletypewriter messages handled in the communications center, and has been very effective in reducing the over-

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all high precedence traffic.

(5) The Americal Division switchboard (AN/MTC-1) continued to handle a high volume of traffick, reaching a peak average daily peg count in November of 8,000 calls. Emphasis has been placed on operator efficiency and training, which has resulted in increased subscriber service. The Division switchboard developed serious maintenance difficulties during the period, which required three technical assistance visits for support. Current plans are to replace the present board with another AN/MTC-1 switchboard on a 90 day loan and evacuate the old board for reconditioning by the QUI NHON Support Command facility.

b. Training, although limited by heavy operational commitments, continued for the large influx of replacements arriving in the months of November and December. Battalion classes were organized and conducted as follows:

(1) Radio relay and carrier operator refresher training (7 days), conducted 31 October through 5 November 1967.

(2) AN/GRC-106 radio operator refresher training (4 hours), conducted on 4 and 7 December 67 (including students from Divisional units, hosted by the Battalion).

(3) PLL and TAERS classes (4 hours), 8 November 67 (two classes).

(4) Radio teletypewriter operator refresher training (7 days), 13 through 19 November 67.

(5) Teletypewriter operator maintenance training (4 hours), 1 December 67 (two classes).

(6) VHF troubleshooting training (4 hours each site), 30 December 67 and 1, 3, 5 and 6 January 68.

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E. Logistics.

1. (U) Changes in personnel during this period for the G4 Section were as follows:

Departed:	SGM Cleveland	12 Nov 67
	SGM Ellis	7 Nov 67
	MAJ Purdy	6 Jan 68
	MAJ Bessler	20 Jan 68
Joined:	SGM Hall	29 Oct 67
	MAJ Roo	
	MAJ Wood	25 Nov 67

2. (U) The primary problems facing the G4 during this period were establishing locations for incoming units, building stockage levels, improving maintenance, repair parts, and supply posture of the Division, and expanding base development.

3. (U) During the month of December the 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) arrived in-country. The unit arrived at Qui Nhon and moved over the road to Duc Pho. The entire operation was exceptionally well executed due to the close liaison maintained with and between the 11th Brigade, Division Support Command, and 1st Log Command personnel at Qui Nhon.

4. (U) During the month of January the 3/1st Cavalry (Air Mobile) moved out of the division area. With some help from the 80th General Support Group (Forward) the division assigned the 3/1st with 122 trucks of various types.

5. (C) Highway One continues to be classified as secure. Convoys are scheduled daily throughout the TAO.

F. Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

1. (U) Organization.

a. The G5 Section of the Americal Division is an augmentation to TOE 7-4E and is organized according to paragraph 25, TOE 7-4E, as follows:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GRADE AUTH/ACT</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
ACofS, G5	LTC/LTC	1	1
Asst G5	MAJ/MAJ	1	*2
Admin Supv	E-7/E-7	1	*2
Clerk Typist	E-4/E-4	1	1
LT Truck Driver	E-3/E-3	2	1

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* 1 Asst G5 will return to CONUS O/A 17 Mar 68 and 1 Admin
Supv will return to CONUS O/A 12 Feb 68.

b. In addition to the personnel listed above, the Section has an E-6 linguist (Vietnamese Language) assigned who is not authorized by TOE; however, a linguist is required in order to rapidly and equitably resolve the problems addressed by the local populace in the Division's area of responsibility.

c. The G5 Section has a USMC augmentation of one Major. This augmentation is provided by HQ III MAF to assist in the supervision and coordination of civil affairs/civic action activities of USN/USMC elements in the Chu Lai area. The officer is assigned to the Division on a TAD basis. The officer filling this position departed on 16 January 1968 and a replacement has not been provided.

d. The G5 Section is further augmented by three Civil Affairs Platoons which are under the operational control of the G5, Americal Division. Two of these platoons are organic to the 29th Civil Affairs Company is under the command and control of the US Office of Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). The 4th and 6th Civil Affairs Platoons are authorized two (2) officers and four (4) enlisted men. All three platoons are at full strength. The 4th CA Platoon is in an area support role in the Duc Pho AO. The 6th CA Platoon is in direct support of the 3d Bde 4th Inf Div at LZ Baldy in Que Son District, Quang Nam Province. These platoons coordinate the overall civic action program in the Americal Division area of responsibility and act as liaison agents between the US military and civilian agencies.

e. The organic brigades and battalions of the division have principal duty civil affairs officers. The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div has a principal duty civil affairs officer at brigade level, and major additional duty civil affairs officers at battalion levels.

f. The 29th Civil Affairs Company provides a displaced persons team to each Province Senior Advisor in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. These teams assist the Province Advisors in the control of refugees, and maintain records of relief supplies.

2. (U) Operations.

a. During the period 7 thru 10 November, the G5 held a series of meetings with the GVN Officials in Hamlets on the southern boundary of the Chu Lai Defense Command. Meetings were held at the request of CO, Chu Lai Defense Command and were conducted to inform the local Vietnamese of the dangers of entering the combat base through the wire to scavenge in the sanitary fill, which is located near the fence.

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It was explained that in addition to the danger of being shot by the guard's on the perimeter, there was also a great danger of being run over by trucks and bulldozers which work in the sanitary fill. The Hamlet Officials were also informed that the base was off limits and that entering the base was a criminal offense. The Hamlet Chiefs agreed to inform their people to stay out of the Chu Lai Base and away from the wire. As an additional deterrent powdered CS was placed along the fence line.

b. On 11 November 1967, LTC James S. Conklin, G5 Americal Division departed for an assignment to the operations group, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. LTC Charles Anistranski assumed the position as G5, Americal Division. LTC Anistranski's previous position was Executive Officer to the Division Surgeon, Americal Division.

c. On 22 November 1967, the G5 held a meeting of all Civic Action Officers in the Chu Lai area. Since the 198th Lt Inf Bde has overall responsibility for the area, the S5 of the Brigade outlined the Brigade's Civic Action Program to the personnel attending the meeting. Major Robert Nourse, Sub-sector Advisor Ly Tin District explained the District Chief's Civic Action Program. Mr. Bob Kenny, explained the CORDS organization, its capabilities and limitations. During the meeting, each unit in the Chu Lai area was assigned a civic action area of responsibility. The designation of areas of responsibility will result in a more effective coordinated civic action program.

d. On 21 December 1967, LTC Anistranski briefed Gen Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff on the long and short range, high impact civic action program of the Americal Division. Included in the briefing was a wrap-up on the accomplishments of the Division in the civic action field since 20 April 1967.

e. On 26 December 1967, the G5 received a request from 80th Support Group to assist in the relocations of 26 graves in the vicinity of BT535045 to make room for a property disposal yard. The 6th Civil Affairs Platoon coordinated the action with the District and Hamlet Officials and the graves were moved on 29 December 1967.

f. On 9 January 1968, LTC Anistranski, G5 Americal Division briefed the following members of Congress on the Civil Affairs/Civic Action activities of the Division:

- (1) Mr Maston O'Neal D-Georgia
- (2) Mr Richard T. Hanna D-California
- (3) Mr Richard D. Price R-Texas
- (4) Mr Eligio De La Garza D-Texas
- (5) Mr George V. Hansen R-Idaho
- (6) Mr Thomas Relville D-Alabama

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g. Throughout the period, the G5 has been coordinating the movements of CORDS supplies from the sand ramp at Chu Lai to Tam Ky and Quang Ngai City. During the three month period a total of 3055 tons of supplies were moved by the Division for CORDS. The supplies consisted of cement, tin and food items. Additionally the Division provided 75,000 board feet of scrap lumber to CORDS for use by refugees.

h. In order to insure a coordinated civic action program throughout the Division area and to exchange ideas and discuss problem areas, the Americal Division G5 attends the Weekly Staff Meetings held by the Province Senior Advisors. A meeting is held in Tam Ky each Wednesday and in Quang Ngai on Friday. At these meetings, each Staff Officer presents a brief on current activities and future plans. The G5 is also given an opportunity to discuss the civic action plans and programs of the Division.

i. In early December 1967, the Binh Son District Chief, the Quang Ngai Province Chief, and the Senior US Province Advisor, Quang Ngai discussed the possible disposition of the Sa Ky Refugee Camp following the departure of the 2d Bde ROKMC from the Binh Son District in January 1968. It was tentatively agreed that the Sa Ky camp posed two major problems, namely, PF/RF were not readily available to replace the ROKMC Security Force at Sa Ky; and, that Province/CORDS could not, with their limited transport means, resupply Sa Ky on a regularly scheduled basis. It was agreed that unless these problems could be resolved prior to the departure of the ROKMC Security Force, consideration would have to be given to relocation of the Sa Ky Refugee Camp. At a meeting in Quang Ngai City on 7 January 1968, the principal agencies, together with a representative from the Americal Division, concluded that the Sa Ky Refugee Camp should be relocated to a more secure area. The Americal Division was requested to assist in the relocation of the camp and agreed to consider the matter pending preparation and submission of movement plans by the Binh Son District Chief. Upon receipt of the movement plans, the Americal Division in coordination with appropriate US Naval agencies programme the necessary airlift/seaborne requirements.

j. On 14 and 15 January, the G5 provided the transportation and most of the labor to move 165 refugees from Ky Chanh (VIC BT417119) to Chu Lai New Life Hamlet (VIC BT506056). The refugees were moved along with all personal belongings, including their homes. Move was made at the request of the Ly Tin District Chief since he felt he could no longer provide security for the refugees at Ky Chanh.

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3. (U) Civic Action/Revolutionary Development.

a. In support of the GVN program of revolutionary development, the G5, Americal Division, has continually maintained close coordination with CORDS organization in the Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces and more recently in Que Son District of Quang Nam Province.

b. Since 1 November 1967, Americal Division elements have performed the following MEDCAP activities:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO OF VISITS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>
Division Artillery	64	2,798
Division Surgeon	2	950
196th Inf Bde	101	6,743
*198th Inf Bde	278	25,591
**11th Inf Bde	14	2,706
3d Bde 4th Inf Div	49	6,085
3d Bde 1st Air Cav	120	14,748
1st Bde 101st Abn Div	15	3,537
15th SPT Bde	5	635
14th AVN Bn	<u>18</u>	<u>1,614</u>

* 198th Inf Bde joined the Division on 21 October 1967.

** 11th Inf Bde joined the Division on 17 December 1967.

c. All elements of the Division participated in "self-help" projects throughout the Division Area. The Division assisted in the following projects During the period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968:

- 3 - Dispensaries
- 17 - Schools (25 Classrooms)
- 22 - Wells
- 21 - Latrines
- 6 - Bridges
- 3 - Marketplaces
- 561 - Refugee Housing Units
- 9 - Garden Plots
- 2 - Playgrounds
- 1 - Church

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d. Following items were contributed by units and individuals:

Clothing	-	1390 lbs
Food	-	287,274 lbs
Lumber	-	58,274 Bd Ft
Soap	-	16,850 Bars
Money	-	142,470 \$VN

4. (U) a. This report covers organizational and unit activities of the PSYOP section, Americal division during the period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968. At the end of the reporting period the PSYOP section was staffed as follows:

PSYOP officer	1	O-4
Asst PSYOP Officer	1	O-3
Operations Sergeant	1	E-6
Clerk Typist	1	E-4
Illustrator	1	E-3

b. Indirect support of the division is Detachment G, 7th PSYOP Bn, consisting of 1 officer and 11 enlisted men. These personnel presently comprise 1 audio-visual (HE) and 4 combat loudspeaker (HB) teams. Each team consists of 2 enlisted men with the HB teams augmented by a 2 man Vietnamese armed propaganda team. The loudspeaker teams provide ground, waterborne and aerial broadcasts in support of tactical operations and civic action projects in each brigade area. The audio visual team is in support of the division and is used to show films on health and education and provide general entertainment in the Chu Lai area of operations. The 7th PSYOP Bn also supports the division with the production of leaflets, posters and tape recordings. A quick reaction leaflet can be obtained within 36 hours, however, a normal time frame for production of an original leaflet has been 6 to 10 days. The battalion has the capability of printing almost a million leaflets per day.

c. The US Air Force, 9th Air Commando Squadron, is the unit that provides the C47 aircraft for large leaflet drops and performs night aerial loudspeaker missions. The O2B (O2B) aircraft broadcasts during daylight hours and drops limited amounts of leaflets on designated target areas.

d. Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) provides support in the form of films in the Vietnamese Language. These films are used by the audio-visual team. JUSPAO also has a one sided pre-printed leaflet which assists the 7th PSYOP Bn in the production of quick reaction leaflets.

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5. (U) a. A reward leaflet was printed in December 1967 and dropped within 14 hours. The leaflet stated that 20,000\$VN would be paid to anyone who could give information leading to the recovery of a missing pilot. The helicopter had been downed between Chu Lai and Duc Pho. The call was received at 2030 hours and the leaflets dropped at 1000 hours the following day.

b. During the month of December, emphasis was placed on the Christmas "Chieu Hoi" campaign. As a result of these efforts, America Division accounts for 307 Hoi Chanhs during the month. Among these was a NVA senior sergeant who turned himself in with a safe conduct pass in his possession. On 26 December, this same sergeant led a company of the 3/21 Infantry, 196th Light Inf Bde to a cache consisting of 140 weapons. For his efforts in supporting the GVN, the Hoi Chanh was paid approximately one million piasters by the GVN.

c. A campaign was initiated in December to counter the VC mine and booby trap efforts in Quang Ngai sector. Since the initiation of the campaign, leaflets and special taped broadcasts have been used. The campaign has appeals to the local populace to inform allied forces of the location of know munitions. For such information appropriate rewards have been paid. As the number of mining instances has been reduced, it can be assumed that the efforts have been effective.

d. A NVA "hunger" leaflet was initiated for use against the 2nd NVA division in the Wheeler/Wallowa area of operation. The leaflet was formulated following an incident on the night of 5 Jan 68. During heavy contact between the 196th Light Inf Bde and elements of the 2d NVA division, an NVA soldier sat down in the battle area and took a can of "C" rations from the body of an American soldier and began eating the contents. This incident, along with intelligence reports, indicated that the NVA unit was suffering from hunger and appropriate propaganda was developed and disseminated.

e. The 1968 TET campaign is currently underway and all organic, attached and supporting resources are being used to meet the JUSPAO and III MAF requirements for the campaign. The campaign includes broadcasts from C47 and O2B aircraft. In addition, leaflet drops are made by organic division helicopters. The leaflets are mostly preprinted and supplied by JUSPAO. However, localized leaflets directed towards the 2nd NVA division have been formulated by this section. Dissemination was made in the Wheeler/Wallowa area of operation. Through the end of the reporting period, this division had disseminated a total of twenty million leaflets in support of this campaign.

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6. (U) Statistical Data for the period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968.

- a. Leaflets dropped: 125,398,760
- b. Loudspeaker hours:
 - (1) Waterborne broadcasts: 33 hours 50 minutes
 - (2) Ground broadcasts: 693 hours
 - (3) Aerial broadcasts: 277 hours 25 minutes
- c. Movies shown: 214 for a total of 132 hours
- d. Tapes developed by PSYOP section, Americal Division
 - (1) Anti-mine campaign
 - (2) Enjoy a happy reunion with your family at Christmas
 - (3) Return on the occasion of Christmas
 - (4) Curfew for Binh Son District
 - (5) River curfew for Binh Son District
 - (6) No boats on waterway - day or night
 - (7) The hospital area is surrounded - surrender!
 - (8) Nguyen Van Sau's appeal to his comrades to rally
 - (9) Appeal to rear elements of 2nd NVA division
- e. Posters developed
 - (1) Failure of VC to overrun Ly Tin District headquarters
- f. Leaflets developed
 - (1) TET invitation to Chieu Hoi to 2nd NVA division
 - (2) Requesting people of Binh Son district to report location of VC weapons and mines
 - (3) Appeal to soldiers of 40th, 60th and 90th battalions of 1st MF Regt to rally to GVN

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- (4) Appeal to weary soldiers of NVA to Chieu Hoi
 - (5) Appeal to young men of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin sectors to resist VC recruiting effort
 - (6) Do not run from allied forces
 - (7) NVA "hunger" conditions among 2nd NVA Division
 - (8) Message to NVA telling of their dear comrades who lie in unmarked graves
 - (9) Movement of ROKMC elements from this area of operations and replacement by American elements.
 - (10) Appeal to citizens of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin sectors to report VC Activity.
 - (11) Appeal to citizens of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin sectors to report VC activity.
 - (12) Failure of NVA to liberate SVN in 1967
- g. PSYOP in support of major operations
- (1) WHEELER/WALLOWA
 - (a) Leaflets dropped: 45,553,000
 - (b) Aerial broadcasts: 88 hours 5 minutes
 - (c) Ground broadcasts: 221 hours
 - (2) MUSCATINE
 - (a) Leaflets dropped: 4,900,000
 - (b) Aerial broadcasts: 5 hours 55 minutes
 - (c) Ground broadcasts: 12 hours

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h. "Chieu Hoi" program

(1) Hoi Chanhs by sector 1 November 67 - 28 January 68

	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Nam (Que Son District)	-	94	30	124
Quang Tin	71	180	109	360
Quang Ngai	46	33	42	121
TOTAL	<u>117</u>	<u>307</u>	<u>181</u>	<u>605</u>

1 (2) Hoi Chanhs by operation 1 November 67 - 28 January 68

	<u>WHEELER/WALLOWA</u>	<u>MUSCATINE</u>
Quang Nam (Que Son District)	124	-
Quang Tin	360	-
Quang Ngai	-	32
TOTAL	<u>484</u>	<u>32</u>

(3) Hoi Chanhs turned in to the Americal Division 1 November 67 - 28 January 68

	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Nam (Que Son District)	-	-	3	3
Quang Tin	16	-	9	25
Quang Ngai	1	-	1	2
TOTAL	<u>17</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>30</u>

NOTE: All figures for Que Son District as at 21 January 68.

G. Information.

1. (U) During the period 1 November 1967, through 21 January 1968, the Americal Division Information Office served as a clearing agency for news releases from brigade Information Offices, as well as a news-generating office. Support was provided to the news media, both military and civilian as follows:

Number of Printed Releases: 412
 Number of Pictorial Releases: 409
 Number of Home Town News Printed Releases: 4567
 Number of Home Town News Pictorial Releases: 91
 Number of Formal Press Interviews or Briefings: 99
 Number of Correspondents Provided Support: 445

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2. (U) Significant events and activities were as follows:

a. Visit by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey: Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey visited the Americal Division Headquarters on November 1, 1967, for approximately four hours. He was briefed by MG S. W. Koster, Commanding General, Americal Division. During his visit, the Vice President presented awards to three US Enlisted Men and one ROK Army Soldier, and held a press conference at the Chu Lai airfield. Approximately 60 members of the various news media accompanied the Vice President to Chu Lai. The press was met at the airstrip by representatives from the Information Office, transported by two to the headquarters area, and were briefed about events to follow. Two mimeographed fact sheets, describing in detail the days events were given each member of the press group. Cold drinks were available aboard the vehicles, and were appreciated by the newsmen. Upon completion of the ceremonies, the press entourage returned by bus to the airstrip to the area designated for the Vice President's press conference. Detailed planning by the Americal Staff brought verbal commendations, as member of the press were pleased at the way arrangements were planned.

b. Arrival in country of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade: The 11th Light Infantry Brigade arrived in Vietnam on December 20, 1967, and became one of the maneuver brigades assigned to the Americal Division. Most of the elements of the brigade were trucked from their debarkation point in Qui Nhon to Duc Pho, but a representative body of the brigade was left in Qui Nhon for official arrival ceremonies. The press covered the ceremonies, and the events were also filmed by Television camera crews. A large welcoming sign with the Americal Division patch and the 11th Brigade's patch was draped over the side of the MSTS Gordon, and photographed very well for the TV cameras.

c. Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA: Operation Wheeler was launched by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division on September 11, 1967, in the high ground northwest of Tam Ky, in Quang Nam Province, Operation Wallowa was begun on October 4, 1967, by the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces. The operation were merged on November 11, 1967, and set the pace for Americal action and publicity in southern I Corps. Most of the press representatives who came through the Information Office received briefings and transportation to elements participating in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa.

d. Operation MUSCATINE: Operation Muscatine began on December 21, 1967, in Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts of Quang Ngai Province with elements of the Americal Division's 198th Infantry Brigade, coordinated with 2d ARVN Division units. Announcement of the new operation was not made until January 15, 1968, at which time newsmen were given the opportunity to visit the Operation Muscatine area. Delay in the announcement of the new operation was due primarily to the multiple shifts of the ROK Marine Corps combat units which occurred when Muscatine began.

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e. Distribution of Stars and Stripes: The arrival and Distribution of Stars and Stripes was monitored by the Information Office during the reporting period. A new distribution list was prepared and implemented on December 23, 1967. The new distribution list could not fully meet the needs of the division and its attached units. A check into the problem revealed that some other services at Chu Lai were carrying on an unauthorized requisition and distribution of the Americal's Stars and Stripes. Increased supervision and closer monitoring have solved the matter of "borrowed" newspapers.

f. Command Information Guidance, 3d Qtr, FY 68: The division's Command Information Guidance was published and distributed to all subordinate commands along with the Command Information Guidance supplied by Department of the Army. The division's guidance added three subjects - one per month - to the program for the third quarter. The detailed guidance, and published supporting materials promise a more effective Command Information Program for the Americal Division.

g. Other Publications:

Fact Sheet - "Snake Bite"

Fact Sheet - "TET" (Reproduction of US ? R? s fact sheet)

Company Letter - over Commanding General's signature, concerning American discourtesies to Vietnamese.

A Summary of Highlights and Indicators of Progress for the Americal Division for 1967.

A Command letter, requesting newspaper reports, and outlining mandatory distribution of unit newspapers.

A revision of the Americal Division History is currently is currently [sic] being prepared.

Section 2, Part I, Observation-Lessons Learned.

A. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline.

ITEM: (U) Infusion within brigades during their first year in-country.

DISCUSSION: (U) All battalions in brigades which deployed to Vietnam to join the Americal Division have rotational humps, by brigade, during the same month.

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OBSERVATION: (U) No infusion can take place within the brigade.

ITEM: (U) Activation and organization of units.

DISCUSSION: (U) The Americal Division organic units were activated during the period November 1967 to January 1968. Concurrently, former Task Force Oregon units were either inactivated or transferred minus personnel, to provide resources for the new units. The lack of basic TOE's and MTOE's for the new units at the time of their activation created significant problems in effecting a smooth reorganization. In addition, in the late receipt of activation and or inactivation orders from higher headquarters necessitated late initial morning reports and erroneous and confusing strength reporting. Morning reports had to be held pending receipt of activation/inactivation orders, and guess work had to be used in determining personnel authorizations until MTOE's/TOE's were forwarded by higher headquarters.

OBSERVATION: (U) Many problems could have been precluded had activation General Orders and TOE's been received on a timely basis.

ITEM: (U) Infusion and Commander's Desires.

DISCUSSION: (U) The rotational hump month of each organic brigade is widely separated.

OBSERVATION: (U) Each brigade commander desires infusion to be handled evenly thru each month, not "crash" projects in order to accommodate the other brigades. This is especially true of the officer infusion. The brigade commanders desire their officers (commanders) to have the opportunity to obtain six months command time prior to leaving the brigade.

ITEM: (U) Problem in Matching EM for Infusion.

DISCUSSION: (U) EM get promoted, demoted, and have MOS changes continually, thus requiring constant changes to selected infusion rosters.

OBSERVATION: (U) Changes in EM's status complicate the infusion and require constant updating of infusion rosters.

ITEM: (U) DA Form 41, Record of Emergency Data.

DISCUSSION: (U) Excessive errors were discovered in the information contained on DA Form 41 which showed that individuals preparing these forms did not give accurate information. Consequently, this caused incorrect casualty reports to be submitted to DA necessitating correction of reports. Additionally, letters of sympathy and condolence

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were also submitted with incorrect information since these were prepared from information contained on DA Form 41.

OBSERVATION: (U) Increased emphasis must be placed on accurate and complete preparation of DA Forms 41. Individuals preparing forms must be thoroughly aware of the importance of information recorded there on. Procedures of cross-checking information against other available documents will aid in detecting errors and inconsistencies in information.

ITEM: (U) Operation Silver Star (Christmas mail season)

DISCUSSION: (U) Preparations for Operation Silver Star were made in early September 1967. Requisitions for postal supplies were submitted on 5 Sep 67. A meeting of all officers in charge of Chu Lai postal activities was call [sic] on 7 Sep 67. Matters pertinent to personnel and equipment augmentations were discussed in this meeting. The Division APO Personnel strength was augmented by 20 enlisted men effective 1 Oct 67. These augmentees were given all around postal training during the month of October.

OBSERVATION: (U) The Operation Silver Star was successful due to extensive advance preparations and adequate personnel strength augmentation.

ITEM: (U) Postal Support to Americal Division Brigades.

DISCUSSION: (U) The postal sections of the Americal Division Brigades were set up to operate separately soon after their arrival in RVN. This method was adopted due to arrival of the brigades during the Christmas mail season. The separate set-up proved to be highly successful and contributed greatly to rapid and efficient distribution of increased volume of mail during the holiday season. During the month of January when the volume of mail received dropped to normal amounts, unnecessary duplication of function in the separate postal sections was observed.

OBSERVATION: (U) The organization of separate postal sections at Division and Brigade levels was an expedience. Maximum effort should be made to integrate postal activities as soon as possible in order to conserve manpower.

ITEM: (U) Organization of the Division APO.

DISCUSSION: (U) The division APO organization started after the arrival of the brigades in RVN. Hasty preparations were made to provide postal support to the brigades. Since the postal sections did not arrive with the brigades advance parties, each brigade became a heavy burden on the division APO for a period of a month.

OBSERVATION: (U) The division APO capability should be periodically reviewed. Measures should be taken to organize the division APO commensurate with its assigned mission. Brigade size units

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joining the division should be informed well in advance about their responsibility for making necessary coordinations with the division APO prior to arrival in RVN.

ITEM: (U) Relocation of the division APO Discussion.

DISCUSSION: (U) The division APO was relocated during the holiday mail season to an area which is too far from all troop concentration centers and the servicing aerial port. It takes the mail trucks 35 minutes, traveling authorized speed limits, to transport mail from the aerial port to the division APO. Also, unit mail clerks travel long distances to pick up and dispatch mail. Due to this relocation, the division APO established an additional postal finance unit at the Headquarters, Americal Division. This unit, manned by two clerks, serves the headquarters personnel.

OBSERVATION: (U) The division APO should be located in the vicinity of the Division Post Exchange. This will enable all patrons to combine their Post Exchange and APO trips, resulting in a saving of time and economy of vehicles.

ITEM: (U) Operation Holly.

DISCUSSION: (U) The Bob Hope Vietnam Show (Operation Holly) was generally smooth in operation and extremely successful in maintaining high troop morale.

OBSERVATION: (U) The project lead time was rather short. The schedule was not confirmed until 16 Dec 67. This allowed only 3 1/2 - 4 days for actual planning and instrumentation. Also, adequate amplifiers did not exist at the time of the show. Two 100 watt amplifiers were needed to insure a primary and reserve source of power. Many man hours were thus consumed in procuring these amplifiers.

ITEM: (U) USO Gift Program.

DISCUSSION: (U) The Americal Division Special Services Office received and distributed approximately 7,500 individual Christmas Gifts from the USO Gift Program. The program was another project designed to maintain high morale among all troops in Southern Sector, I Corps Tactical Zone. This, the program most certainly accomplished.

OBSERVATION: (U) The only problem which arose, and one which is almost impossible to control, was that of transportation. The gifts were shipped from Da Nang by LST on a space available basis, which gave them low priority. Once arrived, they could be distributed only to units that could pick them up, as Special Services did not, and does not, have adequate transportation to make deliveries. After the

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Christmas season shipments of gifts dropped off, and as a result, the goal of 34,000 gifts was never attained.

ITEM: (U) Non-Deployable Personnel

DISCUSSION: (U) Individuals with personnel actions pending or completed were verbally reassigned. These personnel in many cases are still on our morning reports because no reassignment orders have been received. Letters to Fort Hood have so far failed to produce the necessary orders.

OBSERVATION: (U) Deploying unit must, through command channels, if necessary actively check and recheck progress of orders procurement through constant personal liaison with the appropriate AG-PM office.

ITEM: Falsified claims against the United States in incidents involving solatium payments.

DISCUSSION: In December 1967, a report was received that a grenade had been dropped from a helicopter into a group of children. It was alleged that the detonation of the grenade had injured several of them and it was intimated that a solatium payment should be made. A tactful investigation revealed that the children had in fact gone into an area booby-trapped by the VC and had been injured there. Further inquiry disclosed that this may be a fairly common practice.

OBSERVATION: Due care and caution must be exercised in making solatium payments. In cases where a doubt exists that cannot be quickly and tactfully resolved, it is better to go ahead with the payment.

ITEM: (U) TOE

DISCUSSION: (U) Inadequacy of the authorized TOE strength for Brigade and Battalion S-1's.

OBSERVATION: (U) The TOE in existence for a Brigade Headquarters is strictly for a peace time mission. For example No authorization for Awards and Decoration or Casualty Section or Strength Accounting Clerks. These areas need at least two (2) for casualty, two (2) for Awards and Decorations and one (1) for Strength Accounting. In addition, a Message Center must be in operation to service all the assigned and attached units without any authorization for personnel strength.

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ITEM: (U) Personnel

DISCUSSION: (U) The TOE for an infantry division provides for 5 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 4 enlisted men. This is based upon a troop strength of approximately 15,000. This division's general court-martial jurisdiction numbers approximately 24,000 or 60% above the strength upon which the TOE is based. In addition, this section furnishes legal services to 5,000 - 10,000 other military personnel of all services in the division area of operations who are not under our GCM jurisdiction. The authorized strength of the office should be increased to insure that adequate legal services are available.

OBSERVATION: (U) This section submitted a request in November 1967 that the authorized strength be increased to 7 officers (+2), 1 warrant officer, and 7 enlisted men (+3).

ITEM: (U) Personnel

DISCUSSION: (U) The TOE for the SJA section provides for a warrant officer, Legal Administrative Technician. This position has never been filled but a warrant officer is programmed to arrive in April 1968.

OBSERVATION: (U) When a particular position is established and recognized as necessary it should be filled as soon as possible and not one year later.

ITEM: (U) Personnel

DISCUSSION: (U) The TOE of the SJA section provides for two qualified court reporters. These positions were not filled until December 1967, and then only by the absorption of the Judge Advocate Section, 11th Infantry Brigade.

OBSERVATION: (U) A new GCM jurisdiction should be furnished a qualified court reporter immediately upon activation and not 8 months later.

ITEM: (U) Shortage of USARV Publications

DISCUSSION: (U) Many operational and administrative requirements directed by Army Regulations are modified by USARV Regulations. In addition, new requirements are set forth by USARV Regs. Without these publications, processing even normal administrative operations has been difficult. Many actions and projects had to be redone due to errors in format, required information, routing, and so on. Prior to deployment, this Headquarters was notified that USARV Publications had been requisitioned for it, and that it would receive them shortly after arrival in-country. So far, only a minimum of USARV Regs has been received.

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OBSERVATION: (U) A complete package of regulations should be prepared by the sponsoring unit or senior in-country headquarters for units scheduled for deployment to RVN and delivered to the unit immediately upon arrival in-country.

ITEM: (U) Operations with National Police.

DISCUSSION: (U) The combined operations of Americal Military Police and Vietnamese National Police have been highly successful in reducing the flow of US goods to the Vietnamese black market, cutting the sale of marijuana to US troops, and assisting in the apprehension of Vietnamese draft dodgers. Among items confiscated were 2,066 sticks of marijuana, military payment certificates totaling 4325, and significant quantities of beer and C-rations.

OBSERVATION: (U) The success of these operations lies in the culturing of close and harmonious relations between the Military Police and the National Police at the working level. Military Police should be assigned to combined police out of lengths of time sufficient for the establishment of a proper working rapport between the two groups. Good relations at the supervisory level are mandatory in order to obtain cooperation from National Police supervisors in the commitment of their personnel.

ITEM: (U) Utilization of non-army military personnel as Military Police.

DISCUSSION: (U) The Provost Marshal, Americal Division, has twenty-four Navy and Marine personnel assigned on a special duty basis for 90 day periods. They do not have formal school training as Military Police prior to their assignment. They perform Military Police duty on a base camp which has a mixed population of Army, Navy, and Marine personnel. In addition a Marine officer assigned to the Provost Marshal's office.

OBSERVATION: (U) a. The training and integration of Navy and Marine personnel to form a joint police force has been remarkably successful. The local personnel selection criteria established for non-army personnel is high and compares favorably with the standards required of Army Military Police. The contributing units have adhered to this selection policy and have responded well when it has become necessary to replace any men who did not meet performance standards. They receive expert training by experienced Military Police personnel and they are placed on duty with an experienced Military Police partner.

b. There are several advantages to having a Marine officer in the Provost Marshal's Office. Extensive coordination is necessary in the performance of Sub-zone Coordinator duties which affect the

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diverse units on Chu Lai Base Camp. The Marine officer has a much better understanding of Naval and Marine operations and quickly resolves matters not readily understood by US Army personnel.

ITEM: (U) Convoys.

DISCUSSION: (U) The responsibility of escort of divisional convoys within the division TAOR has been accepted by this office. Since 6 Jan 68, convoys originating at Chu Lai Base Camp and other convoys travelling within or passing through the division TAOR (to include a special convoy outside of the division area) have been escorted by elements of the 23d MP Co.

OBSERVATION: (U) Escort of military convoys in a hostile area requires extensive individual and team training. Military Police must be fully trained in the use of the M-60 machine gun, .45 cal pistol, M-79 grenade launcher, M-16 rifle, M-14 rifle, fragmentation grenade, and several types of pyrotechnics. Further, they are trained in the use of SOI's and must carry detailed pocket sized SOI's that enable them to contact medical evacuation helicopters, gunships, artillery support and area reaction forces. They must be schooled in artillery adjustment and map reading. All Military Police receive this training conducted locally prior to assignment to convoy duty.

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B. Operations.

ITEM: Searching the VC Base.

DISCUSSION: (U) A platoon pushed into a village located near a river in order to set up their night defensive position. While engaged in cutting camouflage for a defensive position, one EM from the platoon discovered a large bundle wrapped in green plastic hidden under a bush 4-5 meters off a main trail. This package contained VC training manuals, tax information, a company roster and a book of orders from VC district headquarters. A thorough search of the surrounding area resulted in the capture of additional enemy materials including uniforms, rice and medical journals. All the material had been waterproofed and hidden along the main trail and branch trails. Although the area contained numerous tunnels and bunkers, a search of these proved negative. Several days later a point squad moving over and down the reverse slope of a jungle covered mountain came upon 3 VC in a camp consisting of three neatly camouflaged hooches. 1 VC was shot and 2 fled. One squad was sent to pursue these enemy while the remaining members of the company began a detailed search of the camp. The search technique consisted largely of five patrols employed in a clover-leaf fashion. The initial find was a plastic improvised pack, found stuffed under a large rock near a hooch. The pack blended so well with the rock that the man sitting on it did not see the pack. The search continued for several hours and resulted in the capture of 10-15 similar packs containing 45 uniforms, rice, ammunition, protective masks, and numerous documents. Most of the packs were found by our troops when they overturned rocks, cut away foilage [sic] and lifted deadfall. The clover-leaf search resulted in the additional discovery of one VC who had hidden in a hedgerow only 100 meter from the VC camp, and who was subsequently shot and killed. The finds described above boosted troop morale considerably and gave them an incentive for future operations. It was interesting to note a pattern in the VC technique in hiding equipment. Other units may well be using similar techniques.

OBSERVATION: (U) Friendly Search and Destroy operations in the mountains often result in much searching and very few tangible results. There are many reasons for this but the most common are:

- a. The friendly unit tries to search too large an area in a short time-frame.
- b. Troops are easily discouraged by terrain and therefore do not follow trails through thick vegetation unless the leaders take an active interest.
- c. The VC are masters at camouflaging equipment and are able to effectively hide items even when pursued by our troops.
- d. Our troops search out only the more obvious hiding places i.e., tunnels, hootches and trails.

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ITEM: Pursuit of small VC Units in Mountainous Terrain.

DISCUSSION: Prior to this units arrival in the AO, it had been operating to the south where the terrain is made up of inundated rice paddies, coastal lowlands, and land flats. In this type of terrain, methodical sweeps of areas resulted in several contacts with small groups of VC. Because of the terrain, which afforded relatively good foot trafficability, pursuit of the VC was not difficult and the usual result was that the VC would try to break contact almost immediately and flee. This proved consistently true for this unit and we never experienced sniper fire during an action when the VC attempted to withdraw.

In mountainous terrain pursuit of the Viet Cong is an entirely different problem. Mountainous terrain with double and triple canopy jungle affords the Viet Cong numerous hiding places, caves, and in all cases excellent concealment from both the air and the ground. This mountain area also contains numerous trenches, tunnels and concealed fortifications. Although there are many trails into the mountains, there are few if any that can be seen from the air.

Most of the contacts with the VC are chance meetings of friendly and enemy forces at trail junctions, VC bases, or near streambeds. To engage and maintain contact with the VC it has been our experience that our companies must operate on a wide frontage with their platoons, operating independent of each other and the element establishing a blocking position to prevent escape.

OBSERVATION: When operation in mountainous terrain we must depend on platoon size operations and use of a blocking force to prevent escape out of the area of operation.

ITEM: Platoon Size Operations:

DISCUSSION: In this units particular AO, enemy activity to date has been characterized by sniper incidents, road mining and sightings of small groups (5 to 5 personnel) of local and main force VC units. Although several company-size S&D Operations have been conducted, the most successful operations resulting in the highest percentage of VC casualties have been platoon-size or smaller. It appears that a company-size unit "telegraphs" its presence more readily that [sic] the smaller elements and the VC either move out of the area or go underground, increasing the difficulty of finding and destroying them. Separate platoons, being smaller, can move faster and with less noise and have the facility of changing direction much more quickly that [sic] the larger units. They are also more responsive to intelligence information because they do not require large numbers of aircraft or vehicles to move quickly.

OBSERVATION: If the enemy contacts in an area of operations are light, i.e. squad or smaller size elements being encountered, separate platoon operations gain more significant results than company or larger size operations.

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ITEM: Maneuver elements enjoy success by returning to scene of previous victory.

DISCUSSION: The preponderance of local force Viet Cong operating in the AO reside along the River, particularly in the destroyed hamlets. One company using saturation patrolling procedures, killed four VC and captured several grenades, medical supplies and explosives. An area analysis of the village locations revealed that the VC used the destroyed buildings for hide-aways and had constructed with District Officials and MACV advisors to the District Chief and his staff, it was determined that additional success might be obtained if the company withdrew from the area and returned one week later. It was further concluded that the Viet Cong, observing their withdrawal would return to the same area. Approximately ten days later, the company returned to the same area and surprised five Viet Cong during the first day of the operation.

RESULTS: 2 VC KIA; 3 VC CIA; 1 US Thompson SMG, 1 US Carbine M-2, 3 hand grenades, and various items of field equipment CIA.

OBSERVATION: It is difficult for local force guerrillas to vary their redoubt areas. They must generally use the same areas, emphasizing camouflage and deception. When American units leave an area for one week or more, the VC return to the same area in an attempt to re-establish themselves.

ITEM: Ground Support of Armed Helicopters.

DISCUSSION: When heavily engaged with an enemy force, the ground commander usually turns to the aerial supporting arm to get him out of a jam and provide suppression on the enemy position while he maneuvers his troops. Because he is concerned with the tactical plan and the safety of his troops, and because the fire power of a gunship is so awesome when viewed from the ground, many a commander considers these helicopters and their crew invulnerable to enemy fire. It does seem improbable that the enemy will fire at one of the "monsters" while it is on an attacking run. But what about the few seconds that elapse during which the gunship must break off the attack in order to move into position for the next pass? Experience has taught us that the average rifleman can aim and fire at a mobile target the size of the average man in 3-5 seconds. A machine gunner can fire 35-30 rounds in three seconds. Considering then both aiming and firing time, the average gunner can fire a deadly burst in less than 10 seconds with one out of three rounds almost certain to hit the target. At an average attack speed of 60-80 knots, a UH-1C will take from 20-35 seconds to position himself for a subsequent attack run. During this period of time, the ship must rely on its door gunners to suppress enemy fire. The altitude of the aircraft in a turn makes accurate fire by the door guns almost impossible. How then can the gunship be

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best protected from enemy ground fire during the period of vulnerability.

OBSERVATION: The answer to the question lies directly with the man being supported and the knowledge of his troops. As a first step, the ground commander moves as many M60 MG's and M79's to a "on line position as he can afford. It is best to set up the MG's on each flank. The gunships then make their pass at the target. At the instant the gunship breaks off, the M60's and M79's on the ground rake the target with a continuous volume of fire until the gunship is again in an attack altitude. Once the subsequent attacking run begins, troops on the ground cease fire and move forward on line. The gunships provide covering fire. This sequence is repeated with each pass until the troops can gain the objective or the enemy position is neutralized.

ITEM: Helicopters prevent injury when evacuating a minefield.

DISCUSSION: An infantry company inadvertently entered an enemy minefield. Four of the mines were detonated, resulting in nine WHA'. The Battalion Commander ordered all movement by the company personnel to cease and obtained three helicopter to evacuate the company. The air evacuation was successful and further injury was prevented.

OBSERVATION: Unit leaders must take immediate and positive action when discovering that their units are in a minefield. All movement must cease and paths to wounded personnel meticulously probed. Helicopters are the most secure method of evacuationg [sic] personnel from an area saturated with mines or booby traps.

ITEM: Communications capabilities in Command and Control Helicopter.

DISCUSSION: During combat operations a requirement exists for personnel in the airborne command group to monitor and transmit traffic on the battalion command net, the battalion air ground net, the brigade command net, and the artillery fire direction net. The battalion commander needs to be able to selectively monitor all or each separate net. Current communication capabilities available permits one man to monitor one radio provided a "Y" cord is installed in the command and control helicopter and the ground command has his own headset. Communication between passengers can only be accomplished by shoutint [sic] at each other.

OBSERVATION: Radio and intercom systems should be installed in the command and control helicopters used at battalion level

ITEM: Marking a Landing Zone in Low Wet Areas

DISCUSSION: During Combat Assaults landing zones are habitually selected in wet areas (rice paddies). Normally landing zones are marked

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by smoke grenades dropped by the Command and Control helicopter. In wet areas these grenades sink to the bottom of the wet area and the smoke is very difficult to detect.

OBSERVATION: A need exists for floating smoke grenades

ITEM: Direct H&I Artillery Fire

DISCUSSION: When we first arrived in country we would receive sniper fire everyday at our base camp. Normally the Artillery H & I's were too far out to be effective against this sniper fire. After discussing the problem with the Arty LNO he started firing direct H&I's. Since that time the number of sniper rounds fired into our base camp has greatly decreased.

OBSERVATION: That by using direct H&I Artillery fires snipers in the general vicinity of base camps will be discouraged from this type of tactics. They will also know that we have the means to neutralize a mass human attack.

ITEM: Fire Support Coordination During Contact.

DISCUSSION: When engaged in enemy contact, the ground commander is often unable to adequately control his maneuver elements and at the same time, coordinate all of his close fire support. This problem frequently is compounded by the fact that there are too many stations on the Company frequency.

OBSERVATION: By permitting the forward observer to coordinate all fire support to include air strikes on the fire direction net, the Company Commander is able to control his maneuver elements more effectively. Use of the fire direction net also eases the coordination problems between the Air and Artillery support and insures minimum interruption in either fire support means.

ITEM: No fire Lines

DISCUSSION: During period of heavy contact, the Artillery Liaison Officer with the supported battalion often becomes so involved in coordinating the fires of the various supporting companies that adequate attention is not given to blocking fires beyond the line of contact.

OBSERVATION: The use of No Fire Lines and preplanned blocking targets will permit the battalion fire direction center to immediately engage blocking targets without delay and thus cut off routes of withdrawal and reinforcements.

ITEM: Plotting Multiple Missions on the 6400m Firing Chart

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DISCUSSION: The 6400m firing chart at battery level works well except when two or more missions are being conducted with 2000 meters of each other. Observer corrections on overlapping target grids increase the probability of error.

OBSERVATION: Several solutions are available

- (1) Smaller target grids
- (2) Target grids of different colors
- (3) Designation of an alternate battery center in the quadrant opposite the quadrant in the heavy use. The needed grid lines are renumbered in a contrasting color. The REP can then be shifted from one mission to the other and a maximum of four missions can be fired at one time.

ITEM: Fuze Setting for Color Smoke

DISCUSSION: Considering the difference in weight for smoke projectiles and subtracting 2 seconds provided accurate data for smoke streamer missions when using yellow smoke, but resulted in impact bursts when using green smoke.

OBSERVATION: Performing the same computations with green smoke and subtracting 3 to 4 seconds resulted in streamer effect for green smoke. This procedure resulted in the same effect when using the FADAC or manual computations.

ITEM: Hardstand for the M101A1 Towed (105mm) How.

DISCUSSION: Shifting trails on the M101A1 How has proven extremely difficult in deep mud caused by monsoon rains. Hardstands of gravel and/or PSP are not available in forward support bases.

OBSERVATION: A hardstand can be improvised by driving shell canisters in the ground upside down.

ITEM: River Crossing Presents Problems

DISCUSSION: One platoon and the Hq's element of an Infantry Company were separated by a river from the remainder of the company. Three 50 foot ropes were tied together and each man used a rope and snap line to cross. At midstream individuals had to switch snap links because of the knot encountered where the ropes were joined. With 15 men remaining to cross, sniper fire was taken and the river crossing was temporarily halted until small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire could suppress the incoming fire. Because of ensuing darkness the company was forced

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to establish its perimeter close to the crossing site. It did, however move its location 100 meters from its daylight position. That evening three 60mm mortar rounds were received where our first position had been located.

OBSERVATION: a. If river crossings are anticipated or swollen streams can be expected in the AO, at least one 120 foot rope should be taken. This would eliminate changing snap links at midstream. Also one light weight rope 50 foot in length should be taken in order to more easily throw it across the stream.

b. River crossings should be eliminated whenever possible and units should not be split unless no other alternative exists.

c. A unit should not locate itself for any period of time at one site. Otherwise the enemy has time to register indirect fire. In this particular instance, movement of the company base only 100 meters prevented possible casualties.

ITEM: Use of 60 MM Mortar in Rifle Companies

DISCUSSION: When maneuvering on foot, and especially over difficult terrain where resupply may be made only by air drop, the rifle companies need a light weight organic mortar. The 81mm mortar can be man carried but the weight of the weapons and necessary ammunition greatly reduces the rate of movement of the unit. At present rifle companies of this unit normally carry on 81mm mortar with them while conducting Search and Destroy operations and have one airlifted to their night location in the evening and airlifted out in the morning. Because of weather and insufficient aircraft to effect pick up of the 81mm mortar in the morning, the unit movement is sometimes delayed. With two 60mm mortars in each company this requirement could be eliminated.

OBSERVATION: The 60mm mortar is an excellent light weight indirect fire weapon for use by Infantry units on extended ground operations with foot mobility.

ITEM: Communications with Medical Helicopter Ambulances

DISCUSSION: Occasionally, division or brigade medical units are unable to establish immediate radio communication with supporting helicopter ambulances because of range or terrain features. When the range or terrain prohibits radio contact with supporting units or between elements within a unit, the following actions should be considered:

a. Radio Relay: Relay of messages by radio can be accomplished by establishing points between the two locations.

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b. Telephone (Hot Line) Communications: Coordination with supporting signal units or the Brigade Signal Officer to solve communications problems often results in obtaining a single user line direct to the supporting unit.

c. Field Medical Regulator: The Field Medical Regulator is equipped with a single side band radio which has a range of over 100 miles. If one is attached to the medical unit by the supporting medical group, it will generally have direct communications with the supporting unit.

OBSERVATION: Medical units must achieve communications and should consider use of radio relay, telephone-hot line, and field medical regulator single side band radio.

ITEM: CS Drum Drops using the M173A1 and M157 bomb fuzes (U).

DISCUSSION: Failure of CS Drums, which were rigged with the M173 or M157 point detonation fuzes, to detonate was noted by the Chemical Section. The drums were being dropped from 1500-2000 feet above the ground. The M157 and M173 must be dropped from a minimum height of 3000 feet in order for a sufficient amount of time (for arming) to elapse before impact.

OBSERVATION: The M157 should be dropped from a minimum of 3000 feet.

ITEM: Firefly Missions

DISCUSSION: A firefly mission conducted under conditions of poor weather characterized by a low ceiling broken to overcast and further reduced by haze significantly endangers not only the success of the mission but also endangers the life of the helicopter and crew. It has been found that the use of the firefly light during such weather conditions reduced the visibility outside the lights beam to near zero. Since it is necessary to keep the beam of light along the water during most missions during period of low ceilings. Maneuvering along a winding river involved rapid maneuvers under the stated conditions tends to induce vertigo.

OBSERVATION: Careful weighing of results expected versus the danger of low level firefly missions conducted in mountainous areas under conditions of poor visibility must be made if aircraft and lives are not to be needlessly endangered.

ITEM: Use of Flame Field Expedients in Defensive Positions

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DISCUSSION: A Chemical Detachment has developed several types of flame field expedients. These are of the flame mine type. The largest one is using 55 gallon drums filled with thickened gasoline, fitted with three M-4 Incendiary Bursters and set off with electrical blasting caps. The other type of flame field expedient is using 175mm shell containers filled with thickened gasoline and two M-4 incendiary bursters.

OBSERVATION: the use of flame field expedients are both effective as a psychological weapons and as a casualty producing weapon. Man has always had a fear of fire and when a flame mine is detonated at night the enemy will more than likely panic. If he is close enough to the explosion he will become a casualty due to the burning of the thickened fuel. Subject expedient has not been tested as of 1 Feb 68.

ITEM: Hand Grenades in Base Camp

DISCUSSION: In the past we have had at least two fatalities and a number of injured due to improper handling of hand grenades. These accidents have all occurred in base camps where there was no need for individuals to have grenades on their person.

OBSERVATION: that a grenade issue and turn-in point be established at each base camp thereby eliminating the need for soldiers to carry hand grenades on themselves while in camp. Also, continued safety training during standdown would prove beneficial.

ITEM: Standing Instructions for perimeter guards

DISCUSSION: It is necessary to continuously instruct and brief perimeter guards on rules of engagement. Lines of communications limiting points of fire and other standing instruction pertinent to each specific fixed position. Special instructions and range cards should be posted at each position so as to provide a ready reference to on duty sentinels.

OBSERVATION: Posting of range cards and special instructions at each fixed position contributes appreciably to the overall preparedness of security forces.

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C. Training and Organization.

ITEM: (U) Organizing and equipping a TO&E Medical Unit from a Provisional Task Force Organization.

DISCUSSION: (U) When organizing and equipping a Medial TO&E Unit while continuing support of tactical operations, a heavy administrative burden is placed on already busy personnel. Attempting to form a new battalion without a staff to assist with all the required reports, man-power and equipment tables and other administrative requirements diverts many man-hours from tactical support especially when developing an MTO&E and justifying the requirements through several levels of review. Essential personnel are considered to be the battalion staff officers, NCO's and clerical personnel. Minimum equipment should include transportation and communications for the battalion staff and these items necessary to provide for minimum clerical job accomplishments. Prompt action of this extent would speed up the promotion of the new organization and relieve others of a large administration burden during tactical operations.

OBSERVATION: (U) When circumstances permit the headquarters which directs such a reorganization should anticipate personnel and equipment needs of the new unit and promptly assign those personnel with authorization to provide the minimum base equipment required to support initial organization activities.

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ITEM: Consolidation of medical supply operations at highest level consistent with the performance of the mission.

DISCUSSION: (U) Brigade mobility is one of the axioms of army operations in Vietnam and a large medical supply operations within a brigade is a hinderance to the mobility of the brigade medical company when it is supported by a Division base. The separate brigade requires a self-sufficient medical supply operation with a capability to sustain itself for extended periods of time. A brigade which is an organic element of a Division need only be able to sustain itself for a period of approximately fifteen days before resupply could be effected. Large quantities of Medical supplies on hand within the brigade increases transportation and storage requirements, and reduces their ability to deploy rapidly.

OBSERVATION: (U) Medical supply operations should be consolidated at the highest level consistent with the operational mission.

ITEM: (U) Planning for movement for Medical Units to tactical areas.

DISCUSSION: Medical units occasionally move into tactical areas (RVN) without planning for the immediate medical treatment, care and evacuation of patients. Sufficient Medical Personnel equipment and supplies must be immediately available to provide this care. Medical personnel preparing for deployment should ship sufficient medical equipment and supplies including Malaria Prophylactic to sustain seven days of combat service including Malaria Prophylactic to sustain seven days of combat service support "RED" or "YELLOW TAT". General cargo shipments seldom arrive with the main body of personnel. Medical personnel should also hand carry a small amount of immediate use medical items in Doctor's bags and aidman's bags. Movements within a combat zone should be planned for as outlined in advance.

OBSERVATIONS: (U) Division Medical Units, Platoons, and Sections must plan for the immediate treatment and evacuation of casualties upon arrival in the tactical area.

ITEM: Enlisted Medical Training, common diseases.

DISCUSSION: (U) Newly arrived enlisted medics are usually trained to care for wounds but are less adequately prepared to care for common diseases such as colds, skin infections, and immersion foot. Since more medical care is devoted to the treatment of diseased states than the care of wounds, most aidmen especially those who care for small isolated units (such as a forward support area), request additional training in managing common disease problems.

OBSERVATION: (U) There is a need for additional training in common disease management for aidmen assigned to remote and/or isolated units within the theater of operations. Additional training for all junior aid men would provide more flexibility in assignment and utili-

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zation. This training should be accomplished prior to arrival in this area. The medical training center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, should consider adding more instruction in the identifying and managing of patients who suffer from common diseases to the program of instruction for basic medical personnel.

ITEM: (U) Bunker construction for medical facilities in combat zone.

DISCUSSION: Medical units occasionally delay preparation of protective bunkers should be planned for and must begin immediately upon arrival in a new operation area. The enemy can be expected to make maximum use of his available firepower during the initial period of occupation.

OBSERVATION: (U) Medical units must be trained to construct defensive facilities immediately upon arrival in a new operational area.

ITEM: (U) Police of Helipads.

DISCUSSION: (U) In the past we've had a few incidents where helicopter blades were damaged due to insecure articles on helipads. In one instance a radio antenna struck and damaged a helicopter blade. Another time a poncho flew into the path of the rotor blades. Both times the blades were damaged to the extent that repair was necessary. This is valuable transportation which was lost due to carelessness.

OBSERVATION: That all areas where helicopters are liable to land be policed thoroughly. Also, personnel in the immediate area should be instructed to secure all gear on their person and in the general vicinity.

D. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

ITEM: (C) Village and Hamlet Sketches.

DISCUSSION: (C) The imagery interpreters in this unit have experimented with making village and hamlet sketches from basic cover photography as a supplement for maps and to display areas of interest for the tactical commander. Many commanders have found these quite useful to pinpoint VC caches, hideouts, living quarters in hamlets, cordon and search operations and map corrections. The interrogation section has also used sketches quite extensively when interrogating a prisoner.

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OBSERVATION: (C) If time is available photography can be very useful as an aid in making accurate sketching for use by the tactical commander, interrogators, returnees, and agents in operations to locate the VC.

E. Logistics.

ITEM: (U) Waterproof Packaging for Photographic Papers.

DISCUSSION: (U) The majority of the projection and contact paper received through supply channels is not protected by waterproof packaging. A great deal of this paper is ruined by exposure to moisture in the form of rain or humidity prior to receipt.

OBSERVATION: Adequate waterproof packaging of photographic papers destined for humid [sic] climates can eliminate unnecessary waste.

ITEM: Replacing Faulty Switchboard Signal Assemblies.

DISCUSSION: (U) While utilizing SB-86 switchboards in 24 hour operation, it occasionally becomes necessary to replace the TA-207P jack field section to replace or repair inoperative drops, jacks or switches. A method of rapidly rewiring a replacement TA-207/P is required to eliminate circuit outages [sic].

OBSERVATION: (U) The following method has been developed to provide a rapid replacement:

a. The SB-86 was originally wired as follows: All telephone lines enter two J-1077/U Junction Boxes; from there to 26 pair cable stubs are connected to the switchboard--one for each TA-207/P.

b. To replace the TA-207/P, first the replacement TA-207/P was pre-wired similarly to the original TA-207/P with another 26 pair cable stub.

c. The faulty TA-207/P was then replaced with the pre-wired replacement.

d. The faulty TA-207/P was then disconnected from the J-1077 and the replacement was connected in its place.

e. Finally the 24 volt power supply and ground were connected to the replacement TA-207/P.

ITEM: (U) Cryptologic Support for the Americal Division.

DISCUSSION: Cryptologic support for the division is provided

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by the 523d Signal Battalion. This support is a function of the Division Signal Office under the HHD TOE 11-36E. Personnel authorized to provide cryptologic support are one Warrant Officer, MOS 721A and one Cryptomaterial Specialist (E4), MOS 72B20. Support is provided through a Crypto Distribution authority within the Division Signal Office and consists of a central office of record and issue and 14 subordinate crypto accounts. Nature of support provided is as follows:

- a. Supervision of third echelon maintenance, including repair or direct exchange and evacuation of equipment.
- b. Accountability for approximately 200 major items of equipment and several hundred other accountable publications, ancillary equipments, etc.
- c. Distribution of low level codes to division units.
- d. Processing of requisitions, issue of material and initiation of accountability of subordinate accounts.
- e. Conducts command inspections of subordinate accounts.
- f. Provides staff assistance to the Division Signal Officer and subordinate accounts on all crypto matters.

OBSERVATION: As organized under TOE 11-36E, personnel authorized to provide crypto support are far below the number actually required to provide effective support. Accordingly, it was necessary to augment the Distribution Authority with one NCO and two additional clerks (all MOS 72B, to provide effective support. These personnel were obtained by withdrawal from other units within the battalion, thus leaving other vital sections short authorized personnel. Due to the size of the crypto accountant the nature of support provided by the Distribution Authority, a Non-commissioned Officer (Preferably SSG E6) should be assigned for duty with the section to act as NCOIC and alternate custodian. (Current regulations require alternates to be E5 for temporary assumption of custodial duties and E6 for normal custodial duty).

ITEM: (U) Getting ice cream to troops in the field.

DISCUSSION: (U) Ice cream has proven to be a big morale factor to troops on continuous field duty. Getting the ice cream to the field un-melted was a problem.

OBSERVATION: (U) By packing hard frozen ice cream in a disposable food kit with a small bag of ice on each side, it was found that the ice cream would remain hard up to five hours. This method has been used a number of times and has worked every time.

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ITEM: (U) The shortcomings of the new handset, H189/GR, for the AN/PRC-25 radios.

DISCUSSION: The shortcomings of the new handset, H-189/U handset, the H-189/GR handset does not possess the durability required for extended tactical operations. The dust cover for the push-to-talk mechanism is composed of an inferior materiel which deteriorates rapidly when exposed to dampness and subjected to continued use. Cracks in the dust cover permit the entry of foreign matter into the push-to-talk switch, causing the mechanism to stick or function sluggishly. This results in "keying" of the radio and substantial reduction in the transmission capability of the entire net.

OBSERVATION: In spite of attempts by RTOs to properly maintain the H-189/GR, the handsets continue to deteriorate. A closely supervised maintenance program is necessary to reduce transmission disruptions during extended tactical operations.

ITEM: (U) Disposable Food Containers

DISCUSSION: (U) Infantry battalions have begun using the disposable food containers and five gallon water containers to resupply patrols working out of base camps. Once the meal is consumed the food containers are destroyed and the lightweight water container is placed on the pack:

OBSERVATION: Disposable food containers and lightweight water containers eliminate the need for resupply helicopters to return to pick-up bulky mermite and five gallon water cans. This allows the helicopters to resupply other units and perform other needed missions which allow improvement in the combat effectiveness of the infantry battalions.

ITEM: (U) Saving Claymore Bags.

DISCUSSION: (U) The majority of troops find it difficult to travel light and still carry a basic load of ammunition for night ambush patrols. The bandoliers that the 5.56 ammunition comes packaged in is ideal for clear weather operations but affords no protection from rain and moisture.

OBSERVATION: (U) There are several reasons for using the claymore bag as it has to large compartments and is very durable. It lasts longer than the bandoliers and gives more protection to the magazines from rain and dirt. On ambushes extra grenades can be carried in the bag with ease and safety. The claymore bag does not hinder the man from gaining access to the ammunition inside the bag.

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The claymore bag is also used to carry M79 rounds; 30 rounds of M79 can be carried in one claymore bag and any man armed with the M79 can carry two claymore bag very easily giving him a total of 60 rounds, the basic load being 27 rounds which he must carry. The regular M79 ammunition bag carries on six rounds

ITEM: (U) Loss of water cans in the field.

DISCUSSION: Battalions were losing water cans at an increasing rate because most of the aerial resupply runs were in the evening and very few were available in the morning. This meant that if a company received water in the evening, the next morning they either have to carry the water cans or destroy them. Since they were already heavily loaded, many times they chose the latter.

OBSERVATION: Disposable water cans have been ordered, but until their arrival, a substitute item has to be found. It was found that the 6 gallon plastic containers that milk was issued in were excellent for this use. All that has to be done was for the gags to be washed out, then filled with water, If the using unit chose to destroy them, there was no monetary loss, and no chance of giving the enemy any materiel thy might be able to work with.

ITEM: (U) Map Supply

DISCUSSION: (U) Experience has shown that for this particular area of Vietnam, the supply of maps has been more responsive when frequent small orders are placed on the supporting map supply depot. Large orders generally present greater problems particularly for air shipment than do the small ones.

OBSERVATION: Small but economical size shipment orders of maps can be processed and transported more rapidly than less frequent bulk orders.

ITEM: (U) Inner tube patch failures.

DISCUSSION: The high incident rate of flat tires in Vietnam presents a significant maintenance problem. The repair of inner tubes with "cold" patches has proven to be generally less satisfactory than using "hot" patches. However, "hot" patches are not available through supply channels. Since "cold" patches do not hold as well, repeated repairs are required, with the inherent expenditure of added manhours.

OBSERVATION: "Hot" patches for repairing inner tubes for vehicle tires should be made available through normal supply channels.

ITEM: (U) Lubrication of vehicles.

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DISCUSSION: Vehicle breakdown frequently occur due to the lack of lubricant on the damaged part. This occurs even though the vehicles have been serviced in accordance with lubrication orders. Sandy areas and monsoon weather combine to break down lubricants leaving moving parts dry and exposed. Because of these factors, lubrication must be accomplished more thoroughly and more frequently than normally.

OBSERVATION: Due to sand and monsoon weather condition, vehicles must be inspected closely and lubricated as required. This will mean that vehicles will be lubricated as much as two or three times as frequently as stated in the applicable lubrication orders.

ITEM: (U) Placement of collapsible POL bags.

DISCUSSION: When collapsible POL bags are emplaced in an operational status, care must be exercised in selecting and preparing the site for the bags. If the selected site is inadequately drained, prolonged water exposure on the underside of the POL bag will accelerate deterioration and rotting, thereby considerably shortening the life of the bag.

OBSERVATION: (U) Well drained locations must be selected when establishing POL locations using collapsible bags to prevent undue deterioration. If necessary, because of the terrain, wooden platforms may have to be constructed to keep the bag from continued exposure to water.

ITEM: (U) Inventory teams for direct support unit supply points.

DISCUSSION: Hastily established supply storage areas particularly for Class II and IV supplies under less than ideal conditions results in accumulations of unrecorded supplies on hand. These supplies must be identified, properly located, inventoried and recorded on the appropriate stoc [sic] record card so they become "available" for customers having valid requirements for the items. Inventory and adjustment teams must be fully exploited in achieving these results.

OBSERVATION: (U) Inventory and adjustment teams serving a most useful function in a direct support supply operation if adequately staffed and utilized. Because of adverse storage conditions in most areas of Vietnam, inventory and adjustment teams must be strengthened beyond the number normally assigned this mission. The resultant accuracy in accounting for supplies and reduction in the number of warehouse refusals more than compensates for the number of men required.

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ITEM: (U) Mortality rate of gas driven pumps.

DISCUSSION: (U) Gasoline driven pumps used for POL, laundry and bath activities have a particularly high deadline rate. This is generally attributable to long hours of operation and adverse climatic conditions. The use of a reserve or backup pump to provide adequate maintenance to be performed on the primary pump results in a marked lengthening of equipment life.

OBSERVATION: (U) Wherever possible, reserve or backup pump(s) should be made available. Through effective utilization of these :: reserve pumps, primary pumps can be maintained properly.

ITEM: (U) Closed Loop Support Program.

DISCUSSION: (U) Implementation of the Closed Loop program has caused a number of problems due to lack of adequate assets to provide the DSU with a working stock, inconsistencies in procedures between various project codes, delays in receipt of turn-in documents from 526th and 633d CC&S Company, and the constantly changing instructions for requisitioning Closed Loop repair parts. The result of this confusion has been a general delay in receipt of parts, additional paperwork for tech supply personnel when requisitions are returned for various reasons, and no single source at the depot where accurate direction may be obtained.

OBSERVATION: (U) The theory of the Closed Loop program must be modified to become flexible enough to accommodate fluctuations in on-hand assets to include zero balance and resulting Red Ball for deadlined vehicles. Specified procedures based on depot and DSU experience should be established by Log Command which will be applicable to all Closed Loop items as the projects are implemented in-country. Separate procedures are necessary for Closed Loop exchange items.

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ITEM: Retrograde shipments

DISCUSSION: There has been an absence of heavy lift capability which is required to move combat loss or otherwise disabled heavy equipment which cannot be rolled. The M48A3 tank, the M107/M110 self-propelled artillery piece, 20 ton cranes, and other heavy equipment in excess of 25 tons are in the class of equipment concerned. There is presently at Chu Lai port, one 60 ton crane which is capable of lifting 25 - 30 tons under ideal conditions but the swing radius is so small, its use in loading barges at dockside is extremely limited. The only lift capability in the weight class required is a barge, derrick which is based at Da Nang under US Navy control. This barge was made available on occasion during the summer months but has not been available during the monsoon season because heavy seas prohibit its movement. the result of this situation is a delay of three to four months thus far in moving equipment to CC&S facilities. Road movement of such items on tank transporters or low bed trailers is prohibited by enemy activity and bridge weigh [sic] restrictions.

OBSERVATION: Until such time as heavy lift capability is available to Chu Lai port, retrograde cargo of the type described above will continue to be delayed. A possible alternative to alleviate the situation would be to move such cargo on tank transporters or low bed trailers which can be loaded in the maintenance area and driven to the port. The trailers would be driven onto LST's for shipment to Qui Nhon or Cam Rahn Bay. Trailers would have to be provided from the depots or CC&S assets as needed.

(U) ITEM: Stock accountability - Closed Loop items

DISCUSSION: At the present time a selected number of major mechanical assemblies are under the Closed LOOP Program. Our Tech Supply accounts for ASL stock by use of ten NCR 500 accounting system which automatically submits requisitions for restocking the ASL when the on hand quantity reaches the recorder [sic] point. The Closed Loop Program requires proof of turn in (DA Form 2765-1) to accompany the requisition before the depot will release an assembly to the unit. When the NCR 500 places the requisition no turn in is submitted. The requisition is returned from the depot as a cancelled requisition because no turn in was submitted. This is time consum- for the depot and it delays the time for the unit to restock its ASL.

OBSERVATION: The only sure method of preventing the above action from taking place is to institute manual stock accounting for all Closed Loop items. This will require additional personnel and will prevent the unit from taking advantage of the NCR 500 stock accounting system.

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ITEM: Replacement of Track shrouds for M113 series vehicles

DISCUSSION: It has been noted that the new M113 series vehicles, when issued to units, are having their track shrouds removed. When the vehicle is turned in for rebuild due to excessive mileage, the shrouds usually do not accompany the vehicle. Other times the shrouds are placed on requisition to cover such things as CMMI, IG Inspections, etc. When the shroud is sent to the unit, it is never put on the vehicle or it may be turned in as excess to the requirement of the unit.

OBSERVATION: If all M113 series vehicles issued to USARV had the shrouds removed, a considerable savings of money and labor would result.

ITEM: Use of Field Medical Regulators

DISCUSSION: Medical Regulators are often available for attachment to a Medical Company from Field Army Medical Supporting Activities. (Medical Groups).

OBSERVATION: When a unit is engaged in an area where evacuations go to two supporting hospital facilities, Field Medical Regulators should be requested to insure equal distribution of patients and for the handling of special category patients and patients with special and/or class of wounds and/or diseases. Air Force evacuation teams are available to provide evacuation by Air Force personnel in most instances where Field Medical Regulators are used. The Combination of the Field Medical Regulator-Air Force Teams have proven most effective in high casualty situations and when immediate Air Force aircraft was the fastest method of evacuation.

(U) ITEM: Replacement of salvaged TO&E tentage

DISCUSSION: Salvaged tentage (TOE) was not replaced because the unit was occupying tin covered buildings.

OBSERVATION: The inability to promptly established a forward clearing section or deploy away from base camp greatly reduces the mobility and capability of a medical company. The ability to expand operations and bed capacity during heavy casualty periods are practically nonexistent.

(U) ITEM: Medical Company TOE's do not authorize individual aid bags for use within the unit.

DISCUSSION: The individual aid bag is an extremely useful item and can be effectively utilized within the Medical Company.

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The mission of the Medical Company includes a requirement to react quickly to emergency medical situations. Aid bags should be available for use by ambulance drivers, medical attendants and aidmen. The aid bag is an effective substitute for a field unit for the emergency vehicles and medical personnel when called upon to perform medical treatment at a location other than the treatment facility.

ITEM: Personnel are arriving in country without the proper amount of spectacles which severely taxes the capability of optical facilities to replace glasses that are broken or lost.

DISCUSSION: Many personnel are arriving in country without the proper amount of spectacles. Replacement of broken glasses represents a substantial effort on the part of in country optical laboratories and non-FOR qualified personnel who require re-examinations and the subsequent fabrication of new spectacles imposes an unnecessary burden upon in country optical resources.

OBSERVATION: All personnel alerted for Vietnam who wear glasses should accomplish required eye examinations and fabrication of authorized spectacles prior to reporting for deployment.

(U) ITEM: The Case, Medical Instrument and Supply Set, Non-rigid #5 FSN 6545-912-9890 designated for use only by medical parachutists is vastly superior to the case presently authorized to be used by the field medical aidman, Case, Medical Instrument and Supply Set, Non-rigid #3 FSN 6545-912-9870.

DISCUSSION: In our operations, Infantry Companies and Battalions often operate independently without resupply for up to four and five days. The small aid bag does not hold sufficient material to reliable support operations for this period of time. The #5 case is a much larger case and is carried on the back by means of a back strap arrangement. The #3 case carried over the shoulder and tends to hinder the movement of the medic when he is in a non-treatment role. The #5 bag being larger holds a greater amount of medical supplies and is particularly valuable in that it is large enough to accommodate bottles of IV fluids. The value of being able to administer IV fluids at the time of wounding or very soon thereafter by the medic has been proven in the prevention of shock. The comparison in the quantity of medical supplies which can be carried by the two bags means the aidman can more effectively perform his treatment mission. The similarity between airmobile assault operations and airborne assault operations is evident. Mobility, maneuverability, and tactical surprise are characteristics of both type operations and the medical aidman's role in both is the same.

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OBSERVATION: The #5 aid bag should be authorized as a standard item of issue and use for all field medical aidmen in the US Army operating in Vietnam. Which of the two bags issued should be the option of the unit surgeon.

(U) ITEM: Removal of artillery rounds from packing containers prior to firing.

DISCUSSION: Some units are removing an excessive number of rounds from packing containers prior to firing.

OBSERVATION: It has been observed that some units are removing an excessive number of rounds from packing containers prior to firing. This poses two problems: (1) The unprotected rounds are exposed to the weather, which may result in malfunctioning; (2) If the unit leaves the area, the rounds must either be taken with them, or given to another unit. The ASP will not accept loose rounds as serviceable turn-ins. Units should keep the number of open containers to a minimum to preclude the above mentioned problems.

(U) ITEM: Coordination of Unit Move.

DISCUSSION: In moving a Brigade by land and air from the Americal Division Area of Operation, the Americal Division Transportation Office experienced difficulty in coordinating the move due to poor communications. Land line communications with the forward area from which the Brigade was moving were very poor in that the Brigade switchboard was dismantled. Even through the Division Transportation Officer made daily liaison visits to the landing zone to coordinate with Brigade Movement Control Officer, sufficient information was not obtained to plan details of the movement for the following day. Since adequate airlift capabilities were not available to meet the requirements, a significant portion of troops and cargo that had originally been designated for air movement were sent by truck convoy. The main problem area was that the Division Transportation Officer did not know the exact number of aircraft sorties and truckloads needed to complete the move. Although information was called in when communications were available, the information was inaccurate.

OBSERVATION: A liaison from the Division Transportation Office should be at the forward location for the duration of the move. Adequate communications should be established. The liaison would control the trucks needed for convoys, and insure that any deviation in the airlift schedule is reported. Since the periods when units are being moved are the busiest times for the Transportation Office, an additional man should be provided for Division Transportation Office from the Division Support Command during the period of a major move.

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(U) ITEM: Base Development and Construction

DISCUSSION: During this period urgent construction requirements have been identified to USARV for MCA funding and for project directives to be issued through MACV to NAVFORV REP DA NANG.

The Class II & IV yard construction is progressing on schedule and the Class V storage area is nearing completion. The quality of construction being performed by the Navy Construction Battalions is exceptional. In addition to these projects four Butler type buildings have been erected to provide urgently required covered storage and a post exchange facility.

The Duc Pho area is being developed into a base camp for the newly arrived 11th Inf Bde. Logistic support facilities are slowly being developed. However, the C-130 capable airfield is deteriorating to the point that a major upgrading project is being considered.

A Base Development Plan for Army facilities at Chu Lai has been submitted to USARV during this period and assets transferred from the Marines to the Army have been identified.

OBSERVATION: 1. Tactical Army units in the I Corps Zone are faced with two major problems by being placed in an area where another service is charged with support, these area:

a. Minimum essential construction requirements is given top priority for engineer effort in the other three Corps in the theater by the US Army Engineer Command. However, in I Corps where the Army is dependent on another service for engineer effort the requirement for protective revetments for helicopters (which is MER) must be put on a formal construction priority list before promulgation. A period of two months has elapsed since development, of the formal construction priority list and yet no construction of revetments, to protect more than one hundred aircraft has begun.

b. Repair and utilities services have been and remain completely unsatisfactory and practically non-existent. Even though an intersevice agreement has been developed for the Navy to provide this service necessary forces for complete services will not be available until June 1968 due to lead time in recruitment of personnel. Under the system proposed all work requests must be screened and approved by an Army agency prior to sending them to the Navy for evaluation and cost estimating. Since there is no Army Post type organization to perform this function spaces have been pulled from tactical units to form a formal screening office. After the request is estimated by the Navy Public Works office the request must then go to another Army command in Da Nang for funding approval because

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there is no funding approval authority at Chu Lai Installation for maintenance or minor new construction. Since the staff and commander that reviews and approves the funding for these projects are so far removed geographicly from Chu Lai many are disapproved even after being carefully screened by the division and the long lead time is not responsive to the commanders requests for minor new construction projects. For example, a maintenance request for materiel to repair a badly deterioriated mess hall was disapproved after a six week processing period and a request to block up, connect electricity and water to four house trailer provided for female nurses quarter, has been in the staffing process for more than four months with negative results.

2. When planning is being accomplished for establishing Army Combat units in the I Corps Zone provisions should be made for responsive engineer effort for minimum essential requirements and for responsive and effective repairs and utilities support. These provisions should come from Army resources and not from another service.

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D. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

SUBJECT: (U) Aerial [sic] Rhotography [sic].

DISCUSSION: (C) Aerial photography and imagery of tactical value is almost non-existent in some areas of I Corps. The primary reasons for this are bad weather conditions and the extremely long time lag from mission request to mission flight to imagery return to the requesting unit. Although the hand held camera program has proven very successful, the hand held camera is only capable of photographing pinpoint targets. If aerial cameras designed for the Army aircraft O-1G or the Air Force O-2 were made available, a source of low level, large scale photography would be available for immediate tactical readout.

RECOMMENDATION: (U) Aerial cameras designed for low level observation aircraft should be made available down to separate brigade level.

E. Logistics.

SUBJECT: (U) The shortcomings of the handset, H-189/GR, for the AN/PRC-25 radio.

BACKGROUND: (C) Battalions have experienced disruptions of communications due the faulty construction of the H-189/GR handset. To reduce malfunctions of the handset a closely supervised maintenance program was initiated by unit commanders. As a field expedient, the push-to-talk mechanism was protected with strips from plastic bags which were taped above and below the dust cover. This prevented foreign matter from entering and interfering with the functioning of the handset.

RECOMMENDATION: (C) It is recommended that the dust cover for the handset H-189/GR be replaced or modified to prevent foreign matter from entering the handset and causing malfunctions.

SUBJECT: (C) Rapid Build-up of COMSEC Capability

BACKGROUND: (C) Programs for issue and utilization of tactical COMSEC equipment, TSEC/KY-28 and TSEC/KY-38 are progressing rapidly. KY-28 equipment will be issued during February and receipt of KY-38 equipment is expected in late February or early March. The Americal Division is programmed to receive 696 TSEC/KY-38 and an initial issue of 50 TSEC/KY-28. Upon receipt of this equipment, cryptologic support will be increased by a minimum of 500%. While plans for issue and use of the equipments progress, no definite plans have been received for additional personnel to account for material and provide maintenance of equipment. Currently only one Warrant Officer

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(MOS721A) and one cryptomaterial clerk (E4, MOS 72B20) are authorized by TOE. Five General Cryptographic Repairmen (MOS 31K20) are authorized, but only three assigned. None are authorized to perform maintenance of TSEC/KY-28 or TSEC/KY-38 equipment, although a limited maintenance class is being programmed by HQ, USARV.

RECOMMENDATION: That some definitive plan be formulated to increase the authorized number of personnel necessary to provide control and maintenance of additional cryptomaterial within the division. The following are considered minimum requirements which will be necessary when all equipment is employed:

Warrant Officer, MOS 721A	1
Cryptomaterial Supervisor (SSG E6)	1
Cryptomaterial Specialist (SP4 E4)	4
General Crypto Repair Supv (SSG E6)	1
General Crypto Repairman (SP5 E5)	5

SUBJECT: Replacement of K1 and K2 Relay Assembly Utilized in TSEC/KW-7 Cipher Machines

BACKGROUND: Failure to the K1 and K2 relay assembly utilized in KW7 Cipher Machines necessitates evacuation of the machine to general support maintenance depots. The division has three General Cryptographic Repairmen assigned and are school trained in cryptographic maintenance. Replacement of these plug-in relays at direct support maintenance level would provide the following benefit:

- a. Decrease in number of machines evacuated.
- b. More effective utilization of maintenance personnel.
- c. Faster and more effective support to subordinate units.
- d. Substantial reduction in number of man hours and aircraft hours required by evacuation of equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a study be made of the feasibility of allowing direct support maintenance replacement of K1 and K2 relays utilized in TSEC/KW7 machines.

SUBJECT: (C) Non-availability of installation kits and "X-Mode" Cables for TSEC/KY8 Speech Security Equipment

BACKGROUND: Attempts to obtain adequate quantities of installation kits and "X-Mode" cables for use with speech security equipment (TSEC/KY8) have for the most part been futile. Since the deployment of Task Force Oregon and subsequent activation as the Americal Division, insufficient quantities of kits and cables has precluded full utilization of secure voice capability within the division. In numerous cases, KY8 equipment is available for use, but cannot

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be utilized due to lack of cables. Inability to fully employ secure voice capability seriously affects the mission and prevents the utilization of expensive security equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recognized that DA policy is to provide non-classified parts and cables through common supply channels rather than through cryptologic channels. However, in view of the difficulty in obtaining the cables and proper distribution within units, it is recommended that these particular items be issued and supported through cryptologic channels.

Section 3, DA Survey Information.

(G) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP).

1. The Americal Division established a LRRP unit on 20 December 1967 with an authorized strength of 3 Officers and 115 Enlisted men from organic personnel resources.

2. To date the Division LRRP has conducted 6 patrol missions during December 1967 and 21 during January 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

NELS A. PARSON, JR
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

Inclosures:

1. Americal Division Troop List
2. Scope of Replacement Training
3. Scope of NCO Leadership Training

AVHGC-DST (8 Feb 68) 1st Ind 8 February 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 11 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GOPP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Reports-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, Americal Division.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning marking a landing zone in low, wet areas, page 53, paragraph B; and page 74, paragraph B: Concur. USARV request for 10,000 floating smoke grenades has been validated by DA under ENSURE 231.

b. Reference item concerning plotting multiple missions on the 6400M firing chart, page 54, paragraph B; and page 74, paragraph B: Non-concur. Smaller target grids and target grids of different colors are considered impractical in that the smaller grid could cause greater inaccuracies in plotting in the event adjustment corrections plot off the smaller grid. This would also create the requirement for different size grids because of range variances of different caliber weapons. Likewise, target grids of different colors would depart from the standard color scheme used on firing charts pertaining to deflection indices and battery and radar locations (red - ALPHA; white or black - BRAVO; blue - CHARLIE; and green - radar). Designation of an alternate battery center in quadrant opposite the quadrant in heavy use as standard practice would require considerable additional training of FDC personnel and would also increase the probability of errors which could lead to needless artillery accidents.

c. Reference item concerning CS drum drops using the M173A1 and M157 bomb fuzes, page 57, paragraph B; and page 74, paragraph B. ?The M173 and M157 point detonating fuzes are field expedient means employed to burst 55-gallon drums of bulk CS dropped from aircraft. They were not designed to be employed as utilized by the Americal Division. The XM920

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E2 fuze and burster assembly is being developed under the provisions of ENSURE to provide a standard and efficient means of detonating CS drums. This system will allow low level drops and will satisfy the requirements of the Americal Division.

d. Reference item concerning enlisted medical training in common diseases, page 60, paragraph C; and page 74, paragraph C: Nonconcur. Instruction, consistent with environmental and operational conditions, can best be presented by the unit surgeon and unit senior aidmen.

e. Reference item concerning the shortcomings of the Handset H-189/GR, page 64, paragraph E; and page 75, paragraph E: Concur. Handset H-189/GR was designed to replace the H-138/U. It is an improvement over the older item, but its durability has been questioned before. The fact that the handset is not rugged enough to withstand the stress of combat in Vietnam has been reported by USARV to the US Army Electronics Command. USAECOM has informally advised that they are aware of the problem and the laboratories are working toward a solution.

f. Reference item concerning aerial photography, page 75, paragraph E: Nonconcur. At the present time no plans exist to equip O-1 or O-2 aircraft with aerial cameras for low level, large scale photo coverage. However, when the goal of providing an aerial surveillance and target acquisition platoon to each division is achieved, the division commander will have a source of aerial photography immediately responsive to him. In the meantime, the assets of the 245th AS Company, stationed in Da Nang, are available to the Americal Division to provide such coverage. This company can provide responsive support. Also, the hand-held cameras, program will be expanded by the addition of Polaroid hand-held cameras, which are expected to begin arriving in RVN in June 1968. The expanded hand-held camera program will provide another source of aerial photography which is responsive to the needs of the tactical commander.

g. Reference item concerning rapid buildup COMSEC capability, page 75, paragraph E. Neither TSEC/KY-28 nor TSEC/KY-38 are included in MTOE for Americal signal battalions. Upon, or prior to, receipt of equipment, the division should submit MTOE including the items and realigning maintenance personnel. These MTOE's should provide trade-off from within

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authorized strength allowances. UP AR 611-201, Crypto Repair Supervisors may be authorized only for supervision of six to eleven specialists. The recommended Crypto-material Supervisor (E6) is authorized only for supervision of more than seven personnel. An E5 supervisor is authorized for supervision of five to seven personnel. No provision is made for supervision for four personnel. Standards of grade authorization for four Crypto-material Specialists are two E3's and two E4's. Signal manpower authorization criteria is contained in AR 310-32, Appendix VII.

h. Reference item concerning replacement of the K1 and K2 relay assembly in TSEC/KW-7 Cipher Machine, page 76, paragraph E. Concur. Replacement of the K1 and K2 relay assembly in KW-7 Cipher Machines at direct support maintenance level appears reasonable. Further evaluation will be made by USARV to determine feasibility. If found feasible, a recommendation will be forwarded to CG, USASTRATCOM for decision and, if necessary, implementation.

i. Reference item concerning nonavailability of installation kits and "x-mode" cables for TSEC/KY-8 speech security, page 76, paragraph E: Nonconcur. X-mode cables used with Secure Voice Device, KY-8 have been in short supply Army-wide for several months. However, USARV has received over 600 of these cables during 1968 and distribution to field units is continuing. Item has been assigned a valid Federal Stock Number and is now available through normal requisitioning channels.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C.S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ Americal Div

GPOP-DT (8 Feb 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Americal Div, for
Period Ending 31 Jan 68, RCS CSFOR- 65 (R1)

HQ, US Army Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 ARP 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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AMERICAL DIVISION TROOP LIST

(AS OF 31 Jan 68)

1. HQ AMERICAL DIVISION

HHC, Americal Div

14th Cbt Avn Bn (Attached)

71st Aslt Hel Co

174th Aslt Hel Co

176th Aslt Hel Co

178th Aslt Hel Co

1st Sqdn, 1st Cav

26th Engr Bn

39th Engr Bn (Cbt) (Attached)

123 Avn Bn

496th Trans Det (Attached)

449th Sig Det (Attached)

523d Sig Bn

23d Admin Co

23d MP Co

258th AG Pers Svc Co (Attached)

E Co, 51st Inf LRP

Trp C, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav (Attached)

3d Mil Hist Det (Attached)

4th Plat, 29th CA Co (OPCON)

6th Plat, 29th CA Co (OPCON)

O/L6, Det 31, 5th Weather Sqdn (USAF) (OPCON)

Americal Combat Center (PROV)

Tactical Air Control Party (USAF) (OPCON)

601st Radio Research Det (Attached)

Military Intelligence Det (PROV)

INCL1

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2. AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

HQB, Div Arty

3d Bn, 16th Arty (Attached)

Btry B, 2d Bn, 11th Arty (Attached)

3d Bn, 18th Arty (Attached)

W Btry, 2d Bn, 11 Mar (OPCON)

3d Plat, G Btry, 29th Arty (OPCON)

4th Sec, 1st Plat, G Btry, 65th Arty (OPCON)

3. AMERICAL DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC and Band, Support Command

23 S&T Bn

Hqs & A Co, 23 Med Bn

Hqs & Maint Spt Co, 723d Maint Bn

4. 11th LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Lt Inf Bde

3d Bn, 1st Inf

4th Bn, 3d Inf

1st Bn, 20th Inf

6th Bn, 11th Arty

6th Spt Bn

Trp E, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav

90th Chem Det

415th Radio Research Det

52d MI Det

11th Sig Plat

31st Public Information Det

INCL1

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5. 196th LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE
HHC, 196th Lt Inf Bde

2d Bn, 1st Inf

3d Bn, 21st Inf

4th Bn, 31st Inf

3d Bn, 82d Arty

8th Spt Bn

Trp F, 17th Armd Cav

156th Sig Plat

10th Public Information Det

27th Cml Det

408th Radio Research Det

569th MI Det

48th Inf Plat, Scout Dog

U.S. Army Combat Tracker Team No. 10 (Prov)

6. 198th LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Lt Inf Bde

1st Bn 6th Inf

1st Bn, 46th Inf

1st Bn, 52nd Inf

1st Bn, 14th Arty

9th Spt Bn

H Trp, 17th Cav

87th Chem Det

48th Public Information Det

635th MI Det

49th Sig Det

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7. 3d BRIGADE, 4th INFANTRY DIVISION

HHC, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1st Bn, 14th Inf

1st Bn, 35th Inf

2nd Bn, 35th Inf

2nd Bn, 9th Arty

Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav

3d Spt Bn (Prov)

Co D, 725th Maint Bn

Co B, 65th Engr Bn

Co D, 65th Engr Bn

Co B (-), 124th Sig Bn

Team C, 41st CA Co

Det, 374th Radio Research Co

4th Inf Plat, Scout Dog

SCOPE OF REPLACEMENT TRAINING

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
In-Country Orientation	9 1/2	Customs of the people; geography of I CTZ area; current operations; VC/NVA tactics, techniques, uniforms and equipment; Div operating procedures and lessons learned; handling of PWs weapons, equipment and document; sentry duty; civil affairs (civic action); safeguarding the remains and effects of deceased US personnel; savings; Geneva Convention; and history of the Division.
Security Indoctrination	1	Instruction in Armed Forces Censorship; Defense against Subversion and Espionage; Safeguarding Defense Information, SAEDA; and Clandestine Surveillance and Listening Devices.
Field Sanitation & Personnel Hygiene; Combat First Aid	1 1/2	Field sanitation; prevention of disease; battle-field police; construction of latrines and garbage sumps; mosquito control; malaria prevention and water purification; Basic lifesaving techniques; type wounds; snake bites; disease; heat exhaustion; evacuation of wounded and the use of morphine and other drugs.
Basic Map Reading	6	Compass; UTN grid system; use of marginal data; intersection, resection, and pacing. Practical Exercise: Night Compass Course
Offensive & Defensive	3	Introduction to US and VC/NVA offensive tactics and defensive tactics.
TOTAL	21	

SCOPE OF REPLACEMENT TRAINING

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
Tactical Air Support	1/2	Type of aircraft, available ordnance, mission and FAC procedures
Air Mobile Operations instruction	1	Helicopter characteristics, capabilities, employment and SOP. Students with combat MOS receive on loading and unloading techniques.
Weapons Familiarizing & Zero	10	Rifle zeroing; M16 familiarization firing; M79 grenade launcher; M60 machinegun and M72 (LAW); Claymore mine.
Mech Tng, Care & Cleaning, M16, M60, M72 & M79	4	Characteristics, nomenclature and employment of weapons; Proper procedures in care and cleaning equipment, and PM indicators.
Demolitions	2	The use of C4; TNT detonating cord; firing system; placement of charges; clearing of LZs and DZs; destruction of obstacles and fortifications.
Mine Detection	2	Use and maintenance of mine detector equipment; employment.
Communications	2	Infantry squad communications equipment, use and maintenance. Radio procedures and field expedient antennas.
TOTAL	21 1/2	

SCOPE OF REPLACEMENT TRAINING

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
Mines & Booby Traps	2	Characteristics; casualty producing effect; employment; detection and comparison of US and NVA mines and booby traps.
Patrolling	7	Patrol organization; order ; equipment, employment of scout dogs; reporting information; arm and hand signals; and application of lessons learned.
Convoy Procedures & Safety	1	Convoy procedures; vehicle safety; accidents; injuries; fatalities and accident prevention.
Adjustment of Arty Fire	1	Element of the fire requests; type, missions; ammunition characteristics; organization of mortar sections and artillery batteries. PE in adjustment of live fire and rules of engagement.
Ambush/Counter Ambush	13	VC/NVA and US ambush; counterambush; employment of weapons; use of Claymore; movement; searching techniques and fire discipline. Practical Exercise: Conduct of Live Fire Ambush
Mine & Booby Trap Confidence Courses	2	PE requiring students to negotiate a confidence course marked with trail markers; avoidance; detection and destruction techniques; mines; booby traps; bunkers and other emplacements.
Special infrared, Equipment	2	New and special equipment; staflight [sic] scope intrusion devices, sniper equipment, etc.
TOTAL	28	

SCOPE OF REPLACEMENT TRAINING

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
Claymore (M18A1)	1	Characteristics; safety and employment of M18A1 (claymore)
M26 participate	1 1/2	Characteristics; safety; casualty producing effects and employment. Each student will in a practical exercise requiring him to throw a live M26 grenade.
Review & Critique	1	A final critique of class performance is conducted at the conclusion of each class. Students are offered the opportunity to ask any questions and discuss any points they desire.
Gas Chamber Exercise	1	Proper masking techniques and participation in a gas chamber exercise in a CS environment
TOTAL	4 1/2	
COURSE TOTAL	75	

SCOPE OF NCO LEADERSHIP COURSE

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
Principles of Leadership	1	The class serves as the introduction to follow. The principles of leadership are introduced stressing the accomplishment of the mission as the paramount consideration.
Weapons Training	3	Familiarization with M16, M79, 81mm mortar and 105mm howitzer is covered in this class. The characteristics, nomenclature, ammunition, tactical employment and common deficiencies noted in Vietnam are discussed and elaborated upon
Physical Training	10	Army Drill #1 with run is accomplished at the squad level under the supervision of a student leader. The student is graded on his leadership qualities against an established criteria.
First Aid	3	This period includes a review of the four basic lifesaving techniques, a discussion of special type wounds and the first aid for each, use of morphine and other drugs, care of the feet, removal of foreign bodies from the eyes, snake bites, the effects of heat, malaria preventative practices, and transportation of the sick and wounded. Demonstrations and practical exercises continue throughout the period.
Radio Telephones Procedures	1	Students will be instructed on the proper use of the AN/PRC-25 radio; selection of a site for radio operation; netting procedures; the use of password phonetic alphabet and its use in radio transmission proper use of authentication systems and message writing to include encoding and decoding.
Field Expedient Antennas	1	The student will be instructed (with appropriate demonstrations) on field expedient means of erecting and supporting antennas to include a vertical antenna on a pole or tree, a vertical wire antenna between two trees, a center fed half-wave antenna, an end fed half-wave antenna, a full wave antenna, a long wire and the half-rhombic antenna. The use of a field wire as a substitute for antennas, field expedient means for repairing broken antennas, an field expedient substitutes for insulators will be discussed.
TOTAL:	<u>19</u>	

INCLOSURE 3

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
Map Reading	7	This class reviews the essential elements of map reading. The reading of grid coordinates is reviewed. The declination diagram, map marginal information, military symbols and topographic symbols are studied. Interpretation of contour lines to determine ground topographic is included. Intersection and resection is elaborated upon. Close individual attention by AI's is given to student problem areas throughout the class.
Map Reading Exam	1	Evaluates map reading proficiency.
Land Navigation	3	This class begins with a discussion of the use of the lensatic compass. Following this discussion, students are broken down into fire teams, assigned problems and directed to execute a compass march with frequent azimuth changes.
Field Sanitation	1	The need for field sanitation is discussed. Included is a general discussion of water supply, including sources and individual purification measures. Improvised sanitary devices, hand washing devices and drainage devices are discussed. Waste disposal includes types of wastes, construction and placement of latrines, urinals, grease traps, seakage pits and disposal of garbage and trash is elaborated upon. Field sanitation lessons learned are duscussed [sic].
Airmobile Operations	1	The class includes a study of the elementary tactics involved in an airmobile operation. Also covered are the characteristics of rotary wing aircraft, aircraft landing formations, airmobile resupply techniques and considerations, and landing zone security considerations, types of helicopter operations and helicopter medical evacuation procedures.
Landing Zone Selection and Terminal Guidance	1	This period of instruction familiarizes the student with the requirements of a good landing zone and with terminal guidance, techniques used in the field. This period covers the considerations which go into selection of a landing site to include the mission, number of aircraft involved, ground slope, approaches to and from the landing site, and influence of winds and communication. The terminal guidance portion of the class elaborates upon use of communications, arm and hand signals, night light-devices and field expedient guidance devices.
TOTAL	14	
INCL 3 -1	93	

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
Leader Reaction Course	3	This class tests leadership potential through the medium of a county-fair type proficiency test. At each of ten separate stations, students are presented a situation to which they must present a proper solution. All situations are oriented to the squad leader. Students are evaluated against an established criteria.
Maintenance of the M16E1	2	The class includes a discussion of functioning; those main groups which may be disassembled by the user; subassemblies which may be disassembled by the user; effect of dampness on wood parts; those parts which require oil and those which do not; the effects of over lubrication and under lubrication; care of magazines.
Joint Air-Ground Operations System	2	This basic class will include the capabilities of the 7th Air Force to support the Division. The tactical air request system, tactics and techniques of strike control weapons effects and capabilities of reconnaissance aircraft will be discussed.
Mines and Booby Traps	4	This instruction includes the US Claymore mine, its characteristics, capabilities and methods of employment. VC mines (including Claymore types) and booby traps are elaborated on. Methods of detection and disarming VC mines and booby traps are studied. Instruction includes practical work in arming and disarming live and simulated US and VC mines. A walk through a jungle lane set up with common booby traps is included.
Demolitions	2	Class includes the characteristics of explosives to include primacord, C4 and TNT. It includes instruction in the various firing devices and firing systems. Destruction of bunkers, tunnels and other fortifications is covered. Clearing of LZ's by the use of explosives and rigging of field expedient flame producing devices are elaborated upon. Practical exercises include the application of techniques learned in the class.
Adjustment of Artillery Fire	2	This block of instruction provides the Student with the tools necessary to call and adjust all types of artillery and mortar fire. The class covers the general characteristics and nomenclature of
TOTAL	<u>15</u>	

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
Adjustment of Artillery fire		weapons and ammunition, elements of firing data, map and azimuth terms, adjustment procedures, fire requests, and the different types of missions. The practical application includes calling in fire missions with the adjustment of fire (simulated).
General Subjects and Weapons Exam	1	This test evaluates individual proficiency in weapons and general subjects.
Squad Reaction Course	4	The squad reaction course is a live fire problem requiring students to lead a squad through a simulated fire fight. The problem includes breaching of man-made obstacles, recognition and engagement of enemy fires, fire and movement, destruction of bunkers and consolidation and reorganization. Every member of the class will function either as a squad leader or team leader. Leaders will be graded against an established grading scale.
Anti-Sniper Training	1	This class will include recognition of enemy weapons fire. Actual enemy weapons will be fired to demonstrated their sound and cyclic rate. Target detection, counter-sniper measures, the use of camouflage and concealment will also be covered.
Patrolling	3	This class examine general an special organization. Types of patrols, patrol orders, special patrolling equipment and LRRP techniques are covered.
Infiltration/Exfiltration Techniques	1	This class covers infiltration/exfiltration techniques, to include: (1) rappeling from helicopters, (2) stay behind infiltration, (3) contact and direction of aircraft without radio, and (4) escape and evasion. The escape and evasion phase encompasses disarming techniques and living off the land.
Combat Patrol	12	This class covers type missions, patrol elements, the natural order, rehearsals, central measures, formations and equipment as each applies to the combat patrol. A patrol leader is designated and given a mission, he issues a patrol order, goes through appropriate troop leading procedures, rehearses the patrol and acts as leader through the patrol. Members of the patrol accomplish missions as directed by the
TOTAL	<u>22</u>	
	4	

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
Combat Patrol		patrol leader. Accompanying lane graders provide supervision, guidance, and critique as required by the situation. Personnel designated leaders are graded against an established criteria.
Reconnaissance Patrols	10	This block of instruction revives previously learned skills and provides for the preparation and actual conduct of a night reconnaissance patrol. Covered is the purpose of reconnaissance patrol, essential elements of information, elements of the patrol, patrol planning in the patrol in the patrol leaders briefing and debriefing. All students plan the patrol while going through proper troop leading procedures. A patrol leader is selected and actual patrol followed by a debriefing and critique is conducted.
Patrolling Exam	1	This test evaluates patrolling proficiency.
Tactical Operations	20	This class covers platoon formations, operation orders, techniques of fire and maneuver, common small unit offensive tactics (i.e., encirclement, rabbit hunt, hammer and anvil) employment of supporting fires, and use of scout dogs in offensive operations. The instruction includes a combat operation one of the aforementioned types or combination thereof. Emphasis is placed upon finding the enemy, offensive techniques and formations. (A student chain of command is designated to execute troop leaders procedures, issue appropriate orders and lead the combat operation. The student leaders are graded according to an established standard.) During the defensive phase (perimeter type defense) organization of terrain, employment of weapons, issuance of operations orders, planning of supporting fires, use of scout dogs in the defense and troop leading procedures are covered. An actual combat operation is conducted under student leadership and students are graded against an established scale.
Tactics Exam	1	This test evaluates tactical knowledge.
The Individual Soldiers role in Psychological Warfare	1	Introduction to Psychological Warfare and its purpose. Discussion on winning population to gain intelligence and support; on individual behavior of the soldier based on Vietnamese customs; on importance
TOTAL	<u>33</u>	5 of Chieu Hoi Program; on importance of

	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>
The Individual Soldier's Role in Psychological Warfare		treatment of prisoners to reduce enemy combat effectiveness.
The Role of the Small Unit in Revolutionary Development	1	Discussion of the Revolutionary Development Program. The aspects of missions that could be assigned small units in support of the program (i.e., security, defense, population and resources control, technical assistance) are discussed. Importance of assisting people to assist themselves in discussed. A conference is held on ways and means small units can support this program.
Ambush/Counter Ambush Operations	17	This class covers US ambush and counter-ambush techniques; VC/NVA ambush and counter-ambush techniques; employment of weapons and special equipment; terrain analysis and organization of terrain; establishment of SOP's. Lessons Learned are stressed throughout the instruction. A student leader is designated and given an actual mission. He issues an order, goes through appropriate troop leading procedures and acts as leader of the ambush force.
Methods of Instruction	6	Preparation for and presentation of classes include practical exercises by each student.
TOTAL	24	
COURSE TOTAL	127 Hours	